@article{oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001637,
 author = {Hamada, Kojun},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {"This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model. We show that even if governments choose export subsidies in whichever of a simultaneousmove\nor sequential-move game, the leader firm always loses its first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. Furthermore, we examine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover advantage occurs with regard to profit and welfare under the endogenous timing of subsidies."},
 pages = {407--415},
 title = {Second-mover Advantage under Strategic Subsidy Policy in a Third Market Model},
 volume = {29},
 year = {2009}
}