

# End of World War II and Formation of New World System

Buyanlham Tumurjav

## 要 旨

本論文は、1945 年の第 2 次世界大戦終結以降 1960 年代までの東アジア諸国の国際関係を論じる。まず、第二次大戦後の東アジアの国際関係および世界秩序を規定した 1944 年のヤルタ秘密協定締結にいたるアメリカの中国、ソ連認識を検討した。この過程で、アメリカは中国戦線で国共両勢力が対日戦に共同してあたることを促すと同時に、アメリカの国内的要因もあって、東アジア戦線での参戦をソ連に促し、ヤルタ会談にいたったことを明らかにする。さらにヤルタ秘密協定に対する中国側の反応、中ソ友好同盟条約締結にいたる経緯、およびヤルタ秘密協定における外モンゴルの地位についての中国側の対応についても検討した。そして、ヨーロッパの東西対立が、中国共産党の内戦の勝利の結果、東アジアにも波及したことを検証した。

**Key words:** North East Asia, World War II, Yalta agreement

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## 1. Prologue

In this Chapter, the main focus will be given to the world structure right after the World War II. This period is significant period not only to the study of North East Asian countries but also to the whole world. Prior to analyzing the Yalta conference and its outcomes there is a need to review the

American policy with regard to China and the Soviet Union in 1944-1945 to get a clear picture why the Americans sought to secure the Soviet entry into the Pacific war.

## **2. American views on China and the Soviet Union**

China by 1944 had seen a fierce struggle between Chinese Nationalist Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communist Party headed by Mao Tse-tung whom to lead the country. Although both sides were expressing their intentions to be united against their common enemy – Japan, it was far too optimistic to believe in their cooperation.

General Joseph Stilwell, Commander of all American forces in the China-India-Burma (later China) Theater of WWII, who favored a tough policy toward Chiang Kai-shek and his government, was recalled in October 1944. He believed that the removal of Chiang would save China from a fight between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties by stating that “the only thing that keeps the country split is fear of losing control. He [Chiang Kai-shek] hates the Reds and will not take any chance on giving them a toehold in the government.... If this condition persists, China will have civil war immediately after Japan is out. If Russia enters the war before a united front is found in China, the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia’s influence and control. The condition will directly affect the relations between Russia and China, and therefore indirectly those between Russia and the United States”.<sup>1</sup>

Although General Stilwell indicated the problems with the National Government like corruption and incapacity of the leaders, he was removed from his post in China mostly due to conflicting personality with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of American forces in China in 1944. He was successful in cooperating with the Nationalist Chinese and established an effective China-American cooperation. Though he maintained friendly relations with the National Government, “in 1944-45 he contributed decisively to convincing Marshall that Stilwell’s portrayal of the Generalissimo and China’s weaknesses was accurate”.<sup>2</sup>

During this time Major General Patrick J. Hurley was appointed as a Personal Representative of the President of the U.S. to China and later became an Ambassador in China. Prior to the arrival of General Hurley the National Government and the Communists were negotiating for several years to

reach a consensus with regard to establishing a united front against the Japanese aggressors but no success was seen yet.

Upon arriving in China General Hurley started negotiating with both parties, the Kuomintang Party and the Communist Party, and served as a mediator between them. The two parties refused to accept each other's suggested plans, the Five-point draft agreement developed by the Communists and the Three-point plan, a counter proposal made by the National Government.

As there was no success in reaching a consensus between the National Government and Communists in China some Americans suggested to having relationship with both of the parties that were struggling for power to control the whole country. In particular George Atcheson, American Charge d'Affaires at Chungking, raised a question of supplying arms and military equipment to the Communists along with the Kuomintang army. He suggested that "the President inform Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to cooperate with and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against the Japanese. ...Chiang Kai-shek can be assured by us that we do not contemplate reduction of our assistance to the Central Government."<sup>3</sup>

However, General Hurley strongly opposed these recommendations and the National Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek remained the only Government of China which received military materials and financial support from the U.S.

The U.S. Government did their best through its people in China to make the two parties of China reach a consensus and unite against the Japanese. However, no positive outcomes were seen despite their efforts. Thus their belief in Chiang Kai-shek that he was the only one who could hold China together was waning.

When General Hurley was heading for China via Moscow he met with Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and had a discussion with regard to the Chinese matters in September 1944. As George Kennan, the U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, wrote: "General Hurley had carried away from the interview a most remarkably optimistic impression of Soviet intentions towards China. He summed up as follows... what he understood Molotov's views to be:

1. The so-called Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all.

2. The Soviet Government is not supporting the Chinese Communists.
3. The Soviets do not desire dissensions or civil war in China.
4. The Soviets complain of Chinese treatment of Soviet citizens in China but frankly desire closer and more harmonious relations in China.”<sup>4</sup>

General Hurley met with Stalin in April the following year. His views on Soviet considerations regarding Chinese matters remained as optimistic as it was before. According to the report of the interview, the U.S. policy would be supported by the Soviet Government, the Soviets would provide full support for immediate actions directed to the unification of the armed forces of China, and they would recognize the Chinese National Government under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. When George Kennan became familiar with the report of the interview he decided to make some corrections, as its content was much more optimistic than the real situation was. Thus he together with Mr. John Davies<sup>5</sup> drafted a personal message to Mr. Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow (who at that time was in the U.S.). As Kennan writes “...to the Russians words mean different things than they do to us. Stalin is of course prepared to affirm the principle of unifying the armed forces of China. He knows that unification is feasible in a practical sense only on conditions which are acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party...”<sup>6</sup>

Although men like George Kennan was providing different views on Soviet intentions there were other men like Hurley and Marshall who viewed cooperation with Russia as possible at that point. “After meeting Stalin at Tehran and Yalta he [Marshall] concluded that the Russian leader would keep his word if he had positively and unequivocally given in”.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the American policy towards China was changed when friendly relations with Soviet Union took precedence over all other issues. A military necessity on the first place made the U.S. government agree to conditions the Soviet Union requested in order to join the Allied force. At that moment the Japanese Kwantung army seemed to have a considerable force in Manchuria. Above all, the U.S. government wanted to make the war end as early as possible in order to save as many lives of their people as possible. All these concerns were the governing reasons for America to seek the Soviet entrance into the Pacific war along with its primary concern of securing their sphere of influence in East Asia.

### 3. Yalta Conference: Discussions concerning Far East

Prior to Yalta conference American and Soviet military officers were holding discussions on their joint operations against Japan. Of course, “these were dealt with in a separate secret accord between the Heads of State”.<sup>8</sup> Russians had in their mind to enter the Pacific War soon after the defeat of Germany and their plan in fact suited the American military strategy.

Stalin saw in the war against Japan an opportunity to realize some of his ambitions in the Far East. As Tien-fong Cheng argues, “he wanted to choose a most advantageous moment to enter the war so that the Soviet Union would get maximum benefit at the minimum sacrifice”.<sup>9</sup> Thus Stalin declared his intention (to join the Allied force when he defeated Germany on the western front) at Moscow Big Three Foreign Ministers’ Conference as well as at Teheran Conference in 1943.

On February 11, 1945 the heads of three states, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin signed the secret Yalta agreement with a title “Agreement regarding Japan”. According to this agreement the Soviet Union will declare war on Japan “in two or three months” after the surrender of Germany, “in return for:

- (1) preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia;
- (2) return of Southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands, internationalization of Dairen, restoration of Port Arthur as a leased naval base, joint Chinese-Russian operation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet for Dairen (“China shall maintain full sovereignty in Manchuria”);
- (3) Kurile islands to be “handed over” to Russia”.<sup>10</sup>

In fact, discussions concerning the above issues were held between only American and Russian sides. In his book *Triumph and Tragedy* Churchill wrote: “I must make it clear that though on behalf of Great Britain I joined the agreement, neither I nor Eden<sup>11</sup> took any part in making it. It was regarded as an American affair and was certainly of prime interest to their military operations. It was not for us to claim to shape it. Anyhow we were not consulted but asked to approve. This we did....To us the problem was remote and secondary”.<sup>12</sup>

Thus the Yalta secret agreement concerning the Far East was discussed primarily between the Americans and the Russians as stated earlier. Of course, the Americans did not agree with the Soviet

desires immediately. The provisions concerning the Dairen port, Chinese Eastern Railroad, South Manchurian Railroad, as well as maintenance of the status quo in Outer Mongolia required Chinese approval. Therefore, upon discussing the above issue the two sides agreed to include a statement: “it is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshall Stalin”.<sup>13</sup> For its part the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude a pact of Friendship and Alliance with the National Government of China and to provide assistance to its armed forces.

At Yalta conference, therefore, the Soviet Union formally agreed to enter the war against Japan. As Tien-fong writes “due to inaccurate intelligence reports, however, American leaders overestimated Japanese strength and were exceedingly anxious to get the Soviet Union into the war against Japan so as to shorten the duration of the war and to save many American lives”.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union declared a war on Japan on August 8, 1945, as promised, after joining the Potsdam Declaration. At the same time Mongolia, an ally to the Soviet Union, declared war on Japan a day later. In the morning of August 9, 1945 the Soviet army entered the North East China in three big fronts and occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin and Kurile islands within a short period and liberated towns in North Korea. Kharbin, Mugden, Chungking and Giring were liberated on August 20 and Port Arthur was liberated on August 23.<sup>15</sup>

#### **4. How China, in particular Nationalist China reacted to the secret agreement**

Two reasons why China was not consulted with regard to above issues can be explained. Primary concern of both American and Russian sides was a fear that there would be a leak of the information from Chinese sources to the Japanese. And the governing consideration was a “military necessity”. America wanted to secure the participation of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war for whatever it cost. However, for this reason the American leaders will be blamed later.

As the Chinese were not aware of this secret agreement concerning some parts of their land both the American and Soviet sides found it hard to break the news to Chiang Kai-shek. Both of the heads of state, the U.S. President and Stalin wanted each other to deal with this sensitive issue. Finally, as Stalin requested the American side agreed to consult first with Chiang Kai-shek. Roosevelt did it so through his Ambassador Hurley (who informed Chiang Kai-shek in June 1945) in China.

This is what Mr. Forrest C. Pogue, a historian, writes about a reaction of Chiang Kai-shek: “he described his shock at the Yalta agreements relating to China. Under the circumstances the Generalissimo had accepted these arrangements, although they were contrary to the United States’ traditional stand<sup>16</sup> toward China and would create resentment. Action of the Moscow Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding China, in late 1945, had also been offensive to Chiang.”<sup>17</sup> Thus the secret agreement was a shock to Chiang Kai-shek. Although there were positive promises on the Soviet side the Chinese had doubts when they were to conduct direct negotiations with the Russians.

As promised at Yalta Conference the Soviet Union concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Republic of China on August 14, 1945. According to the Article V of the Treaty, the two countries “agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party”.<sup>18</sup>

During this time, the two parties in China, one headed by Chiang Kai-shek and another headed by Mao Tse-tung, were as much against each other as they were against Japan. Their wartime unification was to be tested with the fall of Japan.

As it was anticipated after the surrender of the Japanese the struggle between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese bore a danger to lead the country into a civil war. Chiang Kai-shek invited Mao Tse-tung several times to Chungking to discuss the changed situation. After some time and hesitation Mao decided to go to Chungking. As Rogue writes: “Mao Tse-tung’s decision to come to Chungking may have been influenced by the announcement of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in mid-August 1945, in which Stalin appeared to favor the Nationalists over the Chinese Communists”.<sup>19</sup>

General Hurley submitted a report with regard to the negotiations conducted between the National Government and the Communists before he departed to the U. S. According to the report, both parties agreed to cooperate to establish a democratic government in China. They both agreed to support the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek as well as Sun Yat-sen doctrines.<sup>20</sup> The Communists agreed to recognize the Kuomintang as the dominant party and cooperate with it during a transition period to a democratic regime. However, there were two issues where the two sides could not reach agreement. One of them was the claim by the Communists the right to appoint, select, or elect any Communist governors and mayors in certain places. The second point was regarding the number of Communist

troops to be included in the National peace-time army of China. Although both sides were negotiating to reach a consensus time was needed for final positive outcomes.

After a while a consensus was reached to the above second point when the Communists agreed to the National Government proposal (20 divisions will be allotted to the Communists in the National army). No agreement was reached with regard an issue of political control in the liberated areas dominated by the Communists.

Although both parties did not reach a consensus to all the issues discussed above, they agreed to continue their negotiations. However, their cooperation did not last long as the Communists repeatedly expressed their concerns that the National Government had an intention to secure the military control in areas liberated by the Communists. And a failure to conduct a Political Consultative Conference resulted in a worsening relationship between the Nationalist Government and the Communists.

Although the Nationalists were getting support from America they were no longer capable enough to control the situation in the country. The Communists were gaining power. There had been a dramatic change in the power ratio between the above two sides with the Communist Party retaining 1/4 of the population and 1/5 of the territory. In its final stage, their friction turned into a war between the Communists and Kuomintang Chinese.

However, the Yalta secret agreement concerning the Far East was signed and real disputes and problems over the signed statements would be brought up very soon after all the promised desires of the Soviet Union were satisfied.

## **5. A provision of Yalta agreement concerning Outer Mongolia or Mongolian People's Republic**

Although a People's revolution had a victory in Mongolia in 1921 and a new Mongolian People's Republic was promulgated there, the status of this country was unclear until 1945 in the world. Mongolia's independence was officially recognized by only two states, the Soviet Union and Tuva Tanu Republic (which was absorbed by the Soviet Union in 1944 at the latter's "request").



Thus, a provision of the Yalta Secret Agreement concerning Mongolia was a very important provision for this country. The people of Mongolia got their independence in 1921 after 300 years of Manchu rule. However, China was resisting that by stating Mongolia to be a part of China.

Thus a provision which states “the status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be restored”<sup>21</sup> was a promising move towards independence of Mongolia.

China did not want to fulfill this provision as they were sticking to the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924, which recognized the Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia although it had stopped to exist many years. To the Chinese as well as to the Americans the Soviet proposals exceeded the provisions of the Yalta agreement. The Americans advised the Chinese against making any concessions beyond the terms of the Yalta Agreement. Then, “on August 10, 1945, Mr. Harriman,<sup>22</sup> acting on instructions, informed Dr. Soong as a matter of record that the United States Government considered that the proposals which he had already made fulfilled the Yalta Agreement and that any other concessions would be with the understanding that they were made by the Chinese Government because of the value it attached to obtaining Soviet support in other directions.”<sup>23</sup>

Although the Chinese were ready to agree to any other concessions in return for Outer Mongolia they accepted this provision “should a plebiscite of the Outer Mongolian people confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia with the existing boundary as its boundary”.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, the people of Mongolian People’s Republic were happy enough to confirm their desire for independence. On October 20, 1945 a referendum was held in Mongolia under the supervision of observers from the Chinese government and the people of Mongolia voted for their independence. Thus finally on January 5, 1946 the Chinese Government formally recognized the Mongolian People’s Republic as an independent state. “On February 27, a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between Mongolia and the Soviet Union”.<sup>25</sup>

## **6. Soviet Union after World War II**

The Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe was also formally approved at Yalta Conference. Although it was agreed to hold free elections in those countries liberated by the Soviet force in the region, the

newly elected governments were dominated largely by the communists. As a result, by 1948 seven East European countries had communist governments.

The Western powers reacted strongly to this expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. An “ally” between the Soviet Union and the West, thus, was collapsed after the WW II. 1946 and 1947 were the turning periods in the world history when The Big Three declared their division of the world into two systems: communism and capitalism. In his famous speech Winston Churchill said, “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent”.<sup>26</sup>

There can be several reasons for the collapse of the ally between the Soviet Union and the West. Firstly, their task to destroy the common enemy was accomplished, and secondly, their mutual suspicions with regard to each other’s intention and actions were flourishing. There might be another reason for the partition of the Allied Powers. As Mr. Georgi M. Derluguian from Northwestern University writes “the geopolitical history of balance of power suggests that Russia is simply too big to the West’s ally in normal times. In a pattern that has held for more than 300 years, Russia has been an ally to the West only in times of serious trouble in world governance”.<sup>27</sup>

The tension between America and the Soviet Union was also accelerated by the Marshall Plan, which aimed to send economic aid to Europe in 1947. “Molotov represented the Soviet Union, which turned down the proposals and exerted pressure to ensure that their allies did likewise”<sup>28</sup> as A. Nove writes in his book entitled *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* The Soviet Union refused to join the Marshall plan as this plan, firstly, required to disclose its economic records to the U.S. Secondly, the Soviet Union feared of western influences. As a counter measure to the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union offered financial aid to its satellites through the Molotov Plan.

Thus, the world was divided into two antagonistic blocs after the World War II. Both blocs, one headed by the U.S and the other headed by the Soviet Union, tried to maintain their influences in their respected areas, including so called satellite countries. As Mr. Alec Nove admits “The Soviet Union emerged from the war no longer isolated, no longer the world’s only communist-ruled state”.<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet Union besides Eastern Europe and Mongolia<sup>30</sup> had China in the same block after the war. On October 2, 1949, the Soviet Union recognized the People’s Republic of China. Soon after Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader, was received at the Kremlin in Moscow on December 16,

1949. Thereafter, amicable relations started developing between these two Communist powers. On February 15, 1950 Stalin and Mao Tse-tung signed a mutual defense treaty in Moscow.

Although the Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers were deteriorating, it was not alone in its communist world. With a support of its satellites the Soviet Union launched a campaign against the Western countries, which landed in the opposite bloc.

## 7. Epilogue

Yalta Conference had come and gone. The world, in particular North East Asia landed in two different systems. According to Yalta agreement concerning the Far East, two big powers, America and Russia shaped their spheres of influences there. The Soviet Union got to be dominant over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia or Mongolian People's Republic whereas the United States was to have dominant power in Japan. China would be a country where they maintain balance. However, the U.S. supported Nationalist China lost the war to gain a control over the whole China. When the Communist Chinese got the power the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Communist China started flourishing. The following chapter, therefore, will analyze if the cooperation between the two communist giants lasted long and how their cooperation was reflected in developing relations with other neighboring countries.

## 8. Endnotes

- 1 Stilwell paper Cited in Pogue, Forrest C., *George Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Penguin Books, 1989, p. 42.
- 2 Pogue, Forrest C., *George Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Penguin Books, 1989, p. 55.
- 3 *The China White Paper: August 1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 89.
- 4 Kennan, George F. *Memoirs 1925-1950*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 236.
- 5 The U.S. embassy secretary, who was most familiar with Chinese affairs, in Moscow.
- 6 Kennan, George F. *Memoirs. 1925-1950*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 238.
- 7 Pogue, Forrest C., *George Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Penguin Books, 1989, p. 153.
- 8 Feis, Herbert. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 503.
- 9 Cheng, Tien-fong. *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975, p. 263.
- 10 <http://cnnton.cnn.com/Specials/cold.war/episodes/01/documents/yalta.html>
- 11 Foreign Minister of Great Britain.
- 12 Cited in Feis, Herbert. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 517.
- 13 Feis, Herbert. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 515.
- 14 Cheng, Tien-fong. *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975, p.263.
- 15 Naran, Dugarjav. *History of China. XX Century*. Ulaanbaatar: Publishing House of Mongolian National University, 2002, p. 126.
- 16 Open Door Policy. It originally stated that every nation should have equal economic opportunities in China but it was soon redefined as a call for the territorial and administrative integrity in China.
- 17 Pogue, Forrest C., *George Marshall: Statesman*. New York: Penguin Books, 1989, p. 140.

18 Ibid., p. 586.

19 Ibid., p. 74.

20 Three people's principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen – the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people

21 *The China White Paper. 1949.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 113.

22 American official and diplomat/U.S. ambassador to Moscow at that time

23 *The China White Paper. 1949.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 117.

24 Ibid., p. 588.

25 Batedene, B. *History of Mongolia.* Ulaanbaatar: Monsudar, 2004, p. 412.

26 Lafeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1980.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980, p. 19.

27 <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6004-10.cfm>

28 A. Nove. *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* Penguin Books, 1978, p. 313.

29 A. Nove. *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* Penguin Books, 1978, 313.

30 Mongolia became a Soviet satellite country since 1921 when a national revolution took place.

主指導教員（井村哲郎教授） 副指導教員（芳井研一教授・佐藤芳行教授）