@article{oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00006714,
 author = {Okuguchi, Koji},
 journal = {Review of economics and information studies, Review of economics and information studies},
 month = {Jul},
 note = {Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998) generalized Long and Soubeyran's lobbying model of protection. They also constructed a simple numerical example with the linear inverse demand and cost functions to illustrate a paradoxical result in which entry of a new domestic firm leads to an increase in the domestic incumbents' profits. This paper shows that the paradoxical result occurs even if cost functions are quadratic. Numerical examples in this paper, together with the one in Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998), indicate that the paradoxical result is more likely if the number of domestic firms is small and if the number of foreign firms is large.},
 pages = {27--35},
 title = {Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection},
 volume = {1},
 year = {1999}
}