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  1. 040 経済学部
  2. 30 研究報告等
  3. 01 Working Papers
  4. No.23
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 07 テクニカルレポート

Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly

http://hdl.handle.net/10191/598
http://hdl.handle.net/10191/598
f0f69347-f2c2-45fd-9f43-0a179d406c8b
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
9_0004.pdf 9_0004.pdf (1.6 MB)
Item type テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1)
公開日 2013-10-07
タイトル
タイトル Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly
タイトル
言語 en
タイトル Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Mixed oligopoly
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Strategic contract
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Subsidy
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Privatization
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
タイプ technical report
著者 Serizawa, Nobuko

× Serizawa, Nobuko

WEKO 175737

Serizawa, Nobuko

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著者別名
識別子 175738
識別子Scheme WEKO
姓名 芹澤, 伸子
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 This paper investigates the effect of production subsidies in a mixed duopoly in which the owners of firms provide strategic incentives to their managers. When the asymmetric subsidy is introduced to the public firm, it is shown that neither industry output nor welfare can be changed. this means that the optimal level of such subsidy in a mixed duopoly must be zero. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, it is shown that the government should privatize the public firm by arranging for an asymmetric subsidy when there are two firms in a market.
書誌情報 Working Papers
en : Working Papers

巻 23, p. 2-13, 発行日 1999-03
権利
権利情報 新潟大学経済学部
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
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