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  1. 040 経済学部
  2. 20 紀要
  3. 02 新潟大学経済論集
  4. 第88号
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 03 紀要論文

On the Existence and uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players : A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach

http://hdl.handle.net/10191/12631
http://hdl.handle.net/10191/12631
1c66d5d5-1b4d-4dbe-a295-bd51388a3d38
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
88_51-66.pdf 88_51-66.pdf (1.4 MB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2010-03-29
タイトル
タイトル On the Existence and uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players : A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach
タイトル
言語 en
タイトル On the Existence and uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players : A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Rent Seeking
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Risk Aversion
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Fixed Point Theorem
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
著者 Yamazaki, Takeshi

× Yamazaki, Takeshi

WEKO 158602

Yamazaki, Takeshi

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著者別名
識別子 158603
識別子Scheme WEKO
姓名 山崎, 剛志
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 Yamazaki (2009) proves that if each player's measure of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing in his or her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a general rentseeking game with risk-averse players, where their attitude toward risk and production functions for lotteries can differ among players. We examine cumulative best replies of players in the game to prove the same result, while Yamazaki (2009) studies share functions of the players to prove the result.
書誌情報 新潟大学経済論集
en : 新潟大学経済論集

巻 88, p. 51-66, 発行日 2010-03
出版者
出版者 新潟大学経済学会
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 02861569
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AN00183269
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
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