@article{oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00027160,
author = {Yamazaki, Takeshi},
journal = {新潟大学経済論集, 新潟大学経済論集},
month = {Sep},
note = {There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent-seeking contest. First, the effectiveness of agent's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent-seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. Without assuming that each player's production function for lotteries is differentiable, Yamazaki (2008) proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a general rent-seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players. In this article, assuming the differentiability of each player's production function for lotteries, we give a simple proof of Yamazaki's (2008) result.},
pages = {99--115},
title = {On the Unique Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests},
volume = {95},
year = {2013}
}