{"created":"2021-03-01T06:39:34.761810+00:00","id":33190,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"364909a2-dad3-4339-8991-53673167e7ac"},"_deposit":{"id":"33190","owners":[],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"33190"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00033190","sets":["163:444:1866:1872","453:460"]},"item_11_biblio_info_6":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"1999-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"13","bibliographicPageStart":"2","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"23","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Working Papers"},{"bibliographic_title":"Working Papers","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_11_description_4":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper investigates the effect of production subsidies in a mixed duopoly in which the owners of firms provide strategic incentives to their managers. When the asymmetric subsidy is introduced to the public firm, it is shown that neither industry output nor welfare can be changed. this means that the optimal level of such subsidy in a mixed duopoly must be zero. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, it is shown that the government should privatize the public firm by arranging for an asymmetric subsidy when there are two firms in a market.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_11_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"175738","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"芹澤, 伸子"}]}]},"item_11_rights_15":{"attribute_name":"権利","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"新潟大学経済学部"}]},"item_11_select_19":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"publisher"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Serizawa, Nobuko"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"175737","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2019-09-10"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"9_0004.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.6 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"9_0004.pdf","url":"https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/33190/files/9_0004.pdf"},"version_id":"31065850-2317-42ee-bbaf-8e4311fec4c4"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Mixed oligopoly","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Strategic contract","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Subsidy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Privatization","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly"},{"subitem_title":"Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"11","owner":"1","path":["460","1872"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-10-07"},"publish_date":"2013-10-07","publish_status":"0","recid":"33190","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Strategic incentives in a subsidized mixed duopoly"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":null},"updated":"2022-12-15T04:03:24.965262+00:00"}