{"_buckets": {"deposit": "5fc915f3-0f12-4917-a395-b68f1d40dddd"}, "_deposit": {"id": "27177", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "27177"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00027177"}, "item_7_biblio_info_6": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2012-09", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicPageEnd": "73", "bibliographicPageStart": "53", "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "93", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "\u65b0\u6f5f\u5927\u5b66\u7d4c\u6e08\u8ad6\u96c6"}, {"bibliographic_title": "\u65b0\u6f5f\u5927\u5b66\u7d4c\u6e08\u8ad6\u96c6", "bibliographic_titleLang": "en"}]}]}, "item_7_description_4": {"attribute_name": "\u6284\u9332", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "This paper presents a simple two-stage lobbying competition model of tariff determination. In the first stage, domestic firms lobby for tariff protection, an anti-tariff group of domestic consumers or foreign firms lobbies against tariff protection and then the government sets a specific tariff rate. In the second stage, given the tariff rate determined in the first stage, domestic and foreign firms set their output level \u00e0 la Cournot. This paper will show in the lobbying competition model with a specific functional form that the equilibrium tariff rate can be a non-monotone function of the number of agents in an interest group.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_7_publisher_7": {"attribute_name": "\u51fa\u7248\u8005", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "\u65b0\u6f5f\u5927\u5b66\u7d4c\u6e08\u5b66\u4f1a"}]}, "item_7_select_19": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005\u7248\u30d5\u30e9\u30b0", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "publisher"}]}, "item_7_source_id_11": {"attribute_name": "\u66f8\u8a8c\u30ec\u30b3\u30fc\u30c9ID", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "AN00183269", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "NCID"}]}, "item_7_source_id_9": {"attribute_name": "ISSN", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "02861569", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "ISSN"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "\u8457\u8005", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Takeshi, Yamazaki"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "158481", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "\u30d5\u30a1\u30a4\u30eb\u60c5\u5831", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2019-08-20"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "93_53-73.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "4.2 MB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 4200000.0, "url": {"label": "93_53-73.pdf", "url": "https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/27177/files/93_53-73.pdf"}, "version_id": "61aa5cf7-30f8-428e-9c19-a01068bdc939"}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "\u30ad\u30fc\u30ef\u30fc\u30c9", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "contest", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "lobbying", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "public good", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "rent-seeking", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "tariff", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "\u8a00\u8a9e", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "\u8cc7\u6e90\u30bf\u30a4\u30d7", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "departmental bulletin paper", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]}, "item_title": "Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "\u30bf\u30a4\u30c8\u30eb", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model"}, {"subitem_title": "Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model", "subitem_title_language": "en"}]}, "item_type_id": "7", "owner": "1", "path": ["453/456", "163/164/1432/1444"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/10191/20409", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "\u516c\u958b\u65e5", "attribute_value": "2012-11-01"}, "publish_date": "2012-11-01", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "27177", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Competition Model"], "weko_shared_id": null}