

Mongols and Nationalism

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要 旨

本稿は、第二次世界大戦前のモンゴルとロシア連邦ブリヤート自治区におけるナショナリズムの発展とナショナリズム意識について分析する。両地域のモンゴル人は20世紀初頭から汎モンゴル運動を開始し、統一への動きを見せた。しかし、この汎モンゴル運動は強力な支持をえられず、最終的にはソ連の影響力を強く受けた両地域の政府は、1930年代のモンゴルとブリヤートのナショナリズム運動を防止するために、汎モンゴル運動を利用した。

Key words: nationalism, Pan-Mongolism

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1. Introduction

There are several regions in the world, which share the same Mongol root, including Mongolia, Buryat, Kalmyk and Tuva Autonomous Republics in Russia and Inner Mongolia in China. This paper analyzes how nationalist sentiments and movements were developed in some Mongol regions, including Mongolia or Mongolian People's Republic and Buryat Autonomous Republic of Russia.

Prior to addressing the above topic there is a need to say a few words about history of Mongol origin people. As history recalls, Chinggis Khan established a Great Mongol Empire in 1206. However, six centuries succeeding

his rule saw the rise and fall of Mongol Empire, its collapse and finally a formation of different regions with Mongol people.

By early 20th century Mongols residing in different territories were under Manchu or Chin dynasty rule. However, living for more than 200 years under Manchu rule made all the people fight against the Manchus. Therefore, all the nationalities which were under Manchu rule, including Mongols, Chinese, Uigurs and Tibets had been engaged actively in national liberation movements to overthrow the Manchu regime in early 20th century. Behind their common role to defeat the Manchu rule Mongols like any other small nations had a serious intention to restore their independence.

Thus, further this paper attempts to examine if Mongols succeeded in restoring their independence and how nationalism or nationalist movements had been developed in pre WW II period in some of the Mongol territories. As the relations of the above-mentioned areas have a very peculiar characteristic the development of nationalist sentiments in each of the area will be discussed separately.

2. Mongolia

As Mongolia is situated between the two big powers, its fate in modern times has always been connected either with the northern neighbor Russia or with the southern neighbor China. These two neighbors mostly wanted to make Mongolia as a 'buffer zone' between them as both had strategic, geopolitical and economic considerations. Russia and China had several negotiations concerning the fate of Mongolia and they defined their borderlines according to the interests of the dominating power, however, excluding the interests of Mongolia. With the fall of the Chin dynasty Mongolia declared its independence in 1911 and Mongol princes were determined to unite Mongolia by joining all Mongols residing then in Mongolia, Russia and China. Though Russia was not interested in independent Mongolia, it did some compromise by signing a treaty with Mongolia in 1912. On the other side, the Chinese did not approve the independence of Mongolia at all. After the fall of Chin dynasty, a short period of Sun Yat Sen's rule of China was transferred to Yan Shi Kai's government which declared to give equal rights to all nationalities of China, including Outer Mongolia. However, Mongols did not accept a new policy of the Yan's government, but sent a congratulating message on the establishment of a new government.

Therefore, when the news about the negotiation between Russia and Mongolia reached Beijing, Chinese reacted seriously. Consequently it resulted in a small-scale military fight between Mongols and Chinese along the western borderline of Mongolia, Hobdo¹.

Both Russia and China could not reach agreements to discuss Outer Mongolia's position until November 5, 1913, when Russia and China signed the declaration and exchanged notes. At this time China agreed to have Russia's presence in discussing the situation of Outer Mongolia and decided to have tripartite negotiations including Outer Mongolia. The tripartite negotiation started in September 1914 in Khyagta. As Mongolian publicist Batbayar writes, both Russia and China already agreed on their proposals: Russia to agree the Chinese suzerain rights in Outer Mongolia; China to agree Mongolia's autonomous rights; and both Russia and China to refuse their residents to reside in Outer Mongolia, and their military force to enter into Mongolia. Mongolia had only to agree and sign that treaty and finally three parts signed the treaty in June 1915.

In their struggle for Mongol unity, Mongol princes were hoping to get Japanese help. They even decided to send Da Lama Tserenchimed, and Inner Mongolian Chin Van Gonchigsuren to Japan in 1912. Heard about the Mongols' intention, the Foreign Minister of Russia Korostovets tried to persuade Mongols to give up this idea. He succeeded to stop Mongols in Harbin, as the Japanese did not give them permission to continue their mission to Japan. The next attempt to contact the Japanese government was made through a letter in 1914. Prior to this event, a Japanese officer named Kodama visited Mongolia and met some officials there. Most probably "...the Living Buddha had been inspired to send this message by the visit of a Japanese officer Kodama to Mongolia".² Mongols asked in this letter the Japanese Emperor to assist them in their unification of Outer and Inner Mongolia. However, as Russia and Japan already had conventions concerning the fate of Mongolia both sides were not interested to be involved in this affair. Thus, Japan refused to accept the letter, but wanted its refusal to remain secret. It also denied that Japan sent official messengers to Mongolia.

In addition to this, though the Japanese were reluctant to assist Mongol unity during Tsarist Russia as its attitude was mostly based on Russo-Japanese convention, the situation changed after the fall of Tsarist Russia. The Japanese government joined the allied intervention into Far East against the Bolshevik Russia, and the spread of communism. In their fight against Bolshevik Russia, the Japanese supported the White Russians, particularly so-called Ataman Semenov, who were chased into Siberia and consequently into Manchuria. Ataman Semenov got support from the Japanese officers not only in his anti-Bolshevik activities but also in the

Pan-Mongolian movement. Moreover, in the latter movement he organized a conference of Mongols from Bargut, Inner Mongolia and Buryatia in 1919 near Khyagta without a representative from Outer Mongolia. This conference adopted a resolution for the creation of a united Mongol Government, including Bargut, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and Buryatia. In addition to this, the conference decided to get a loan for the period of 20 years from a 'foreign state'³ in return for a guarantee of gold, silver, salt and other mineral resources for the newly established state. However, Ataman Semenov's ambition to establish Pan-Mongolian government did not get recognition from any state, except for some Japanese military officers. Soon the Japanese gave up their intention to support Ataman Semenov in Pan-Mongolian movement. As Friters writes, "in Tokyo, however, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs denied to the Russian Ambassador that Japan had anything to do with the attempts to create a new Buryat-Mongol state"⁴. Bolshevik Russia reacted to it seriously by having two different declarations: one to Mongolia and another to China. The Soviets declared that they supported the Mongols intention to be an independent country and refused to accept all the treaties with China and Japan concerning Mongolia. With regard to China, they issued Karakhan declaration which nullified 1915 Khyakta negotiation.

Though it failed, Pan-Mongolism later became an often used term by the Stalinists who wanted to prevent or if possible to eliminate nationalist sentiments in not only Mongolia but also in other territories where Mongol nationals were residing.

In dealing with nationalism Stalin smartly used Comintern, which had a role to instruct Mongolian new leaders. Thus according to their instructions, Mongols carried out almost everything that was done on a Soviet soil, including collectivization of farmers, collection of private livestock to state ownership, struggles against rich or so called feudal elements, and even struggle against religion.

Thus, new leaders of the party started implementing Comintern instructions against their countrymen. We must admit that the newly appointed leaders were divided among themselves into two groups; one that intended to follow the instructions of Comintern and the other that was against implementing the measures as they feared that it would lead to a domestic rebellion. However, as the Soviets were urging Mongols to start their campaigns against feudal elements and lamas, the 5th State Great Khural issued a decision to confiscate the property of feudal elements. This campaign allowed the households to leave property worth of 300 tugrug without concerning the number of family members. This campaign actually had two stages; the second stage

was thought to find and confiscate the hidden property of feudal elements. The noblemen and feudal elements, of course, were not always passive observers and they employed different ways to struggle against the communists' taken actions by selling, hiding and transferring their livestock to others. Consequently, Mongolian cattle decreased greatly, as Ruben writes "the livestock total for the MPR⁵ had fallen from twenty-three million head in 1930 to sixteen in 1932"⁶. In the second campaign against feudal elements a lot of people fell victims to the campaign as many people were put into jails for their misconduct.

The campaign against religion was a lot more aggressive than against feudal elements. The main purpose of the communist doctrine against religion was to eliminate it if possible. To confiscate the property of monasteries, temples and lamas, therefore, the communists employed a different way than that was employed against feudal elements. They did not confiscate the livestock and property of religious centers and lamas as they did with feudal elements. Instead they issued a very high tax on almost everything these religious centers possessed, including statues of Buddhas. At the same time many influential and popular religious leaders were arrested or killed. All these measures taken against feudal elements, noblemen, and religion arose antagonism towards the communists among those who suffered a lot from these campaigns. The most common way to show their dissatisfaction towards the new communist regime was to escape or to flee their native land to Inner Mongolia and North China. According to "unofficial document, totally 7,542 families consisting of 30,000 people joined these border crossing"⁷ during 1930-32, including not only feudal elements and lamas but also party, government officials, ordinary people, and herdsmen. The other and most severe way to show their antagonism towards new regime was expressed through revolts. The first uprising took place in Tugsbuyant monastery, Hubsugul province in 1930 headed by disappointed lamas to the new regime. The shocked government put down the revolt severely by executing 19 lamas, 9 feudals and 20 arats⁸. In different parts of Mongolia hurt and disillusioned lamas and religious people joined the revolts against communist regime and its slaves-party workers. To this revolt a rumor that a Tibet religious leader Panchen Bogdo was coming to help Mongols in restoring Buddhism contributed partly. As Vanchin Bogdo visited Japan once, it was thought that he would bring the Japanese assistance to fight against the communists. Thus, the main "anti-red"⁹ revolt started in April 1932 in Hubsugul province. Though the government reacted to these revolts very quickly by sending their internal affairs force uprisings occurred not only in Hubsugul province, they covered almost all parts of the country. Therefore, in May the government passed a decision "to use regular army"¹⁰ against the rebels. As Batbayar admits, it was a civil war; on one side the Mongolian government, representing a dictatorial regime

supported by the outside - Soviet force, on the other side injured, disappointed, disillusioned people who were protesting this excessive repression. In the end the rebellions were defeated.

The collectivization (confiscation) of livestock did not result in the increasing number of cattle, but on the contrary it led to its decrease and moreover, resulted in the rebellions against the government. These outcomes were not what the Comintern; particularly the Soviet government was looking for. Therefore, they decided to change the direction on Mongolia and in the end of May 1932, they issued a resolution to the MPRP¹¹ to reverse the course and abandon collectivization. The Soviets criticized that Mongols did not consider the country's specific conditions by copying the Soviet collectivization. Therefore, they suggested a new move "New Reform Policy", one example of which, to allow a controlled private ownership of some livestock, shows the complete reversal of the collectivization policy. As Rupen says, "the immediacy of the Japanese threat and the vulnerability of the MPR, which was being torn by violent dissention, undoubtedly contributed to this decision; but it was also probably easier for the Russians to admit their mistake and abandon their policy in an area that was not formally part of the USSR and thus did not directly involve Stalin's prestige"¹². Therefore, the communists' campaign against feudal elements and religion, and collectivization of livestock was a failure of the Soviet doctrine in Mongolia.

However, the most tragic period was coming very soon. In the failure of the communist policy regarding collectivization, the communists had to find someone to blame for their failure. Therefore, the two conflicting groups of new leaders of the party were paid according to how they viewed the campaigns against feudal elements and religion. Those who they were supporting to follow the Comintern's instructions blindly were named as "left opportunists". A new party leader Genden was appointed as the Prime Minister and was entrusted to carry out the New Reform Policy (NRP). At the beginning of his career, Genden seemed to believe in the programs of NRP. Therefore, some of the decisions he made were in favor to the disillusioned lamas and herdsmen. He released some lamas who participated in counter-revolutionary uprisings. A newly adopted 1932 tax law decreased tax on livestock. Tax on almost all property of religious centers was abolished leaving only tax on livestock. Some actions were taken to bring some of the fled people back and to their surprise some of them were not blamed for leaving their country but even were given herds, loans and in some cases were exempted from tax for one year. Though it was short but sunny period just before another darker period was striking the history of Mongolia.

Very soon a campaign against Buryat nationals and Japanese spies started in Mongolia. There were many Buryats who fled the Soviet Union at the start of communist revolution in 1917. When Mongolia became the second communist country some of them fled again, this time to Manchuria. Perhaps, their destination, Manchuria gave the communists the idea to claim them to be spies of Japan. In their struggle against Buryats the communists employed a new method – making a story about someone’s provocative actions. These false stories, in some cases, gave some officials of the party and Ministry of Interior (MI) to revenge their enemies.

One of the suspects of “Lkhumbé’s Affair”¹³, Choibalsan, however, did not get any penalty from the Soviet Union, though his name was mentioned during the process of interrogation of the affair. This must be admitted as in the coming history of the communist rule in Mongolia this dual thinking about so-called dissidents was a normal picture. If they wanted to blame someone for misbehavior to communist principle, they employed whatever possible to blame him for that. If some of their ‘treasured’ people to the party were involved in one of these affairs they did everything not to involve his name into the list of dissidents. Therefore, according to this dual thinking, Choibalsan was not touched at all, even was appointed as an assistant to the Prime Minister Genden. At that time Genden was in already in a disfavorable position to Stalin, as he was employing his own measures to deal with the current situation of Mongolia, favoring lamas. Genden was arrested suddenly in summer of 1937, and was executed in November 26 with a claim to be a Japanese spy and counter-revolutionary dissident. With the failure of Genden, Choibalsan started rising to stardom. Choibalsan was appointed to the post of head of Ministry of Interior in February 1936.

In the campaigns against feudal elements and so-called counter-revolutionary dissidents the Soviet commissars played a significant role. They instructed the ‘obedient’ party leaders. They were even given ‘limitless’ rights in the leadership conference of central and local administrative units by Marshal Choibalsan in 1937. This conference issued decision to study Mongolian monasteries, temples, lamas, and feudal elements. This decision meant that the communist government declared a “real war” to the remaining lamas and feudal elements. The communists had a plan to deal with the religion and feudal elements in three stages in accordance with study results. In the first round 23 religious leaders were caught and 19 of them had the fate of execution. Then some of the party and government officials were targeted. The victims of Choibalsan’s distrustful policy towards his countrymen and the Soviet policy to be free from national-minded Mongolian leaders in line with Genden became not only Mongolian leaders but also their Soviet instructors.

A “Great Purge” of political dissidents started on 10 September 1937. Prior to this day “a Soviet group led by NKVD¹⁴ deputy minister Frinovskii visited Mongolia and introduced a Japanese occupation plan of Mongolia to Mongolian leaders. At the same time they handed to Choibalsan the name list of 115 persons participating in “Plot” and materials concerning the Prime Minister Genden”¹⁵. Many party leaders and State Baga Khurals members, and mostly intellectuals were arrested. Most of these captured people were suspected to be members of Genden and Demid plot against the communist government. As they were instructed to finish the interrogations in 25 days, all possible cruel and violent methods were applied to make the dissidents claim their personal guilt, and participation in counter-revolutionary provocative actions. In order to deal with the Japanese spies and counter-revolutionary dissidents a Special Commission was established in October 1937 with a right to investigate and to try accused dissidents and “51 meetings of this Commission discussed 25,785 political cases. Out of this, 20,099 were shot and 5,739 were imprisoned until the last day of the Commission’s existence, 22 April 1939.”¹⁶

The irony of this dark period lies behind the fact that the same fate was waiting the ones who were in the first front to deal with the political dissidents. As Batbayar admits, it was in fact a copy of the Soviet strategy employed against political dissidents in the Soviet Union. Just as Stalin blamed his counterparts Yagoda and Yejev for the bloody repression in his country, Choibalsan had to blame someone for this act in order to save not only his name but also the Soviet name. This time the main figures that 'fought effectively' against the political dissidents were caught, such as the first secretary of the MPRP Luvsansharav, Dogsom and Losol. In this campaign against his counterparts Choibalsan was also instructed to deal with the Prime Minister Anand Amar who sought to employ his policy suitable to his motherland. His name also was put into the ‘people’s enemies’ list along with Dogsom for the fact that they released some of the prisoners on the 15th anniversary of revolution in 1936. Amar had the same fate as some other leaders of the state faced - execution.

Thus, the dark repression period cost the lives of 30,000 Mongols. It is a very big figure if we consider the population of Mongolia of that period – about 700,000. It was a real tragedy in the history of Mongolia. It is not an exaggeration, if we say that there is no family that did not experience this dark repression period in Mongolia. Its shadow reached every part of the country, even remote provinces.

Nationalist sentiment and a strive for unification of all Mongols did not get a support from the Government of Mongolia as it was backed by the Soviet Government. Such actions, on the contrary, led to a tragedy that cost

many lives and resulted in the destruction of traditional culture including religious centers. The meaning of the word nationalism associated with such negative terms as anti-socialist development in the country, people's enemy or even a foreign country spy. As a result, people in this country have hidden their feelings on nationalism or patriotism for several decades until a peaceful democratic revolution took place in 1990.

3. Buryat Autonomous Republic of Russia

The issue of nationalism and nationalist sentiment was a very sensitive topic in the former USSR which was comprised of many different nationalities. "The October 1917 Revolution gave a powerful impulse to the struggle of the oppressed non-Russian nationalities to put an end to the 'prisonhouse of nations' that tsarism had created. The Bolsheviks recognized that the advance to socialism was possible only on the basis of guaranteeing the right of national self-determination to all oppressed nations, and through the creation of a voluntary federation of worker's republics"¹⁷. Initially the intention was to have a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) consisting of different nationalities on the basis of equal treatment of all who joined the Union and eradicate economic gaps between them. However, it turned out to be different as Mr. Doug Lorimer¹⁸ points out "the USSR became a new 'prisonhouse of nations' dominated by the central bureaucracy in Moscow with its Great-Russian chauvinist outlook"¹⁹.

As a large part of the Soviet population was not Russian national "of course, there was much talk of the Soviet people, of Soviet patriotism, but the various nation's histories had to be written, so that Russia appeared as their protector. Thus she saved Georgia from Turks, the Ukrainians from the Poles, and this was good"²⁰.

During 1936-1938 the Soviet Union with its all Republics had suffered the terrible purge carried out by Stalin and his cliques. Stalin wanted to build his own regime and have the whole country under his control. As Alec Nove argues Stalin liquidated all his enemies in some kind of order starting with leading members of the Party. Then he turned to a large number of senior military officers, a high proportion of managers at all levels, leading scientists, engineers, almost every Party and state leader in every national republic within the Soviet Union. Even NKVD head (Yagoda) and most senior police officials, people who had contacts abroad (including diplomats, trade representatives and even many communist leaders who were residing in the Soviet Union), and finally anyone who was associated with the above-mentioned groups of people, including their colleagues,

friends and family members suffered the terrible purge. Therefore, it will be difficult to find someone who had not suffered this terrible period in the history of the Soviet Union.

The primary charge for the purge was treason. The suspects were called as the enemies of the people for their alleged betrayal of the country and facilitation of the enemies. Stalin intended to liquidate all capable men who could challenge him. He also charged the leaders of Soviet Republics for real or alleged bourgeois nationalism. Although Stalin himself was from Georgia, his homeland suffered severe repression during this period.

National parties and governments were under real or alleged charges for nationalism and they were repressed in masses. All national groups including minor ethnic groups suffered greatly during this period and each of them can be a case study for research. Therefore, this paper attempts to narrow it down and examine how Buryatia dealt with this sensitive issue in pre WW II period.

Nationalism was spread out in all territories where Mongols were residing in the beginning of the 20th century. As a result in 1923 Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic was established in Buryatia and they could experience some sort of independence. “At its inception, the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had a population of slightly more than 450,000, 49% of which were Buryats.”²¹

However, the Soviet Government was not in favor of the Buryats’ strive for independence. Thus, it started an aggressive policy to eliminate Buryat’s nationalism starting with a harsh action against the religion in Buryatia. Buryats follow the same religion as other Mongols – Buddhism, but with a more focus on Shamanism. Buryat religion came under an attack with a forced atheism, which was denying existence of any Gods. For people, who had practiced Buddhist and Shamanist traditions for more than two centuries²², it was difficult to face a new reality – a world without a religion. Many people, in particular lamas were resisting to this new phenomenon. However, any opposition was violently crushed and as a result, most of the religious traditions, including datsans and many cultural treasures, were destroyed and many lamas were either killed or sent to labor camps.

One of the very active organizations in Buryatia the Writer’s Union faced a big turmoil as well. Though short but a promising period, which started with the establishment of Autonomous Republic, for Buryat nationalist activists, writers and teachers came to an end. Most of the members of the Writer’s Union were arrested for their real or alleged work against the Soviet Government. One of the Buryat representatives of the Writer’s Union Mr. Dambinov (named also as Tsolmon Tuya) had undergone different paths of this unstable period in

the history of Buryatia. A play titled “The Great Shamaness”²³ was one of the charges imposed on him though “this play - the only work not written by Dambinov to be mentioned in his interrogation protocol - was part of the “evidence” presented in Dambinov’s forced confession in 1938 linking him to a fanciful Pan-Mongolist conspiracy. By staging this play, his accusers insisted, Dambinov had tried to promote Pan-Mongolist goals and Buryat-Mongol nationalism. Thus, this play, and none of the other Buryat plays of the same era, apparently met with particular displeasure from the Soviet authorities and partially sealed the fate of Dambinov during the Stalinist Great Purges of the late 1930s”²⁴. Moreover, this work was criticized as politically wrong play for its lack of proletarian direction and praise of religious traditions. Though the theater understood the situation of that certain period and stopped staging plays with nationalist points and started performing Soviet style plays and work, it did not help many whose fate were already decided by the Great Purge. Only a few have survived of the over 100 members of the Buryat Writer’s Union.

It is said that some of wealthy Buryats were also escaping the Soviet government tax on their stocks. As it was a very unstable period when the two forces, one called Red and the other called White Russians, were fighting for the power to control the vast territory of Russia. The remaining White Russians who were almost defeated by the Red army were fleeing into Mongolia forming armies with different purposes. As mentioned earlier Ataman Semyonov even tried to establish a United Mongol State in 1919 in a secret meeting with representatives of 49 khoshuus²⁵ of Inner Mongolia and 7 aimags²⁶ of Buryatia and 16 people representing Bargas. However, his efforts failed.

Stalin was specifically harsh towards the Buryats as many of them fled into Mongolia escaping the struggle between the White and Red Russians. Thus he urged the Mongolian Government to take measures against the Buryats who had settled in Mongolia by blaming them as part of Ataman Semeyonov’s people.

Though Semeyonov’s force gained some support at the beginning in some parts of Buryatia he soon lost his position for their bad behavior and as a result he could not gather troops there as well. This attempt to establish a united Mongolia became a main reason for Stalin to blame Buryats for Pan Mongolian conspiracy and resentment against the Soviet government during the dark years of the purge. Many Buryats who even dared to think about any conspiracy or plots were charged for Pan Mongolism and called as enemies of the people.

Thus, fearing for Buryat nationalism Stalin had 11,000 Buryats killed in the 1930s. During only 1937-1938 6,836 people were arrested and 4,709 of them were charged for their alleged work against the Soviet

Government. “As of February 15, 1938, 2,036 people were arrested for their Pan-Mongolist aspirations and 1,303 of them were lamas”²⁷.

Though the Buryats suffered a lot during the dark years of purge, they did serve in the Red Army honorably during the WW II. They received more ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ decorations than any other ethnic groups in the USSR.

During WW II Buryats also made some attempts to revive Buddhist datsans and “Stalin as a gesture of gratitude allowed the Ivolginsk datsan to be rebuilt.”²⁸ Though they could revive some of their traditions all the decisions regarding their nation were still made in Moscow. Stalin’s suspicious attitude to Buryats for their alleged Pan Mongolism was continued by the subsequent leaders of the Soviet Government and the name ‘Mongol’ was removed from the name of Buryat Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during N. Khrushchev’s leadership.

Buryatia like Mongolia had gone through similar periods with regard to the nationalism and nationalist sentiment. Though many Buryats resisted the Soviet policy in their homeland, they did not get a support from both inside and outside.

4. Conclusion

It was interesting to examine how nationalism was developed in Mongolia and Buryat Autonomous Republic of Russia. Although there had been efforts to unite all Mongols into one country in early 20th century, both internal and external factors hindered its fulfillment. It was the only chance for all Mongols to be gathered under one government, but the unstable period and new governments oriented to communism had prevented it to be happened.

Of all Mongol regions Mongolia and Buryatia had come closer in early 20th century. Mongolia had become for many Buryats their homeland. However, Stalin had made these two regions suffer greatly as he feared that nationalist sentiment may rise there. He smartly used new leaders in these territories to deal with nationalists or even to deal with capable men there as he needed only obedient followers of his policy.

Thus, if we compare nationalist sentiments of movements developed in some of the North East Asian region, small nations strive for nationalism is expressed by their wish to preserve their own territory, culture and even language whereas bigger nations tend to address this issue towards their past invader.

5. Endnotes

- 1 One of the Western provinces of Mongolia.
- 2 Friters, G. M. *Outer Mongolia: And Its International Position*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1949, p. 221.
- 3 Probably Japan.
- 4 Friters, G. M. *Outer Mongolia: And Its International Position*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1949, p. 228.
- 5 Mongolian People's Republic.
- 6 Rupen, Robert. *How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic 1900-1978*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 56.
- 7 Batsaikhan, O. Quoted in Batbayar, B. *Horidugaar Zuunii Mongol (Twentieth Century Mongol)*. Ulaanbaatar: Hevleliin Gazar, 1996, p.395.
- 8 common people.
- 9 Communists.
- 10 Batbayar, B. *Horidugaar Zuunii Mongol (Twentieth Century Mongol)*. Ulaanbaatar: Hevleliin Gazar, 1996, p. 401.
- 11 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.
- 12 Rupen, Robert. *How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic 1900-1978*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 56.
- 13 The case of counterrevolutionaries and Japanese spies.
- 14 The secret police system - People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
- 15 *Mongol Ulsiin Tuukh*. (History of Mongolia) Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 1999, p. 135.
- 16 Batbayar, B. *Horidugaar Zuunii Mongol (Twentieth Century Mongol)*. Ulaanbaatar: Hevleliin Gazar, 1996, p. 456.
- 17 Lorimer, Doug. *The collapse of 'communism' in the USSR. Its causes and significance*
<http://www.dsp.org.au/dsp/Collapse> August 5, 2005.
- 18 A member of the National Executive of the Democratic Socialist Party of Australia.
- 19 Lorimer, Doug. *The collapse of 'communism' in the USSR. Its causes and significance*.
<http://www.dsp.org.au/dsp/Collapse> August 5, 2005.
- 20 A. Nove. *Stalinism and After. The Road to Gorbachev*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 68.
- 21 <http://www.buryat.info/sach-en2.htm> August 8, 2005.
- 22 It is said that in 18th century Tibetan Buddhism was officially recognized in Russia as one of the religions.
- 23 This play describes how Buryats from 11 clans asked for petition Peter the Great and had an imperial decree issued regarding the lands from the river Yenesei to Lena to be under Buryat control.
- 24 <http://www.buryat.info/solb2-en.htm>
- 25 Administrative unit in Inner Mongolia.
- 26 Administrative unit in Mongolia and Buryatia.
- 27 D. Byambasuren. *Origins of Buryat People and Their Ethnic Peculiarity*. Ulaanbaatar, Uurlakh Erdem Publishing House, 2003, p. 38.
- 28 <http://www.strategicnetwork.org/index.php>

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