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Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model
http://hdl.handle.net/10191/20409
0383b8b8-b72b-4699-a779-dc2eb03cb9b4
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション | |
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2012-11-01 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | contest | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | lobbying | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | public good | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | rent-seeking | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | tariff | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
著者 |
Takeshi, Yamazaki
× Takeshi, Yamazaki |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper presents a simple two-stage lobbying competition model of tariff determination. In the first stage, domestic firms lobby for tariff protection, an anti-tariff group of domestic consumers or foreign firms lobbies against tariff protection and then the government sets a specific tariff rate. In the second stage, given the tariff rate determined in the first stage, domestic and foreign firms set their output level à la Cournot. This paper will show in the lobbying competition model with a specific functional form that the equilibrium tariff rate can be a non-monotone function of the number of agents in an interest group. | |||||
書誌情報 |
新潟大学経済論集 en : 新潟大学経済論集 巻 93, p. 53-73, 発行日 2012-09 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 新潟大学経済学会 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 02861569 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN00183269 | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | publisher |