{"_buckets": {"deposit": "f14f025e-f207-42a3-aacb-129e48342963"}, "_deposit": {"id": "6714", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "6714"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00006714", "sets": ["456", "668"]}, "item_7_biblio_info_6": {"attribute_name": "書誌情報", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "1999-07", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicPageEnd": "35", "bibliographicPageStart": "27", "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "1", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Review of economics and information studies"}, {"bibliographic_title": "Review of economics and information studies", "bibliographic_titleLang": "en"}]}]}, "item_7_description_4": {"attribute_name": "抄録", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998) generalized Long and Soubeyran\u0027s lobbying model of protection. They also constructed a simple numerical example with the linear inverse demand and cost functions to illustrate a paradoxical result in which entry of a new domestic firm leads to an increase in the domestic incumbents\u0027 profits. This paper shows that the paradoxical result occurs even if cost functions are quadratic. Numerical examples in this paper, together with the one in Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998), indicate that the paradoxical result is more likely if the number of domestic firms is small and if the number of foreign firms is large.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_7_full_name_3": {"attribute_name": "著者別名", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "54040", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}], "names": [{"name": "Yamazaki, Takeshi"}]}]}, "item_7_publisher_7": {"attribute_name": "出版者", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "岐阜聖徳学園大学"}]}, "item_7_relation_31": {"attribute_name": "異版である", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_type": "isVersionOf", "subitem_relation_type_id": {"subitem_relation_type_id_text": "http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110000971630", "subitem_relation_type_select": "URI"}}]}, "item_7_rights_15": {"attribute_name": "権利", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_rights": "Copyright(C)2001岐阜聖徳学園大学"}, {"subitem_rights": "本文データは発行元の許諾に基づきCiNiiから複製したものである"}]}, "item_7_select_19": {"attribute_name": "著者版フラグ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "publisher"}]}, "item_7_source_id_11": {"attribute_name": "書誌レコードID", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "AA11833171", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "NCID"}]}, "item_7_source_id_9": {"attribute_name": "ISSN", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "13453998", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "ISSN"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "著者", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Okuguchi, Koji"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "54039", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "ファイル情報", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2019-08-06"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "110000971630.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "425.2 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 425200.0, "url": {"label": "110000971630.pdf", "url": "https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/6714/files/110000971630.pdf"}, "version_id": "af712148-d393-4081-b467-fd1ff5b455b6"}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "キーワード", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "Lobbying", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "protection", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "tariff", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "言語", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "資源タイプ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "departmental bulletin paper", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]}, "item_title": "Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "タイトル", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection"}, {"subitem_title": "Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection", "subitem_title_language": "en"}]}, "item_type_id": "7", "owner": "1", "path": ["456", "668"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/10191/30390", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "公開日", "attribute_value": "2014-11-17"}, "publish_date": "2014-11-17", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "6714", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection"], "weko_shared_id": null}