Teleological & Dolichological Discourse Marking

in Oral American Media:

The Discourse Markers "So" & "Okay"

２０１３年３月

新潟大学大学院現代社会文化研究科

O'Neal George C.

Table of Contents

Abstract

This dissertation contends that the discourse markers "so" and "okay" express procedural meanings in a corpus of oral American media, which is defined in this dissertation as any freely available American media with an oral component available on the internet such as TV programs, movies, and Podcasts, etc. Furthermore, this dissertation claims that both the discourse marker "so" and the discourse marker "okay" have previously unstudied procedural meanings. The discourse marker "so" adumbrates the speaker's intent to initiate the teleology of the interaction; that is, the deployment of the discourse marker "so" in interaction foreshadows the initiation of the main purpose of the interaction. The discourse marker "okay", on the other hand, adumbrates the speaker's intent to initiate a dolichological event, such as an academic lecture, a story, or even a just long answer that necessitates a lengthy period of listenership from the interlocutor.

This dissertation utilizes conversation analytic methodology as a base from which to determine the procedural meanings of the discourse marker "so" and the discourse marker "okay". Conversation analysis claims that an emic retrospective orientation toward data that focuses on the interlocutor's reaction to previous phenomenon reveals the mechanisms of interactional praxis, and thus linguistic meanings and social pragmatics. That is, the meaning of any language phenomenon or any linguistic praxis is determined not by the speaker's intentions, but rather through an analysis of the interlocutor's reaction. Accordingly, interlocutor's reactions that would provide evidence for the previously stated procedural meanings of both the discourse marker "so"

and the discourse marker "okay" would include the following: in the case of the discourse marker "so", the interlocutor must orient to an utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" like the utterance represented the initiation of the teleological orientation of the interaction, or in other words, the main purpose of the interaction; in the case of the discourse marker "okay", the interlocutor must orient to an utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" like the utterance represented the initiation of a relatively long spate of talk, a dolichological event, that compelled a relatively long span of silence and listenership. An examination of the corpus of oral American media gathered for this dissertation reveals each hypothesis to be true: the discourse marker "so" is oriented to as a teleology marker and the discourse marker "okay" is oriented to as an extended turn marker in the corpus data.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my three fine and very kind doctoral dissertation advisors, Professor Kazuo Fukuda, Professor Michiru Sasaki, and Associate Professor Michio Otake for their patience and thorough advice throughout my four years of study at Niigata University.

I would especially like to express my gratitude to Professor Kazuo Fukuda. He agreed to take me on as a graduate student without knowing much about me. He took a risk in taking me under his figurative wing in doing so—and that's something I greatly admire. I cannot express enough my thanks for being given such an opportunity. Thank you a million.

Papers that Form the Foundation of this Dissertation

O'Neal, George (2010b). The Discourse Particle Okay in Base Sequence First Pair Part Position. *The Journal of the Study of Modern Society and Culture* 49, 1-16.

O'Neal, George (2011a). The Discourse Particle So at Anchor Position in the American Television Drama Friends: Adumbrating a Teleological Conversation. *Niigata Studies in Foreign Languages and Cultures* 16, 61-89.

O'Neal, George (2011b). In the First Three Seconds: The Discourse Particles Okay and So at Initial Position in Monologic iTunes University Lectures. *The Journal of the Study of Modern Society and Culture* 52, 167-194.

.

Chapter 1

Down the Rabbit Hole: Assessing Communication

1   Theories of Communication

The discovery of some hidden microcosm in quotidian reality is a common trope in most fiction. A character descends into a new world, and is forever changed because of the experience. With Alice, the heroine of the story *Alice in Wonderland*, the encounter with the rabbit hole launches her into a fantasy world of marvels. With Neo, the protagonist in *The Matrix*, the red pill leads to a dystopian nightmare. Such are the vicissitudes of the genre of the veiled world: the veiled world can be miraculous, mundane, and mendacious all at the same time. And the veiled world of linguistics is no different.

This first chapter is about my own stumbling into the shrouded microcosm that is the ineffable field of interactional linguistics, one of the younger subfields of linguistics. Interactional linguistics is concerned not with language in some abstract sense, such as language as a mental representation (Chomsky 2002; Pinker 1997, 2000), but rather is intensively involved with the explication of how language is used as a tool for communication (Halliday 2009; Schegloff 2007). Interactional linguistics as a research methodology will allow us to approach the focus of this dissertation: the discourse markers "so" and "okay." However, before we venture in to the explication of those two discourse markers, we need to understand how the discourse markers will be assessed. And in order to do that, we need to explain the various interactional linguistic methodologies available to modern analysts, and justify the use of one over the others before we begin to examine the discourse markers "so" and "okay"—and that is the purpose of this chapter.

The first thing we need to do is to discuss how different methodologies claim that communication is achieved, and how the different methodologies assess the achievement of communication. We will examine three major theories of communication, each in its own section: Saussure's Telementation, Relevance Theory, and Conversation Analysis. All three methodologies overlap at certain points, but none of them are the same. Indeed, one of them is not even very concerned with communication in spite of being the brainchild of the father of linguistics.

Although a novice to the field of linguistics might think that communication and linguistics would have had and have the deepest of interconnections, that is not actually the case. For a long period of the history of linguistics as a field of study separate from the study of philosophy, the main concern of linguistics was not communication and how it was achieved (Culler 1986). In fact, the field of linguistics was divorced from communication and theories of communication, the purpose for which language exists. Indeed, the first theory of communication we examine is actually the brainchild of the first linguist, but by no means the last linguist, who claimed that understanding communication is of subordinate interest to linguistics.

2   Saussure's Telementation

How do speakers convey ideas to an interlocutor[1]? The process seems as quotidian and prosaic as could be. After all, human beings have had to be able to relate an idea

---

[1] Throughout this dissertation, the term "interlocutor" will refer to the addressee as well as anyone else who happened to hear the speaker talk. It is important to note that "interlocutor" does not specify only the speaker's addressee.

formulated in our internal cognition and convey that idea into the mind of another person since the advent of mankind. The earliest philosophers were interested in this phenomenon, the phenomenon of moving one idea out of a head and moving it into another head, and designated the phenomenon with an interesting word: telementation.

Telementation is an idea that goes back to John Locke (1689/1996), who described communication as the process by which human beings manipulate the ideas in other people's heads. Although the term "telementation" sounds like "telepathy," and might suggest a superpower to some, the idea that human beings are able to manipulate the thoughts in the minds of their interlocutors is no as strange as it sounds. After all, if people could not convey their thoughts to others, then language would be useless. Because that is fairly obvious, the first fully-fledged articulation of the idea of telementation in linguistics as a field of study separate from philosophy would have to wait for Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics, but also linguistics's first divorce lawyer.

Saussure divorced many facets of language into numerous dichotomies, most of which we will not touch upon in this dissertation. However, there is one partition that Saussure initiated that cannot be ignored: Saussure made a now famous distinction between language, which Saussure called *langue*, and language use, which Saussure called *parole* (Culler 1986). Language is the system of signs in the human mind, and language use is the mechanism by which the signs are used, in other words, communication (Culler 1986; Maruyama 1983). That is, Saussure contrasted the panoply of linguistic codes that reside in human beings from the manner in which the

code is used, and he also decided that the only viable, even worthwhile, method to research language as an object of study was to rend language from its purpose, or its *telos*: enabling communication between people.

Of course, the division of language into coding categories and communicative categories, and the subsequent elision of the later for the former, contains a problem. The first scholar to point this out was probably the greatly underappreciated linguist Tokieda Motoki (2007a, 2007b), but other scholars demonstrated that Saussure's linguistics contains numerous and serious problems (Culler 1986). For example, Saussure assumes that language was a partitionable entity within our mind; that is, *langue* can be subjected to study even if *langue* is divided from the evolutionary purpose of language—communication (Pinker 2007; Culler 1986). For Saussure, *parole* is simply the transference of code, and cannot be considered either the most important or the most interesting facet of linguistics.

In essence, Saussure assumes that all communication was just the transcription of code from one mind to another mind. To use a bad metaphor, one could conceptualize Saussure's theory of communication as telephone poles: communication simply involves sending a signal through language use, which is just a telephone pole, to another receiving mind (Culler 1986; Pinker 2007). This is the core of the theory of telementation: language use is just sending code to another mind; speakers just articulate the message as sounds, and the listener just decodes the phonemes to understand the message.

However, there are some rather easy ways to determine whether this theory is actually truly representative of how communication functions. The following example could be considered evidence that the actual manifestations of the vicissitudes of genuine communication do not conform to Saussure's ideas. In the following example, Betty and Margaret converse about Miss Kelly, but the conversation runs into trouble in line 3—the code does not seem to transfer properly.

Assessing Communication Example 1: from Schegloff 2007[2]

1	Betty:	Was last night the first time you met Missiz Kelly?
2		(1.0)
3	Margaret:	Met whom?
4	Betty:	Missiz Kelly
5	Margaret:	Yes

Betty's utterance in line 1 above contains all of the hallmarks of a question: the operator be-verb has moved to the beginning of the clause; the question mark at the end of the utterance indicates upward intonation, which in turn manifests interrogative mood. According to Saussure's theory of telementation that claims that communication is just sending linguistic signals as code between human beings, Betty's utterance is clearly a question. After all, Betty's utterance is laden with all of the paraphernalia that indicate the speaker requests information: inquisitive intonation and questioning syntax.

However, Betty's utterance in line 1 quickly runs into trouble. After a one-second period of silence in line 2, which as we will later see usually adumbrates imminent communicative troubles, Margaret responds to Betty's utterance with a "met whom?"

---

[2] All the example conversations that appear in this dissertation are transcribed according to Conversation Analytic standards, which a quick look at the transcriptions will reveal does not conform to Standard English orthographic rules. It is highly recommended that any reader first familiarize themselves with Conversation Analytic transcription conventions before going any further. Conversation Analytic transcription conventions are described in Appendix A.

That is to say, Margaret does not react to Betty's utterance as if it were a question; indeed, Margaret only reacts to Betty's utterance as if it were something like a question, but she had failed to ascertain exactly who Betty is referring to. In a word, contrary to the dictates of Saussure's ideas about telementation, Betty's message articulated as sound was not fully transferred to Margaret for some as yet unascertained reason.

This exchange of utterances in example 1 demonstrates that Saussure's ideas of telementation are not operative at all times in human communication. However, it is easy to claim that the failure to communicate in the previous example is simply due to a lack of coherence in the signal. Saussure's ideas include a notion of "noise", which can explain the lack of uptake on the part of Margaret (Maruyama 1983). Indeed, the previous example does not fully invalidate Saussure's ideas. Saussure's idea that communication is simply a telephone pole metaphor writ large can be maintained if one assumes that signal "noise" can attenuate the communicative signal and ruin the telementation process.

Yet there is a means with which Saussure's theory could be invalidated. For example, what if the coded signal was correctly received without the attenuating effects of "noise," and the communication still broke down? In other words, could the phonemic content of the message be correctly transferred to, and understood by, another person, and the communication still fail? If one could find an example of a perfectly functioning code transference that still led to miscommunication, then one could say that Saussure's ideas are lacking, and deserving of some revision (Culler 1986;

Schegloff 1988)[3]. Although one might think that such examples are hard to find, they do exist, and we will examine one below.

The following is an example of communication that fails even though the message was articulated perfectly by the speaker and received flawlessly by the interlocutor. The miscommunication occurs not because the code, or more specifically the phonetic signal, was emitted improperly, but rather because the interpretation process inherent within the communication process misfired—as it often does (Schegloff 2007). In the example below, a mother is discussing her planned visit to her son's school tonight with the family at the dinner table. The conversation between the mother and Russ goes smoothly until the sequence that begins in line 11.

Assessing Communication Example 2: adapted from Schegloff 1988

1	Mother:	z' everybody (0.2) [washed for dinner?
2	Gary:	[Yah
3	Mother:	Daddy 'n I have t- both go in different directions, en I
4		wanna talk ta you about where I'm going (t'night).
5	Russ:	mm hmm
6	Gary:	Is it about us?
7	Mother:	Uh huh
8	Russ:	I know where you're go'in,
9	Mother:	Where.
10	Russ:	To the uh (eighth grade)=
11	Mother:	=Yeah. Right.
12	Mother:	Do you know who's coming to that meeting?

---

[3] Culler (1986) and Schegloff (1988) are hardly the only scholars who have claimed that Saussure's ideas contain significant problems. Many other scholars have described other pitfalls in Saussure's ideas (e.g., Tokieda 1941/2007a), but enumerating all the scholars that have criticized Saussure would necessitate another chapter. However, I believe that Schegloff (1988) provides the best evidence that Saussure's telephone pole metaphor as a genuine example of how human communication functions is flatly wrong, although it must be pointed out that Schegloff (1988) was actually attacking Speech Act Theory in that seminal paper. Indeed, many of the criticisms leveled at Saussure's theory of communication in this dissertation apply almost equally well against Speech Act Theory as well.

13	Russ:	Who.
14	Mother:	I don't kno:w.
15	Russ:	Oh:: Probab'ly Missiz McOwen (n' detsa) en prob'ly Missiz Cadry
16		and some of the teacher. (0.4) and the coun[sellors.
17	Mother:	[Missiz Cadry went to the-
18		I'll tell you

The problematic portion of this dialogue emerges in lines 12 through 16. First, in line 12, the mother's utterance has all of the characteristics and paraphernalia of an English question: the operator "do" has appeared at the beginning of the sentence, which is usually indicative of, and a component of, a yes/no question that requests the production of a positive or negative response; furthermore, the intonation at the end of the sentence rises. If the utterance in line 12 was really a question, then the question is the first pair part[4] of a sequence that obligates the production of a matching second pair part[5] of the sequence[6] from the interlocutor, which in the case of a question is an answer; furthermore, a certain set of responses is expected; that is, a certain type of response is preferred[7] at this point (Schegloff 2007; Liddicoat 2007; Wooffitt 2005;

---

[4] First pair parts are utterances that obligate a response from the interlocutor. One of the most common first pair parts is a question: questions obligate an answer, and indeed the purpose of a question is to elicit further information from someone else. However, first pair parts are not limited to just questions. Any utterance that obligates a response from an interlocutor can be considered a first pair part (Schegloff 2007).

[5] Second pair parts are utterances that are produced in response to an obligation set up by a first pair part. Because second pair parts are produced in response to first pair parts, they are constrained to a degree: second pair parts have to match the obligations set up by the first pair part. For example, questions obligate answers, so the second pair part of a question necessitates an answer. If the second pair part obligated by a first pair part is not forthcoming, the interaction is usually problematized (Schegloff 2007).

[6] A minimal sequence is a paired first pair part with a matching second pair part. Significant sequential expansion is possible, however: pre-expansion (pre-sequences), insert expansion, and post expansion (Schegloff 2007).

[7] Preference is a difficult Conversation Analytic concept. This is mostly the fault of conversation analysts who coined the concept "preferences", even though "preference" does not actually reference any psychological preference of the individuals involved in the interaction; that is, "preference" does not imply that certain responses are more desirable than other, but rather "preference" would be better described as expectations. Responses that are more in accord with conversational expectations, not the psychological preferences of the speaker, are considered "preferred", and responses less in accord with conversational expectations are considered "dispreferred" (Pomerantz 1984; Schegloff 2007). However, it must be said that the concept of "preference" seems to have been either abandoned by many conversation analysts, or has been subject to major revision (Boyle 2000; Drew & Walker 2009).

Heinemann 2009; Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008). That is, the mother's utterance, if a question, would in this case require a "yes" or "no" in an answer.

Furthermore, according to conversation analysis, a question is not really a question unless the interlocutor orients[8] to the utterance as a question. If Russ, the mother's son, orients to his mother's utterance as a question, then he should produce an answer that demonstrates that orientation; in a word, he should respond to the utterance with an answer if he believes it is a question (Terasaki 2004; Schegloff 1980, 1988, 2007; Wagner 1996).

Yet, in line 13, Russ does not seem to orient to the mother's utterance in line 12 as a request for information. That is, Russ does not say something like "Mary is coming" or "Bob will probably be there" or anything else that would indicate that he thought that the previous utterance was a question that necessitated an answer. Rather, Russ seems to orient to the utterance in line 12 as a pre-sequence[9] to be used to set up an information

---

[8] In conversation analysis, the term "orient to" is often functionally equivalent to "react to", and usually refers to how interlocutors react to previous utterances. However, there is one major difference between the common sense meaning of "react to" and the conversation analytic term "orient to": the term "orient to" also includes the reaction of the speaker to the reaction of the interlocutor. That is, while "react to" simply notes the reaction of the interlocutor to an utterance, "orient to" usually includes both the interlocutor's reaction to the speaker's utterance and the speaker's reaction to the interlocutor's reaction. Conversation analysis utilizes a retrospective orientation in its analysis, and therefore the interlocutor's reaction to a previous utterance determines the meaning of the previous utterance. This is a radical emic view of semantics because conversation analysis actually claims the following: the meaning of an utterance resides in the reaction to an utterance, not in the utterance itself. That is, if someone reacts to a question as a joke, even if the speaker intended a question and does not initiate repair, then for all intents and purposes, the utterance is a joke. This is radically different from most other types of linguistic inquiry that claim that the meaning of an utterance is intrinsic to the utterance itself (Schegloff 1988).

[9] A pre-sequence is a type of interactional move that sets up the next interactional move (Levinson 1983; Schegloff 2007). In and of itself, the pre-sequence does nothing other than notify the interlocutor that the speaker is seeking permission to further some interactional trajectory, and is awaiting some form of go-ahead signal. For example, the expression "Guess what" is often deployed in interaction not as a move designed to implore the interlocutor to engage in guessing games. Rather, it tends to be utilized in order to set up the telling of good news (Schegloff 2007). Indeed, the most common response to "Guess what" is not any guess, but rather just "what", which is a type of go-ahead signal that indicates the interlocutor has granted permission to the speaker to relay the good news. That is, pre-sequences like "Guess what" are used to set up a further interactional move, and by themselves simply indicate that the speaker seeks a go-ahead signal from the interlocutor to continue. The following is a fictional example of a basic pre-sequence:

      1   A: Guess what!
      2   B: What?
      3   A: I just won the lottery!
      4   B: Oh wow! You buy the next round of drinks okay!

Because "Guess what" is used to set up the conveying of good news to interlocutors, and because "Guess what" actually appears before the interactional move for which it was deployed to make possible, it is called a "pre-sequences" (Terasaki 2004).

relaying base sequence first pair part (Terasaki 2004; Schegloff 1980, 1988, 2007; Liddicoat 2007). That is, Russ orients to the mother's utterance as if the utterance did not mean, "Please tell me who the other people coming to the meeting are" but rather as if it meant, "I know who the other people coming to the meeting are. Would you like me to tell you?" Indeed, Russ's response to line 12, "who?", strongly suggests that he thought the mother's utterance was not a question that requires an answer, but rather that he thought his mother would relay information to him, not the other way around.

However, Russ's orientation to the utterance in line 12 is not actually in accord with his mother's intended meaning of the utterance in line 12. Russ's response to his mother's utterance in line 13 did not display the expected reaction that would have indicated that Russ had understood the intended interpretation. We know this because the mother orients to Russ's "who" with disbelief and exasperation in line 14: she says "I don't know" with upward intonation and overall high pitch. This demonstrates that the mother does not consider Russ's orientation to her utterance as displaying something she considers appropriate and apposite; Russ has not reacted in a way in which the mother believes to be in accord with the intended meaning of her utterance in line 12.

Indeed, according to Conversation Analysis, one can deduce the intentions of speech through the examination of the interlocutor's reactions to previous utterances, and this example certainly demonstrates that (Schegloff 1991). Through the deployment of this utterance in line 14, the mother makes clear that she did not in fact intend to tell Russ anything, and that Russ had actually misinterpreted her meaning. In conversation

analytic parlance, initiates repair[10], which is defined as any attempt by one interlocutor

to reestablish intersubjectivity[11] between the interlocutors (Schegloff 1992, 1997, 2000,

2007). It is at this point that the mother has made clear that the intended meaning of the

utterance in line 12 was indeed a request for information; that is, contrary to Russ's

initial interpretation of line 12, the mother actually did intend her utterance to act as a

request for information.

Russ's reaction to the mother's "I don't know" begins in line 15. Russ's response

begins with the discourse marker "oh" in second pair part position, which strongly

suggests that Russ went from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing (Heritage

1984). In other words, Russ has realized that he misinterpreted the intended content of

the utterance in line 12, and then finally orients to, indeed reacts to, the utterance in line

12 as if it were an information request rather than a set-up question (i.e., a

---

[10] Repair is an extensive topic that deserves its own chapter, but space constraints prohibit that. However, in brief, "repair" refers to any reworking or reestablishing of previous understandings, or lack of understandings, established between the speaker and the interlocutors (Drew 1997). This is more than a simple comprehension check. It can include any reworking of any previous meaning in the conversation to form a new meaning, whether the reworking of a previous meaning is catalyzed by a misunderstanding or a purposeful recreation of previous material is irrelevant. The following example includes IPA transcription of the lexemes subject to repair, which is not a standard means of transcription in Conversation Analysis, but it demonstrates one instance of repair between a Russian speaker of English and a Japanese speaker of English. For a brief period, the meaning of /poʊ.pl̩/ is in doubt.

Russian-Japanese 3:1
1	Russian:	I thought maybe some would be li:ke rock but it was /poʊ.pl̩/ so
2	Japanese:	/pɑp.pʌl/
3		(1.0)
4	Russian:	/poʊp/
5	Japanese:	/poʊp/ ah /pɔp/ (.) /pɔp/ music? [Hn?
6	Russian:	[/poʊp/ [yes
7	Japanese:	[/pɔp/ music ah okay::

In line 1, the Russian produces /poʊ.pl̩/, which the Japanese subjects to repair in line 2 when she offers a candidate substitution for the problematized word. However, after a second of silence (line 3), the Russian offers her own candidate substitution for the problematized word in line 4. In line 5, the Japanese still does not accept or understand the Russian's candidate substitution for the problematized word, and again offers another candidate pronunciation, and then the same candidate pronunciation embedded in a compound noun to help contextualize the candidate pronunciation. In line 6, the Russian accepts the candidate pronunciation as sufficiently proximate to her intended meaning when she validates the candidate pronunciation of the problematized word with a single "yes." In line 7, the Japanese confirms that the Russian has accepted the candidate pronunciation as valid, and culminates the sequences with a single discourse marker "okay." This example demonstrates the repair of /poʊ.pl̩/ into /pɔp/ music.

[11] The conversation analytic term "intersubjectivity" is functionally equivalent to "intelligibility" in other forms of scholarship (Schegloff 1991, 1992; Jenkins 2000, 2002; O'Neal 2013 in press). In brief, both intersubjectivity and intelligibility refer to the amount of information an interlocutor and a speaker understand each other understand. In Conversation Analysis, intersubjectivity is assumed unless something is subject to repair in the interaction; indeed, intersubjectivity could be defined as the lack of conversational repair. In the example in the previous footnote, it can be said that the breakdown of intersubjectivity is publically displayed in line 2, and that the reestablishment of intersubjectivity is not publically displayed until line 7.

pre-sequence) designed to enable his Mother to relay information to him. Russ begins to enumerate all of the teachers that will probably be present at the parent-teacher meetings, which is an answer, a second pair part, to an information-requesting question. This reveals that Russ finally oriented to the utterance in line 12 as a question and this can be seen in Russ's action: he responds like he is answering a question.

This example demonstrates a facet of communication that is neither present in nor compatible with Saussure's theory of communication: the code we send to our interlocutors does not contain the entire message; language itself, or more specifically *parole* in Saussure's terms, is underdetermined[12]. To a degree, all communication is dependent on two factors, only one of which Saussure ever paid any attention to: 1) the code itself, as Saussure himself recognizes, and 2) the interpretation of the code on the other end of the figurative telephone pole, which Saussure never seems to have assumed could be contingent or problematic—indeed, there is every reason to believe that he never thought about it at all. The above example demonstrates that the interpretive process inherent in communication is ubiquitous and operative at all times. Indeed, the interpretative process is usually so fully functional and obfuscated behind a plethora of examples of successful communication in our daily lives that it is hardly ever noticed until some minor lapses in communicative coherence bring it to the surface.

Yet, misinterpretations of the intended meaning behind comprehended messages are not limited to just children's speech. Actually, the same problem manifests in adult

---

[12] Maruyama (1983) would probably just contend that Saussure's ideas of communication and Conversation Analytic ideas of communication are incommensurable. But that is hardly a defense of an idea.

speech from time to time. In the following example, two highly educated members of the American intelligentsia converse on the *Realtime with Bill Maher* podcast, a weekly comedy-news show hosted by Bill Maher, who invites new guests to his show every week to discuss current events and American politics. In the following extract from the podcast, Bill Maher interviews a guest, but their conversation briefly breaks down for reasons similar to the reasons for the breakdown of intersubjectivity in the previous example. The interviewer is Bill Maher, a very witty and inveterate left-wing American comedian, and the interviewee is Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner for economics and a published author. The details of the transcript reveal that Bill Maher reads Joseph Stiglitz's work on occasion, and Bill Maher asks Joseph Stiglitz questions about esoteric economic phenomena.

Assessing Communication Example 3: Realtime with Bill Maher 252 (6/15/2012)

1 Bill: I must uh (.) I must first start off with a confession. I have been reading you

2   for **years** so that when I went to cocktail parties I could fake my way

3 Joseph: hhnnhnn

4 Bill: through a discussion of economics ande like I read [hn

5 Joseph: [It could help.

6 Bill: It does help (.) except when people start digging further

7 Joseph: hhh[n

8 Bill: [than like the first line I can remember. Like I you said recently

9   everyone's worried in this economy about what's gonna happen in Europe.

10   And you said that you know talking about Spain (.) I read just the other day

11   you said the Spanish government is getting bailed out by the Spanish banks

12   and the Spanish banks are getting bailed out by the Spanish government. It's

13   voodoo economics. That's **per**fect for a cocktail party.

14 Joseph: Hhhnnn

15 Bill: Whadda I say if they ask me something after that?

16   ((studio audience laughs for 2.0 seconds))

17 Joseph: How long's it gonna last?

18 Bill: Oh just a couple of minutes before I run off to get another drink.

19 Joseph: Oh I meant how long's the Spanish economy gonna last.

20 Bill: Oh [hhnnhnnn

21 Joseph: [hhnnhnnn

The above example begins with Bill Maher's long story (lines 1~13) about cocktail party conversations in which he broaches economics as a conversation topic to attempt to look intellectual and knowledgeable, which he also uses to set up a question for Joseph Stiglitz in line 15: what do I say if they ask me something after that? After a couple of seconds of laughter from the studio audience (line 16), Joseph Stiglitz does not directly answer the question with pertinent advice about how one can fake airs of cognoscenti superiority; rather, he asks his own counter-question (line 17) back to Bill Maher, which retrospectively can be seen as intended and interpreted in two different ways by each of the participants, even though both understood the phonetic articulation of content of the question in line 17.

First, let us examine Bill Maher's orientation to the question in line 17. Bill Maher's orientation to the question in line 17 seems to indicate that Bill Maher interprets the anaphoric "it" in line 17 as a referent to the overall situation: the hypothetical cocktail party that Bill Maher is figuratively attending. Bill Maher orients to the question in line 17 like the question was "How long will the cocktail party last?" We know this to be the case because Bill Maher says, "Oh just a couple of minutes before I run off to get another drink," which, through conversation analysis's retrospective orientation, reveals that Bill Maher does understand the phonetic details of

Joseph's utterance. That is, Bill Maher perfectly understood the phonetic articulation of the content of the message in line 17; Saussure's conditions for the success of telementation have been fulfilled in line 17.

Even so, Bill Maher does not interpret the content of the message in line 17 as Joseph Stiglitz intended. This is plainly obvious to the analyst because Joseph Stiglitz reacts to Bill Maher's reaction (line 18) to his original question (line 17) like Bill Maher had misinterpreted his intentions. First, Joseph Stiglitz deploys the discourse marker "oh" as the preface to his response, which indicates that something has occurred in the conversation that he considers inapposite (Heritage 1998). Then Joseph Stiglitz plainly tells Bill Maher that he did not intend his question in line 17 as a query concerning the temporal length of the hypothetical cocktail party; rather, he intended his question as query concerning Bill Maher's opinion about the probable longevity of the Spanish economy's current situation. That is, the anaphoric "it" in line 17 was an anaphor intended to refer to the Spanish economy, not the hypothetical cocktail party of Bill Maher's story. Bill Maher finally realizes that his interpretation of the anaphoric "it" does not match the intended interpretation of the anaphoric "it" in line 17, clearly manifest by the "oh" in line 20, which indicates that Bill Maher has moved from a state of not-knowing to state of knowing (Heritage 1984), which brings both to a state of mirth demonstrated by their choral laughter (lines 20~21).

This example again demonstrates that interlocutors can perfectly decode the phonetic content of a message and still misapprehend the speaker's intended meanings, which is something Saussure seems to be completely unaware of being possible.

Therefore, one must admit that successful communication is contingent on more than just telementation—sending language code as phonetic signals to interlocutors. In the above example, Bill Maher understands that Joseph Stiglitz has produced an "it" in his utterance, but Bill Maher assigns a meaning to the anaphoric "it" that is incongruent with the meaning to which Joseph Stiglitz intended Bill Maher to assign to the anaphoric "it". This phenomenon—perfectly understanding the phonetic content of a message yet still failing to apprehend the intended meaning—is only possible if one believes that the communication is more than the process of receiving phonetic code.

Accordingly, communication has to be more than just the sending of acoustic signals between interlocutors. Communication is far more than the transportation of ideas along a sound wave. This example is good evidence that communication is actually more than just sending auditory signals to another person because the auditory signals have to be interpreted by the recipient, and sometimes the auditory signals are misinterpreted.

Language as code is not sufficient for communicative understanding. Interlocutors must have innate abilities to interpret incoming code; that is, the human ability to assess language as code in order to deduce the probable intended meanings is part of our genetic heritage (Pinker 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003). Accordingly, any theory of communication that we adopt to assess discourse markers in this dissertation must include an element that specifies that communication is partially dependent on the interpretation of the interlocutor, and because Saussure's telementation does not include such a component, it will not de adopted as the reigning methodology of this

dissertation. And this leads us next to Relevance Theory, which is a theory of communication that states that human cognition includes a module designed solely for interpreting linguistic code to create the optimally relevant interpretive effect.

3   Relevance Theory

Problems with Saussure's telementation were readily apparent well before the publication of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's *Relevance* (1995). Indeed, the idea that communication is just the transmission of code between interlocutors was already in shambles before the advent of Relevance Theory (Tokieda 2007a). Yet Sperber & Wilson's (1995) account of Relevance Theory is probably the most elegant theory through which one can see that Saussure's metaphor for human communication—the telephone pole metaphor—is insufficient, and that the interpretation of linguistic code is conducted in the human mind.

Although the theory begins with roots in, or at least a valid critique of, Grice's Maxims, which stipulate that communication is premised on four major guidelines, all of which can be flouted, Relevance Theory sheds most of the Gricean Maxims and compiles them into a singular principle of relevance that cannot be flouted even if someone attempted to do so: human beings automatically make interpretations of utterances, phenomena, and events that are most consistent with assumptions about the world—the interpretation with lowest cognitive cost—that yield the most information—the interpretation with the greatest relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995). In other words, relevance theory claims that human beings automatically seek the greatest

information pay-off by relating everything new with prior assumptions of the world, and that the information pay-off itself is actually a composite of the linguistic code and the relevance theoretic process which derives additional meanings above and beyond the linguistic code itself to arrive at *optimal relevance*—the interpretation that yields the greatest amount of relevance for the least cognitive effort (Sperber & Wilson 1995). The message an interlocutor processes in more than the sum total of the linguistic signal; it is an amalgam of the linguistic signal and the interpretation assigned to it on the part of the interlocutor.

Relevance Theory helps us explain, in part, the misunderstandings in examples 2 and 3: in example 2, Russ assigned optimal relevance to his mother's question that was in accord with his understanding of the world at the moment; further, in example 3, Bill Maher assigned optimal relevance to the anaphoric "it" in accord with his understanding of the world at the moment as well. Relevance Theory is compatible with a theory of communication that claims that communication is premised on at least two factors: 1) the signal from the speaker (the physical phonetic content of the message) and 2) the interpretation of the physical phonetic content of the message that is assigned to it in the mind of the interlocutor. That is, Relevance Theory claims that successful communication necessitates more than just a figurative telephone pole; it requires accurate predictions about how the speaker intends the interlocutor to interpret a message.

Although it is almost certain that evolutionary biology has equipped the human mind with some mechanism that interprets the intentions of all other beings around

humans (cf. Pinker 2003, 2007), this theory does contain a few problematic areas. For instance, this theory has a very etic[13] research methodology: all examples provided by the original theorists are the creation of the original theorists; they made up their own research data. Further, there is absolutely no data that is from natural use or real recordings. Indeed other scholars that work within this framework also used made up data (Blakemore 2002). This is highly problematic because human beings are highly susceptible to justifying their own actions after the fact, and academics are not immune to this human tendency—indeed using data one constructed to prove one's own pet theory probably just amplifies this (Haight 2012). Data must be collected without the involvement of the researcher in the data itself for it to be valid.

However, the predilection of Relevance Theoreticians to create their own data set to prove their own theories is hardly the only, nor even the most salient, problem lurking within Relevance Theory. Indeed, the criticism of the means of data collection is just a methodological quibble. A far more serious criticism of Relevance Theory is that it never specifies if the interpretive process can break down. Indeed, a reading of *Relevance* reveals that the authors never provide even one example when the interpretative process breaks down or that the interpretation with optimal relevance may indeed not be the one intended by the speaker. The more damning criticism of Relevance Theory is this: it makes no concession that interlocutors could reach optimal

---

[13] Although "etic" is an old term that dates from well before the advent of conversation analysis, that hasn't stopped conversation analysis from adopting the term. According to conversation analysis, "etic" refers primarily to the propensity of researchers to ignore how linguistic phenomenon where oriented to by conversational participants; that is, an "etic" orientation to linguistic data allows the researcher to ascertain the import of linguistic phenomenon without recourse to the displayed understanding of linguistic phenomenon. "Etic" is often used in contrastively with "emic."

relevance during the interpretive process and yet still interpret things in unintended ways.

Relevance contains no examples of misinterpretations, and the authors seem to assume that the interpretation with optimal relevance will always be the one intended by the speaker. However, as example 4 below demonstrates, that is patently not the case. The example below is the same example utilized to demonstrate that Saussure's ideas were invalid, but it can also be used to demonstrate that the main ideas of Relevance Theory are lacking as well.

Assessing Communication Example 4: Realtime with Bill Maher 252 (6/15/2012)

1 Bill: I must uh (.) I must first start off with a confession. I have been reading you
2   for **years** so that when I went to cocktail parties I could fake my way
3 Joseph: hhnnhnn
4 Bill: through a discussion of economics ande like I read [hn
5 Joseph: [It could help.
6 Bill: It does help (.) except when people start digging further
7 Joseph: hhh[n
8 Bill: [than like the first line I can remember. Like I you said recently
9   everyone's worried in this economy about what's gonna happen in Europe.
10   And you said that you know talking about Spain (.) I read just the other day
11   you said the Spanish government is getting bailed out by the Spanish banks
12   and the Spanish banks are getting bailed out by the Spanish government. It's
13   voodoo economics. That's **per**fect for a cocktail party.
14 Joseph: Hhhnnn
15 Bill: Whadda I say if they ask me something after that?
16   (studio audience laughs for 2.0 seconds; BM & JS are silent)
17 Joseph: How long's it gonna last?
18 Bill: Oh just a couple of minutes before I run off to get another drink.
19 Joseph: Oh I meant how long's the Spanish economy gonna last.
20 Bill: Oh [hhnnhnnn

21 Joseph: [hhnnhnnn

In the example above, Bill Maher assigns an interpretation to the anaphoric "it" that is optimally relevant to him, while Joseph Stiglitz intended the anaphoric "it" to mean something quite different. Although this example does prove that interlocutors do assign optimal relevance to underspecified portions of language, as Relevance Theory hypothesizes, this example also demonstrates that interlocutors can assign optimal relevance to utterances in ways that were not intended by the speaker, which is an aspect of communication that Sperber & Wilson (1995) never seem to have thought possible. In other words, optimal relevance is not always the intended interpretation, and Relevance Theory, while not specifically denying that aspect of communication, does not specifically validate it either. Accordingly, Relevance Theory has one gargantuan theoretical gap: the interpretation with optimal relevance is not always the intended one; *the interpretation with optimal relevance can actually prevent communication from being successful!*[14]

Because Relevance Theory seems to have no mechanism within its theoretical machinery that could explain the misunderstanding in example 4, and because Relevance Theory contains not even the slightest indication that the authors believed that the interpretation with optimal relevance could be something other than the interpreted intended by the speaker, it will not be utilized as the reigning methodology of this dissertation. A different analytical methodology is needed to assess the

---

[14] In Plato's "Republic," Socrates wins a series of debates with the greatest minds of his time, but Socrates always uses the same opening gambit in his counter-arguments: "do people ever make mistakes?" Of course, all of Socrates opponents have to concede that point, and that concession is all Socrates ever needs to take apart any opposing arguments (Plato 2004). The core virtue of the Socratic creed is that knowledge is a virtue, but the idea that humans are fallible is also core to that creed. It is something that Sperber & Wilson would do well to remind themselves of.

vicissitudes of discourse markers, one which accepts the Relevance Theoretic dictate that communication is a composite of the linguistic signal and an interpretative process that is inherent in human nature, while at the same time having some mechanism within it that can handle instances of misinterpretation, and indeed hypothesizes that misunderstandings are a common facet of communication. Fortunately, there is one theory of communication that does all of that, and it is called Conversation Analysis.

4   Conversation Analysis

Unlike Saussure's theory of telementation and Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory, Conversation Analysis is an emic[15] theory of communication. This means is that the meaning of any linguistic phenomenon is negotiated from within the inside of the interaction itself. One aspect of this is that meaning is not deduced from the linguistic code alone, and in this sense alone, Relevance Theory and Conversation Analysis are compatible methodologies; both Relevance Theory and Conversation Analysis contend that all communication is an interpretive process. However, the way in which meanings are deduced from the data is completely different in two important ways: 1) Conversation analysts never make up their own data to prove their own theories; 2) the meaning of any utterance is determined according to how the interlocutor reacts to an utterance, which means that conversation analysis has a very retrospective orientation to

---

[15] Although "emic" is an old term that dates from well before the advent of conversation analysis, that has not stopped conversation analysis from adopting the term. In conversation analysis, "emic" refers to the propensity of researchers to assess linguistic phenomenon according to how interlocutors oriented to linguistic phenomenon; that is, conversation analysts are often more interested in how interlocutors orient to a linguistic phenomenon than the linguistic phenomenon, believing that the reaction to something tells us more about it than an examination of the phenomenon itself. This is the core of the conversation analytic project: an "emic" orientation to any data impels the researcher to ascertain how conversational participants oriented to a certain phenomenon, rather than assign an interpretation based on the researcher's prerogative (Schegloff 1984).

data interpretation (Schegloff 1992, 2007; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks 1977; Liddicoat 2007). That is, conversation analysis does not believe that the analysis of anything in a data set is valid until an interlocutor's response can be determined.

Accordingly, questions are not assumed to be questions in conversation analysis until someone answers, or orients to, the question as a question. Jokes are not assumed to be jokes in conversation analysis until some laughs, or orients to, the joke as a joke (Wagner 1996; Firth 1996; Schegloff 2007). Single utterances in isolation are considered incomplete in conversation analysis because the minimal unit of study in conversation analysis is the sequence, not the sentence, the clause, or the utterance. In other words, what identifies an utterance as a category of speech in conversation analysis is not the characteristics of the utterance itself, but rather the orientation displayed by the interlocutor to the utterance; that is, the reaction to an utterance tells us more about the interactional significance of the utterance than the original utterance in isolation.

The idea that reactions, or orientations, determine meaning, or at least validate interpretations of data, is the core of Conversation Analysis. This is a radically emic perspective on language because most linguistic methodologies, if not all linguistic methodologies other than Conversation Analysis, associate meaning as inherent within sentences, clauses, or lexemes (cf. Searle 1969; Chomsky 2002; Eggins & Slade 1997). That is, most branches of linguistics assume that sentences, in and of themselves, determine the meaning and intentions of the speakers. Conversation Analysis turns this idea on its head. Indeed, Conversation Analysis is radical because Conversation

Analysis claims that analysis is predicated on the idea that interlocutors, not analysts, are the best judges of what something means in context (Schegloff 2007).

As an example of Conversation Analysis's retrospective orientation to data, we examine the following extract. The following example features a brief conversation between two female non-native speakers of English: Mika, a Japanese woman, and Kelly, a Taiwanese woman, who are both college students. Both names are pseudonyms. The conversation quickly turns to a discussion about school clubs and what clubs each student joined. The points of interest are in line 12 and 13.

Assessing Communication Example 5: 2011 Semester 1 Sound File 2

1	Kelly:	uh so euhn what uh which school club did di jew join?
2	Mika:	uh I was a member of Kendo club
3	Kelly:	oh Kendo club hhn it's very cool
4	Mika:	no.
5	Kelly:	hhnnhn
6	Mika:	hard sports
7		(2.0)
8	Mika:	[uh
9	Kelly:	[It's difficult
10	Mika:	yes I I don't like Kendo [hnnhnnhn
11	Kelly:	[hhnnhnn
12	Kelly:	then **why** did you join hnn [hnnn
13	Mika:	[hhnhnnn
14		(5.0)
15	Mika:	uh why do you want to come Japan
16	Kelly:	uh because uh shree years ago uhm I:::: went to Kyo- Tokyo.

In example 5 above, in line 10, Mika reveals that in spite of joining the Kendo (Japanese fencing) club at her college, she does not actually like Kendo at all. If the

utterance in line 10 was simply a statement designed to elicit an acknowledgement from the interlocutor, then the interlocutor should orient to the utterance in that way, but neither the speaker nor the interlocutor does so. In fact, both speakers break out in a chorus of giggles (lines 10 and 11), and this reveals that both students oriented to the utterance as literally "laughable", or in other words, as a joke. Furthermore, neither student challenges the co-constructed interpretation of the utterance as "laughable," or as a joke, at the next available sequential location to do so, and indeed neither participant ever challenges the orientation to the utterance in line 10 as laughable, as a joke. From this interactional fact, we can assume either that neither participant thought it was worth the trouble to challenge the interpretation of the utterance in line 10, or that the interpretation is congruent with the intended meanings of the utterance in line 10.

Next, in line 12, Kelly utters, "then **why** did you join". Mika's reaction to the utterance in line 12 begins almost immediately: laughter. That is, Mika reacts to Kelly's utterance in line 12 as a joke; she just laughs at the statement rather than orients to it as a question. Indeed, after about 5 seconds of silence, Mika self-selects, and then broaches the next topic of conversation (line 15) and foregoes any chance to problematize the interpretation of the utterance in line 12. That is, if the speaker really intended that the interlocutor orient to the utterance in line 12 as a question, line 14 would have been the best place to address those concerns.

In spite of this, Kelly accepts the question in line 15 and reacts to the question as a question in line 16 and foregoes a chance to reformulate the utterance in line 12 as a question again. Therefore, the fact that participants reacted to utterances as something

other than a question and the fact that participants avoided reformulating previous utterances if they had actually been misinterpreted can be taken as evidence that the reactions to the utterances did indeed faithfully demonstrate the meaning of the utterances themselves as the speakers intended them. In sum, a retrospective orientation, which determines the meaning of utterances retrospectively through an examination of the reactions interlocutors display to previous utterances, reveals the true social semiotic.[16]

The previous example demonstrates that speakers and interlocutors orient to utterances that reveal how the interlocutors interpret those utterances *in situ*. However, unlike Relevance Theory, Conversation Analysis assumes neither that the interlocutor's interpretation is always the one intended by the speaker, nor that the interpretation with optimal relevance is actually the one intended by the speaker. Indeed the next example demonstrates that speakers and interlocutors repair misunderstandings in interactions. In the next example, two female non-native speakers of English converse: Kelly, a Taiwanese woman, and Mika, a Japanese woman. Both names are pseudonyms. The speakers repair a misunderstanding that seems to be the result of a pronunciation of a word in line 13.

---

[16] One may take exception to conversation analytic methodology on this point. For instance, one may claim that conversation analysis is very superficial because it only analyzes surface features and ignores the deeper cognitive reality of communication (Biling 1999a, 1999b; Eggins & Slade 1997). One could claim that the dialogue in the example 5 does not actually demonstrate that Kelly intended to tell a joke. She might have actually been asking a question, but Mika just did not answer the question at all. While that is all certainly possible, conversation analysis makes a very important distinction between what actually happens in interaction and participant intentions in interaction. If Kelly really intended her utterance in line 12 of example 5 to be a question that she expected to be oriented to as an information request, that is actually irrelevant to the interactional details: Kelly did not challenge Mika to answer her question, and let Mika's orientation to her utterance as a joke stand unchanged. So, whether Kelly actually intended her utterance to be a question or not is irrelevant because her utterance was oriented to as a joke, not a question, and Kelly never challenged that orientation to her utterance. Therefore, any claim that Kelly actually intended her utterance as a question to be oriented to as such is the etic interpretation of the analyst, not the emic reading of the interactional details. If one wishes to assign an information request interpretation to Kelly's utterance in line 12 of example 5, they can, but at that point they are no longer engaged in conversation analysis (Schegloff 1999a, 1999b).

Assessing Communication Example 6: 2011 Semester 1 Sound File 2

1	Kelly:	uh uh what's your favori food?
2	Mika:	Uh (0.5) I love cheesecake.
3	Kelly:	Oh.
4	Mika:	uh it is very (0.5) sweets ando (1.0) mhm, I like very I like very much
5	Kelly:	Oh::: me too.
6	Mika:	Mhm
7	Kelly:	hhnnhn uh (1.5) eh (0.5) hhnn
8	Mika:	hh eh uh so what's your favorite movie
9		(2.0)
10	Kelly:	uh my favori (0.5) my favori movie is Hurry Potter
11	Mika:	Oh:: me too.
12	Kelly:	Oh. It's very interesting.
13	Mika:	Un what /sərəz/ do you like?
14		(0.5)
15	Kelly:	Uh, sweet. a sweet.
16	Mika:	[Oh::.
17	Kelly:	[Uh:::.
18		(0.5)
19	Kelly:	Uh::: I like tch, choc, chocolate.
20	Mika:	Hnh.
21	Kelly:	Hnh.
22	Mika:	Me too me too.
23	Kelly:	uh (1.0) uh
24		(1.5)
25	Mika:	hhnn

In the above example, the meaning of /sərəz/ is in doubt. Certainly the interlocutor reacts to the utterance containing /sərəz/ like she did not understand: Kelly provides a few candidate words for how she believes she is intended to interpret /sərəz/. Kelly

offers "sweet" as the candidate interpretation of /sɜ́rəz/, although Mika may have simply intended to ask, "Which one of the Harry Potter series did you like?"

However, conversation analysis believes that interlocutors get a vote in the semantics of any lexemes. Whether Mika actually intended the utterance in line 13 as a question about which Harry Potter movie Kelly liked the best is interactionally irrelevant because Kelly offers candidate interpretations of the utterance in line 13 and Mika eventually accepts Kelly's interpretation of the meaning of /sɜ́rəz/ as "sweet" in line 22. That is, whatever the intended meaning of the word /sɜ́rəz/ is in line 13, by line 22 both participants have oriented to the meaning of /sɜ́rəz/ was "sweets," and therefore the meaning of the utterance in line 13 interactionally became "what is your favorite sweets?" rather than "what is your favorite movie in the Harry Potter series?" This brings us to an important point about Conversation Analysis: the meaning of any word can be renegotiated in repair, and meanings are not fixed, but rather subject to negotiation between conversation participants (Schegloff 1988, 1992, 1997, 2000, 2007; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks 1977; Wong 2000). In a way, the methodological claims of conversation analysis are very similar to other branches of Radical Pragmatics[17].

Because conversation analysis assumes that the interpreted optimally relevant meanings of lexemes are not necessarily the interpretations intended by the speaker, and because conversation analysis contains a methodology to determine the intended meanings of utterances in interactions, it will be adopted as the reigning methodology of

---

[17] The term "Radical Pragmatics" was coined by Geoffrey Nunberg (2006), and was originally used to designate linguists who claim that no lexeme means anything within the mind void of context. It was also pejorative. Steven Pinker (2008) includes Relevance Theory within Radical Pragmatics, although, as we have seen in this section, the claims of Conversation Analysis and Relevance Theory are not the same.

this dissertation in order to determine the meanings and functions of the two discourse markers under study. Conversation analysis is the best methodology for determining the interactional importance of discourse markers.

5   Summary

In sum, communication is a multistage process in which speakers send messages, interlocutors interpret the messages, and then speakers assess the reaction of the interlocutors to their message. Usually, this process is so successful that it renders the interpretive process more or less invisible—or better yet, so prosaic that it is equivalent to invisible. However, at certain times, the mechanism shows itself when communication breaks down or fails at one of the stages: it is possible that the interlocutor perfectly heard an utterance, but interpreted it in a way unintended by their speaker—as in example 6 above.

Because the communication system works so well, to the point of obfuscating the interpretation process completely behind a veil of seemingly instantaneous understanding, Saussure's theory of communication stood unchallenged for decades. But work within cognitive linguistics, Relevance Theory in particular, demonstrates that the interpretive process is operative at all times, although that does not mean that the interpretative process functions perfectly at all times. And recognition of that fact is the reason that conversation analysis is a better methodology for the assessment of discourse markers.

This study takes as axiomatic that communication is a process of sending signals to an interlocutor who interprets the signals—communication is not a telephone pole, nor is it always a processes of deriving optimal relevance. Most of the time, the interpretation of the signal is correct, but at certain points (i.e., repair sequences) the interpretative machinery breaks down, and the communication is put on hold for the duration of a repair sequence which re-establishes common ground between the parties. The central claim of this dissertation is that discourse markers are an important part of the interpretive process, helping interlocutors arrive at intended interpretations, and that is the topic to which we turn next, in the following chapters.

.

Chapter 2

Heterogeneous Squared: The Characteristics of Discourse Markers

1   What are Discourse Markers?

Well, what are discourse markers? *Well*, that is an easier question to, *um*, ask than to, *you know*, answer. *Uh, yeah, I mean* they are not exactly*, say,* words*, you know.* They are*, like,* a different type of word, almost a new part of speech, even though they are often lumped into the dump bucket category of parts of speech called interjections. But*, see*, discourse markers are quite different than*, say,* vocatives and other members of the class called interjections. *Well,* how are they different? *Okay, you see,* that is a very difficult question to answer. But the answer can start, as with most topics in linguistics, with a stroll down memory lane.

As with all discussions of linguistics, inevitably, we encounter Noam Chomsky: in older and more traditional forms of linguistics discourse markers were conceptualized as manifestations of linguistic performance rather than linguistic competence (Chomsky 2002) [1] . What is the difference between linguistic competence and linguistic performance? *Well*, *see*, Chomsky, continuing in the line of linguistic inquiry begun under the auspices of Ferdinand de Saussure (Culler 1986), makes a distinction between the linguistic process happening in your head and, *you know*, the actual language used in, *well*, *like,* everyday life. The code in your head—Chomsky does not call it a code; he calls it a universal grammar—is manifest as linguistic competence, and one of the central features of linguistic competence is that it is bereft of "errors" such as "um, see, uh, yeah, well" and other manifestations of disfluencies, infelicities, jibber-jabber, and

---

[1]   Although Saussure's *langue* and *parole* are not the same as Chomsky's *competence* and *performance*, the effect of the acceptance of either dichotomy as a valid distinction would have on the study of discourse markers would be the same. That is, both dichotomies relegate discourse markers to the category that was considered to be of lesser value to the study of linguistics (Culler 1986).

other general conversational gobbly-gook, of which discourse markers are sometimes considered a type (Chomsky 2002). Linguistic performance, on the other hand, is what actually happens when people speak, and actual performance is laden with a menagerie of linguistic beasts: discourse markers, vocatives, particles, hesitation signals, and fillers.

In actual communication, lexemes that cannot be tightly fit into a Chomskian tree diagram start to bud up all over the place, but according to Chomsky, these are not metaphorical leaves, inherent to a true tree metaphor (Chomsky 2002). Rather, these things are all manifestations of our collective language bungling, our collective inability to manifest our linguistic competence. For Chomsky, elements not reducible to tree diagram nodes are malapropisms at best, and linguistic flatulence at worst. Basically, linguistic performance is our inability to enunciate the grammar in our minds. Furthermore, discourse markers are described as the detritus of cognitive language processing—the linguistic version of bovine flatulence, a side effect of the process but not part of the process of communication—and accordingly not worthy of serious scholarship. This standpoint can still be found today in fields of linguistics that accord a superlative importance to syntax, usually on the basis of the idea that syntax is linguistically prior to all other facets of language.

However, that standpoint did not go unchallenged for long. Indeed, with the advent of sociolinguistic methodologies to the study of non-syntactic elements in language praxis, pioneered by Schiffrin (1987) and Schourup (1985), the importance of components of language that are not easily limited to syntactic taxonomy were revealed.

One of the premises upon which all sociolinguistics is based is that interaction is prior to syntax; that is, sociocultural facets affecting language usage phylogenetically and ontogenetically precede syntactic form, which is a position that mirrors a central tenet of Hallidayan linguistics: language developed to perform a function, and manifests itself as such, not the other way around (Halliday 2004, 2009). This study adopts Halliday's standpoint on language as a product of linguistic functions without adopting Halliday's methodology: that is, all facets of language are the product of language being designed to perform a function, and discourse markers are certainly a manifestation of linguistic functions.

Although other work preceding Schiffrin's (1987) and Schourup's (1985) pioneering studies dealt with Discourse Markers—even though that nomenclature was never used—on some level (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1976; James 1972, 1973), Schiffrin (1987) and Schourup (1985) were the first scholars to shine a lens only on phenomena that are now considered to be discourse markers. Schiffrin's pioneering work on discourse markers was succeeded by scholarship heavily influenced by Relevance Theory, especially that of Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2001, 2011), which claimed that discourse markers are intertwined with the assumptions speakers and interlocutors make about *optimal relevance*[2] to utterances in conversations.

However, over two decades of research on discourse markers has not inevitably led to an agreed-upon definition or taxonomy that either categorizes or describes all

---

[2] As stated in chapter 1, "optimal relevance" refers to the interpretation of an utterance that has the greatest amount of relevance for the least amount of cognitive cost (Sperber & Wilson 1984/1995). However, one needs to remember that the interpretation with "optimal relevance" is not always the speaker's intended meaning; that is, the interpretation with optimal relevance and the interpretation intended by the speaker do not necessarily match. This is a serious issue that Relevance Theory does not contend with.

discourse markers. Even after more than twenty years of research on discourse markers, no methodological convergence has occurred; in fact, the field has not become more syncretic, but rather more eclectic. Indeed, what is referred to as discourse markers throughout this dissertation are also called "interjections" (James 1973), "response cries" (Goffman 1981), "cue phrases" (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990), "lexical fillers" (James 1983), "tokens" (Kasper 2009), "receipt tokens" (Young & Lee 2004), "sequential markers" (Sidnell 2010), "connectives" (Halliday & Hasan 1976), and "pragmatic markers" (Ajimer, Foolen, & Simon-Vandenbergen 2006) by other scholars. As the plethora of terminology suggests, what are discourse markers—and what they are not—is a question that is still very much alive and still in debate even to this day[3].

However, it must be stated that the panoply of descriptive monikers used as nomenclature for discourse markers is not the result of linguists not listening to each other, but rather is the natural byproduct of the heterogeneous nature of discourse markers themselves. That is, what are collectively called discourse markers throughout this work are semantically and pragmatically heterogeneous enough to warrant the circus of nomenclature and taxonomy (Fischer 2006a). Indeed, with a few exceptions, discourse markers are etymologically derived from different parts of speech and syntactic classes, so it is not surprising that discourse markers would be extremely heterogeneous, and as a result, difficult to classify. In sum, the menagerie of names for discourse markers is an inevitable result of studying elements of language that are

---

[3] Indeed, this dissertation will add yet another definition to the slew of definition already in circulation. Although this dissertation refers to the elements under study as "discourse markers," the dissertation defines them in a new way.

etymologically derived from different parts of speech that naturally resist collective description.

2 Fischer's (2006) Framework

Accordingly, this study needs to define what discourse markers are before continuing any further in order to avoid any potential confusion, while also being cognizant that discourse markers are difficult to pin down as a class and categorize as a coherent group. First, any research has to seriously contend with the heterogeneous nature of discourse markers: discourse markers are etymologically derived from very different parts of speech, and perform very different functions; any helpful taxonomy has to deal with that fact.

This study adopts the descriptive framework advocated by Fischer (2006a) to categorize discourse markers. Fischer's framework is malleable enough to describe the heterogeneous character of discourse markers, many of which are synchronically derived from different parts of speech, but it does, however, sacrifice taxonomic exactitude for an eclectic mode of categorization. First, pointing out that not every discourse marker will qualify for every characterization in his descriptive framework, Fischer (2006a) reminds us that words that qualify for a greater number of the tenets of the framework are simply more closely approximate to the ideal discourse marker, and words that qualify for a fewer number of the tenets of the framework are simply less closely approximate to an ideal discourse marker.

This framework allows us to include many different words in the category "discourse marker", but it does not force us to strictly categorize discourse markers as a taxonomic class of entities. Therefore, this malleable framework captures the fact that discourse markers are a category of heterogeneous words and makes taxonomic allowances for that fact. Again, this framework allows us to determine that some words are more discourse marker–like and other words are less discourse marker–like. This is in keeping with most current research, which states that discourse markers are a heterogeneous group with very different meanings (Hansen 1998; Schourup 2011, 2001; Macaulay 2000; Schegloff 2010; Schiffrin 2006; Fischer 2006a, 2006b).

2.1 Discourse Markers & Syntax

According to Fischer's descriptive framework, the first characteristic of discourse markers concerns their relationship with syntax: discourse particles are not part of syntactic structures; that is, discourse markers operate on a plane separate from that of syntax (Schiffrin 1987; Blakemore 2002; Fischer 2006a). Indeed, this dissertation will argue that discourse markers function at the level of the sequence, not the clause or compound clause. In fact, when trying to establish a relationship between discourse markers and syntax through syntactic movement tests, scholars find it impossible to design any syntactic test that affects the position of the discourse marker in the clause, as we will see below.

If the position of discourse markers is related to syntactic structures, then syntactic movement should affect the position of discourse markers in a syntactic clause. In order to determine if syntactic movement affects discourse markers, this study will

perform five different syntactic movement tests on a declarative clause prefaced with a discourse marker, in this case the discourse marker "so". One should note that the discourse marker "so" is always at the head of the clause, regardless of the syntactic movement test that was performed on the clause itself. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the discourse marker "so" does not preface the clause. Accordingly, one must assume that if the discourse marker "so" really is a component of syntactic structures, then it must be in a node superordinate to everything else in the clause, or one must abandon the notion that syntactic movement affects discourse markers. We will conduct some syntactic movement tests on clauses prefaced with the discourse marker "so" below to determine which is true.

However, as of yet there is no syntactic node or level that is described as a location for discourse markers to reside in (Haegeman 1994). This is the inevitable result of the dichotomy between linguistic performance and linguistic competence. Within X-bar theory, no compelling reason exists to suppose that there is a syntactic node in which a discourse marker could reside.

One might consider that the specifier position of the CP node could potentially be the position occupied by discourse markers. After all, coordinating conjunctions, which are often described as discourse markers (Blakemore 2002), occupy positions in the CP node. However, this possibility will be refuted in syntax examples 3 & 5 below. When other elements of a clause rise to the specifier position of the CP node, the discourse marker is not dislodged from the clause. It still prefaces the entire clause. Accordingly, one cannot claim that discourse markers occupy a position in the CP node.

Therefore, the syntactic tests performed below need to assume a position for the discourse markers to occupy. For the sake of argument, this dissertation will assume the existence of a discourse phrase, occupied by the discourse marker "so," superordinate to the complement phrase (CP), at the head of the following clause: you understand discourse markers well. The clause is admittedly syntactically simple, but such a simple clause allows us to perform many types of syntactic tests on it in order to see if any type of syntactic movement affects either the position of the discourse marker "so" or the discourse marker "so" itself.

Syntactic Test 1: Declarative Syntax

Declarative Syntax: *so you understand discourse markers well*

In syntactic test 1, the discourse marker "so" is superordinate to all other elements in the syntactic structure. At this point, this fact is entirely expected: superordinate elements are only affected by subordinate elements in syntactic structures if there is movement of some sort, usually upward movement along the tree diagram (Haegeman 1994). No component of the structure has been subject to raising movement, so it is hardly surprising that the discourse marker "so" has not been affected by anything. This example does not demonstrate that discourse markers are unrelated to syntax, but just sets up a reference for all the other syntactic tests we will perform next.

Syntactic Test 2: Declarative Syntax to Yes/No Question Syntax

Yes/No Question Syntax: *so do you understand discourse markers well*

In syntactic test 2, the tense from position I moves to position C higher in the tree diagram, which in turn changes the clause from non-question syntax to question syntax. Unlike syntactic test 1, the tense moves up the tree diagram, and manifests as the operator do in position C. However, the important thing to note is that the discourse marker "so" has been left unaffected by the syntactic movement. There are two possible explanations at this point: 1) the discourse marker "so" is unaffected by syntax, or 2) the discourse marker "so" is too far superordinate to the movement in example 2 to be affected. As of now, both explanations are possible.

Syntactic Test 3: Declarative Syntax to WH–Question Syntax

WH-Question Syntax: *so how do you understand discourse markers*

In syntactic test 3, the tense from position I moves to position C higher in the diagram, which in turn changes the clause from non-question syntax to question syntax. Furthermore, the adverb "how" moves from the lowest portion of the diagram to the specifier position of the CP. Again, the important thing to note is that the discourse marker "so" has been left unaffected by either type of syntactic movement, but now we are in a position to claim something relevant to the relationship between syntax and discourse markers: the discourse marker "so" does not occupy the CP specifier position.

Syntactic Test 4: Declarative Syntax to Negative Syntax

Negative Syntax: *so you do not understand discourse markers well*

Discourse Phrase

So   CP

                    C'

            C   IP

        [-Q/-Wh] NP   I'

                    You   I   Neg'

                        [2p/Sin] Neg   VP

                            do   not   V   NP

   understand NP   AdvP

                                        discourse markers   well

In syntactic test 4, the negation bar is appended to the syntactic structure, below the tense. However, the discourse marker "so" continues to be unaffected by the presence of any element in the syntactic diagram. The discourse marker "so" and the appended negation node further down the syntactic tree diagram are quite far apart, so it is not exactly surprising that the negation does not affect the discourse marker "so." Accordingly, this example does not prove that the discourse marker "so" and syntax are unrelated, but it does show that negation and the discourse marker "so" are unrelated.

Syntactic Test 5: Declarative Syntax to Topicalized Verbal Object Syntax

Topicalized Verbal Object Syntax: *so discourse markers you understand well*

In syntactic test 5, the NP object of the verb has been moved to the CP specifier position, the highest position allowed to any constituent in X-bar theory (Haegeman 1994)[4]. However, if one assumes that there is a further superordinate level, a discourse phrase, and one fills that level with the discourse marker "so," then the movement of a topicalized verbal object does not affect the discourse marker "so" at all. That is, even movement of one of the most subordinate elements in an English syntactic structure, an object of a verb, to a position that is often considered the most superordinate of all in generative syntax does not affect the positioning of the discourse marker "so" in any syntactically verifiable way.

This example demonstrates one more important fact about discourse markers: they do not locate themselves in the CP specifier position. In the example above, the NP "discourse marker" has occupied the CP specifier position, but the discourse marker "so" still precedes the topicalized NP. Because the discourse marker "so" does not seem to occupy the CP specifier position, then it is difficult to claim that discourse markers just occupy a similar space to coordinating conjunctions and subordinating conjunctions, which fill the CP specifier position in X-bar theory (Haegeman 1994). This fact can be rationalized in two ways: 1) either the discourse marker "so" occupies a node that is superordinate to the CP node; or 2) the discourse marker "so" is not part of the syntactic structure of the clause at all.

---

[4] It must be pointed out that the X-bar theory expressed in Haegeman (1994) seems to not include any of the discoveries of minimalist syntax. Therefore, it is only fair to say that the above syntactic tests might not represent the most comprehensive and authoritative types of syntactic tests in current generative syntactic theory. The omission is the fault of author, who has only a basic knowledge of generative grammar.

In spite of the various syntactic tests performed on the declarative clause prefaced with the discourse marker "so," the discourse marker "so" remains unaffected. The discourse marker "so" continuously positions itself at the beginning of clause, and no matter what syntactic test is performed on the clause itself, the discourse marker "so" is always at the head of the clause: that is, clausal structure and discourse marker position do not seem to affect each other; discourse markers seem to always preface clauses regardless of the type of clausal syntax the discourse marker "so" precedes.

Accordingly, two possibilities present themselves: 1) the existence of a discourse phrase is a legitimate theory that explains why clauses can be prefaced with a discourse marker "so," and still be unaffected by the above syntactic tests; this explanation claims that the discourse phrase is superordinate to the CP, which would explain why elements positioned in the discourse phrase remain unaffected by syntactic movement in subordinate positions; however, this explanation—although possible—would necessitate a serious reworking of the theory of generative syntax, which is not the purpose of this dissertation; 2) the discourse phrase is superordinate to the clause only because discourse markers do not function at the sentential level, but rather function at a discourse, or sequential, level; that is, discourse markers are unaffected by syntactic tests because discourse markers do not work at the sentential level, but rather at the level of sequences[5]. The fact that the previous syntactic tests did not affect the position of the discourse marker "so" in any appreciable way validates both possibilities, but

---

[5] This is exactly how Sidnell (2010) justifies the term "sequential marker": discourse markers do not function at either the sentential level or the discourse level; they function at the sequential level, so the nomenclature "sequential marker" is much more apt.

offers no firm conclusions. However, the above syntactic evidence suggests that syntax is unrelated to discourse markers[6].

Characteristics of Discourse Markers: (1)

- Discourse markers are unaffected by syntactic movement, and seem to function at a level higher than the sentential, clausal, or multi-clausal level.

However, it must be again pointed out that according to Fischer's framework not all discourse markers will actually be unrelated to syntactic structures. Indeed, some discourse markers, for example "you know", seem to be weakly related to syntactic structures on some level, and can be positioned at various places within a clause, unlike the discourse markers "so" and "okay". Again, although most discourse markers are unrelated to syntactic structures, because of processes that are currently ongoing, some discourse markers are more subject to syntactic government than others. This characteristic of discourse markers—being unrelated to syntactic structures—may be shared by many discourse markers, but certainly not by all.

However, if the only characteristic of discourse markers was that they were unrelated to syntactic structures, then discourse markers would be exactly the same as vocatives and sentence adverbs. However, this is clearly not the case—at least for most scholars[7]. There are other features of discourse markers that differentiate them from vocatives and mere sentence adverbs, which are all characteristics that we discuss next.

---

[6] There are, of course, some scholars who claim otherwise. According to these scholars, some discourse markers indeed seem to have at least some minimal relationship with syntax (e.g., Urgelles-Coll 2011). However, the discourse markers studied by Urgelles-Coll are not the same ones under study in this dissertation. It does not seem plausible to the author that Urgelle-Coll's (2011) findings would apply to the discourse markers "so" and "okay," which are the focus of this dissertation.

[7] The exception is the scholarship of Deborah James (1972, 1973) who claimed that discourse markers are just one more

2.2   Discourse Markers & Semantics

The next feature of discourse markers involves the semantics of discourse markers. Some scholars claim that discourse markers are polysemous, which means that discourse markers manifest different meanings in different contexts, and other scholars insist that discourse markers are monosemous, which means that discourse markers express one core meaning (Hansen 2006; Fischer 2006b; Vivien 2006). This is one area of huge debate in the academic literature that continues to be hotly contested[8]. There are two main reasons why linguists still debate the semantics of discourse markers: 1) linguists do not use one methodology to justify their claims, and often the stance of the scholar on the polysemous-monosemous dichotomy depends more on the linguist's research methodology than the discourse markers themselves[9]; 2) discourse markers are heterogeneous group of lexemes derived from many different parts of speech, which makes categorical statements about the semantics of discourse markers all the more difficult. Accordingly, it would be irresponsible to claim that discourse markers are either polysemous or monosemous without assessing the issue head on, and that is what we endeavor to do next.

First, it must be pointed out that polysemy is very common in English. Many words in English express very different meanings depending on the context: if one begins a book, one starts to read it; if an author begins a book, he or she starts to write

---

component of the interjections part of speech. It is safe to say that most recent researchers have abandoned this position.

[8]   There is one academic monograph that is basically devoted to this one subject: Approaches to Discourse Particles (Fischer 2006a). Although the monograph is quite extensive, the scholars never arrive at an answer even after hundreds of pages of debate.

[9]   This dissertation will be guilty of the same crime. This dissertation claims that discourse markers are polysemous more for methodological reasons than the characteristics of discourse markers as a coherent class of entities.

the book. Polysemy can appear in many environments with words that are nominally the same.

This dissertation contends that discourse markers are polysemous rather than monosemous; in other words, discourse markers can express more than one core meaning that can be interpreted with different shades of meaning depending on the context (Ajimer 2002; Hansen 2006; Lewis 2006; Fischer 2006b)[10]. In conversation analysis, "context" is not a nebulous term that could connotate just about any amorphous concept that the linguist wants. In conversation analysis, "context" usually refers to the interlocutor's orientation to previous utterances.

Because conversation analysis insists that context and semantics are both products of participant orientations, creating tests to determine whether a discourse marker is polysemous or monosemous is fairly simple using conversation analytic methodology: if interlocutors orient to the same discourse marker in different ways, then the discourse marker is polysemous; if interlocutors continuously orient to the same discourse marker in the same manner, then the discourse marker is monosemous. Therefore, descriptions of the polysemous or monosemous character of discourse markers will be based on how interlocutors orient to the discourse markers, not on the discourse markers in isolation,

---

[10]   The debate concerning the semantics of discourse markers is far from settled. Some scholars claim that discourse markers are polysemous; that is, discourse markers have many different meanings (Hansen 2006; Lewis 2006; Waltereit 2006; Borderia 2006). Other scholars, indeed perhaps the majority of linguistic who deal with discourse markers, insist that discourse markers are monosemous; that is, discourse markers have one core meaning (Vivien 2006; Nyan 2006; Fraser 2006; Weydt 2006). This is probably the greatest controversy over discourse markers right now. In fact, there is even a minority third position: discourse markers are monosemous, but they have slightly different shades of meaning depending on the context in which they are placed (Fischer 2006b). This dissertation takes a stand in this debate, and claims that discourse markers, or at least the two discourse markers under study in this dissertation, are polysemous. This position is based more on methodology than anything else: according to conversation analysis, the meaning of any element is somewhat dependent on the orientation of the interlocutor; that is, interlocutors have a vote in what anything means in the previous utterance (Wagner 1996). If one accepts that premise, then anything, not just discourse markers, can be polysemous. For that reason alone, this dissertation declares that discourse markers are polysemous.

because within conversation analysis, it is the interlocutor's reaction that matters when determining meaning (Wagner 1996; Schegloff 2007)[11].

In the following polysemous-monosemous tests, conversation analytic methodology is used to determine the semantics of lexemes; that is, the interlocutor's orientation to the previous utterances and the lexemes contained within will be determinative. In Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1, three friends are making dinner together in a kitchen, discussing the price of extra food they have to buy for the dinner they are preparing, although only Rebecca and Rick will actually converse in the example below.

Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1: SBCSAEP1 CHA08 Lines 267-271[12]

1	Rebecca:	Do you know how much it's gonna be?
2	Rick:	Oh no. Not yet.
3	Rebecca:	Okay. u:m
4		(.)
5	Rebecca:	do you guys have the cash to pay for it now?
6		(2.0)
7	Rebecca:	When you- to get out?
8	Rick:	Yeah I think so.

In the above example the discourse marker "okay" appears in line 3. Rebecca asks a question to Rick, who orients to the utterance as a question and responds accordingly in line 2. Rebecca orients to the information in line 2 like it was sufficient to answer her

question in line 1. From the reactions, we can understand that Rick interpreted Rebecca's utterance as a question, which is in accord with how Rebecca intended Rick to interpret her utterance in line 1. That is, the discourse marker "okay" that appeared in line to 3 is a marker of sufficient information receipt (Beach 1990; Schegloff 2007).

After Rebecca deploys the discourse marker "okay" in line 3, she quickly launches another sequence that begins with another question addressed to the two other interlocutors present in line 5. Neither interlocutor orients to Rebecca's question at all. There are two seconds of silence in line 6, which could indicate many things: 1) Rick or the other friend did not hear Rebecca, or 2) Rick or the other friend do not want to answer, or 3) Rick or the other friend do not have enough information at this point in time to orient to the Rebecca's utterance as a question. Rebecca orients to the complete lack of uptake as problematic and relaunches the same question with more specific information in line 7; that is, Rebecca orients to the lack of an orientation to her utterance as a question by trying the question again, in a word, repair. Fortunately for Rebecca, the extra information provided in the utterance in line 7 seems to have been sufficient enough for Rick to provide an answer. In line 8, Rick finally orients to Rebecca's two utterances in lines 5 and 7 as a question and provides an answer.

The important thing to note is that Rebecca deploys the discourse marker "okay" in sequence closing third position to indicate that the previous sequence had culminated sufficiently. Furthermore, Rick never challenges the way in which Rebecca deployed the discourse marker "okay," so it is possible to claim that Rick accepted the way in which the discourse marker "okay" was used. In Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1, one

participant deploys the discourse marker "okay" to indicate satisfaction with the culmination of a sequence, and another participant does not challenge that usage of the discourse marker "okay." However, to determine whether the discourse marker "okay" is polysemous or monosemous, we need at least two examples and so we examine one more next.

Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1 demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" is oriented to by participants as a means to complete a sequence in order to indicate that the sequence has ended satisfactorily. If the next example in Polysemous-Monosemous Test 2 demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" is used in the same way again, that would be conversation analytic evidence for the monosemous standpoint; however, if the next example demonstrates that participants use the discourse marker "okay" in a different way, that would be conversation analytic evidence for the polysemous standpoint. In the next example, Alin and Leonard, who are brothers, are chatting, and Alin is about to tell Leonard about a conversation their sister, Elizabeth, had with their mother.

Polysemous-Monosemous Test 2: SBCSAEP1 CHA06 Lines 320-348[13]

1	Alin:	Did I tell you about when Mom was having Arnold and Lisabeth over
2		for lunch finally
3		(1.0)
4	Alin:	.hh Okay well Mom (.) They call up in August and go (.) I mean it's
5		(.) Daddy's been dead what (.) seven years and finally it dawns on
6		Lisabeth that she doesn't see Mom that much

7		(1.0)
8		well it's cause she n- (.) I know she never calls her right .hh So Mom
9	Leonard:	((swallows something))
10	Alin:	hh. she just goes I feel like you've got a whole other w:orld outside of
11		us like you don't even need us Mar and that you have a whole other
12		life
13	Leonard:	.hh
14	Alin:	Mom said I do (laughs) .hh well.
15	Leonard:	.hh poor Lisabeth

In the above example, the discourse marker "okay" appears in line 4. Alin begins to tell a story, in this case a short story, to Leonard, and Alin begins with one of the hallmarks of an English story in lines 1~2: a pre-sequence. The question, "did I tell you about..." often projects further information-telling if the interlocutor indicates that he or she was not "told about" something; that is, with the appearance of an appropriate "go-ahead" signal, the speaker will proceed to relate the projected information. In this example, the question in lines 1~2 projects a story about "mom" and "Lisabeth". The go-ahead signal is not audible in the sound file data, but the presence of a significant pause, and the fact that Alin begins to tell the story, seems to indicate that some form of non-verbal go-ahead signal was exchanged between Alin and Leonard in line 3, which Alin orients to as a prompt to begin telling the story about "mom" and "Lisabeth" in line 4.

It is very important to note that it is not an accident that at exactly the point of transition between the pre-sequence in lines 1~2 and the beginning of the first pair part of the base sequence in line 4 a discourse marker "okay" appears. That is, this discourse marker "okay" does not appear in sequence closing third position as it did in the

example in Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1. Rather, it appears in base sequence first pair part position, right at the beginning of Alin's story. But the sequential positioning is not the only difference: the orientation of the interlocutor to Alin's story, and the discourse marker "okay," is different than the previous example. The interlocutor in this example reacts to the discourse marker "okay", and indeed the entire base sequence first pair part, with silence, which is exactly the expected response to a story. Indeed, the interlocutor does not make any verbal responses until Alin has indicated that the story is finished in line 14. In other words, Leonard oriented to Alin's utterances prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" like he thought the other speaker was going to take an extended turn.[14]

Leonard's orientation to the utterances prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" is very different to Rick's orientation to the discourse marker "okay." Leonard orients to the utterances prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" with a long silence, which is the appropriate orientation to someone who is attempting to tell a story. Rick, on the other hand, orients to Rebecca's use of the discourse marker "okay" to demonstrate that she accepted his answer as sufficient with silence as well, but there is a key difference: Rebecca launches another sequence that Rick orients to as a further question. These two examples demonstrate that participants are orienting to the discourse marker "okay" in

---

[14] It could be easily claimed that Leonard orients to Alin's utterances as a story and remains quiet, not because of the presence of the discourse marker "okay," but rather because of the other components of the sequence. Pre-sequences, after all, project further talk, and the specific content of the pre-sequence adumbrated a story. One could claim that the discourse marker "okay" was superfluous and irrelevant in the example. While it must be admitted that there are other signals in the example that suggest a story is coming, it must also be pointed out that Alin decided to use the discourse marker "okay" at exactly this location. This is not an argument against the idea that language is multimodal—it certainly is. But just the fact that speakers used multiple signals to indicate the imminent onset of a story does not invalidate the participant's orientation to the utterances prefaced with the discourse marker "okay." The participant is clearly orienting to the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" as a story, or an extended turn. Simply put, the discourse marker "okay" is being used in tandem with the pre-sequence; they are not mutually exclusive elements in this example.

two different ways. In other words, the participants orient to the discourse marker "okay" like it is polysemous.

The examples in Polysemous-Monosemous Test 1 & 2 demonstrate that discourse markers can be oriented to as polysemous; that is, nominally the same discourse marker can evoke different participant orientations, different meanings, depending on the sequential environment in which they are positioned, and the reactions of the interlocutors reveal those different meanings. And this leads us to the second characteristic of discourse markers: if one examines discourse markers through a conversation analytic lens, then discourse markers do not have a single invariant core meaning; rather, discourse markers are polysemous because participants orient to their usage in different ways in different contexts.

Characteristics of Discourse Markers: (2)

● Discourse markers are polysemous.

We have determined that discourse markers, at least the ones subject to our two tests so far, the discourse markers "so" and "okay," are non-syntactic and polysemous. However, we have yet to differentiate discourse markers from other non-syntactic and sometimes-polysemous lexemes like vocatives and sentential adverbs. We still have work to do, and next we turn to the key feature of discourse markers that differentiates them from mere interjections like vocatives.

2.3   Discourse Markers & Cognitive Processing

The next feature of discourse markers also involves the semantics of discourse markers, but in a different way than before. As is well known, lexemes express

55

meanings in different ways: some lexemes express conceptual meanings, which indicates that these lexemes express concepts; other lexemes express functional meanings, which indicate that these lexemes express a semantic relationship between other lexemes (Halliday 2009). Many scholars claim that this dichotomy applies to discourse markers in some way, stating that discourse markers are a type of function word (Blakemore 2002; Fischer 2006a; Borderia 2006, 2008; Fraser 2006)[15]. Indeed, some scholars classify many function words such as coordinating conjunctions like *and* and *but* as discourse markers (Blakemore 2002).

However, scholars who utilize the Relevance Theory framework do not apply the content word-function word dichotomy directly to discourse markers. Rather, this band of influential scholars insists that words can express two types of meanings: conceptual meanings and procedural meanings (Blakemore 2002; Schourup 2001, 2011). In more detail, lexemes that express conceptual meanings are roughly similar to content words (Blakemore 2002). However, the Relevance Theory concept of "procedural meaning" is quite different than that of a function word.

In Relevance Theory, a lexeme with a "procedural meaning" is intended by the speaker to indicate to the interlocutor the procedure by which the interlocutor is to interpret the conceptual meanings in relation to everything else in order to achieve the interpretation with optimal relevance (Blakemore 2002). The differences between "procedural meanings" and the meanings expressed by function words are therefore

---

[15] Borderia's (2008) position is the most complex of them all. Borderia (2008) claims that some discourse markers contain procedural and conceptual meanings at the same time. Again, as with most of the academic literature concerning discourse markers, the debate over whether discourse markers express only procedural meanings or a combination of procedural and conceptual meanings is not settled (e.g., Schourup 2011; Borderia 2008; Fraser 2006).

two-fold: 1) procedural meanings are related to the achievement of optimal relevance, and 2) "procedural meanings" function at the cognitive level, not the clausal or phrasal level like the meanings of function words; accordingly, lexemes with procedural meanings have significantly wider scope over semantics, at least from a cognitive viewpoint, than lexemes that are simple function words.

This dissertation contends that discourse markers signal procedural meanings to the interlocutor; that is, discourse markers express the procedure with which the speaker intends the interlocutor to interpret the utterance in relation to everything else (Blakemore 2002; Schourup 2001, 2011; Fischer 2006; Vivien 2006; Nyan 2006)[16]. As such, discourse markers generally do not convey conceptual meanings[17]. In a word, discourse markers mainly affect the procedural meaning of an utterance, which means that they indicate how the speaker intends the interlocutor to interpret the speaker's utterance(s) in relation to the context.

Although this dissertation accepts the Relevance Theoretic idea that discourse markers are involved in the process of determining and achieving the interpretation with optimal relevance, this dissertation does not accept Relevance Theory's methodology. As explained in the previous chapter, this dissertation adopted conversation analytic methodology in order to determine the meanings of discourse markers, and therefore the

---

[16] The savvy reader will notice that this dissertation does not claim that procedural meanings are inevitably designed to aid the interlocutor achieve optimal relevance. This dissertation uses "procedural meaning" in a manner that sets it apart from the classical relevance theory concept. This dissertation claims that discourse markers aid interpretation, but whether the interpretation is an interpretation with optimal relevance is beside the point.

[17] There is some strong dissent on this point. A small but vocal minority of scholars who research discourse markers in languages other than English claim that some discourse markers express conceptual meanings as well as procedural meanings (e.g., Borderia 2008; Fraser 2006; Bazzanella 2006).

participant orientation is what is most important in assessing the procedural meanings of discourse markers.

Characteristics of Discourse Markers: (3)

- Discourse markers express procedural meanings, by which the speaker indicates the procedures with which the interlocutor is expected to interpret the lexemes with conceptual meanings in the utterance(s).

So far, we have demonstrated that discourse markers are non-syntactic and polysemous lexemes that indicate procedures with which the interlocutor is to interpret messages. However, this is not a definitive set of characteristics. There is another feature of discourse markers that distinguishes them to a greater degree from other parts of speech, especially the other members of the category "interjections."

2.4   Discourse Markers & Semantic Bleaching

This dissertation claims that discourse markers are semantically bleached; that is, the original semantic meaning of the lexical item from which the discourse marker is etymologically derived has been bleached out of existence and replaced with an entirely procedural meaning instead. Of course, all lexemes in all languages are subject to diachronic change, but certain discourse markers seem to be strongly affected by this process, to the point that the semantics of the discourse marker barely resemble the semantics of the lexeme from which it is etymologically derived. One might assume that this is just a process of "grammaticalization" that all language is subject to, but discourse markers seem to be especially sensitive to "grammaticalization" and the process seems to be of a different caliber. Accordingly, this dissertation designates the

process of grammaticalization under which discourse markers are subject "semantic bleaching"[18] in order to differentiate the process from "grammaticalization" and evoke its more extreme character.

Semantic bleaching is readily apparent in the discourse marker "well". When the discourse marker "well" is used in language, the meaning expressed by the discourse marker "well" is very different from its adverbial or nominal usages. As is well known, the word "well", when used as a noun, designates a hole in the ground filled with potable water, and when used as an adverb, designates that the verb referred to in the clause was performed proficiently. These are both conceptual meanings referring to specific concepts, and as such, are not discourse markers when used in such a way.

The discourse marker usage of the same word, however, expresses a procedural meaning similar to the following: the next utterances are to be interpreted as "probably unexpected" from the interlocutor's point of view; that is, the conceptual information expressed in the utterance(s) prefaced with the discourse marker "well" are somehow incongruent with a previous expectation, and therefore achieving the interpretation with optimal relevance will necessitate higher than usual cognitive costs (Pomerantz 1984; Schourup 2001; Schegloff & Lerner 2009). The procedural meaning expressed by the discourse marker "well" is etymologically derived from the conceptual meaning of the original word, but the original meaning of the word has been bleached out of existence when "well" is utilized as a discourse marker.

---

[18] Of course, different discourse markers are in different stages of diachronic change, and are further along the semantic bleaching process. For example, the discourse marker "well" seems to be completely semantically bleached (Schourup 2001), but other discourse markers are not so: the discourse marker "I mean" retains much of the meaning of the lexical phrase from which it is derived (Wong & Zhang Waring 2010); the discourse marker "you know" also retains much of the original meaning of the lexical phrase from which it is derived (Macaulay 2000).

However, it must be pointed out that not all discourse markers are fully semantically bleached, an important characteristic that some scholars have ignored[19]. Indeed, some phrases that are commonly referred to as discourse markers, like "you know" and "I mean," are not semantically bleached; they retain a lot of their original semantics (Macaulay 2000; Wong & Zhang Waring 2010). Because not all discourse markers are semantically bleached, some scholars have proposed another taxonomic dichotomy to differentiate semantically bleached discourse markers and discourse markers that are not fully semantically bleached (Fischer 2006a). The presence of semantic bleaching or lack of semantic bleaching is the main border between discourse markers and discourse particles (Fischer 2006a; Fraser 2006). In sum, some kind of demarcation between discourse markers and discourse particles is necessary.

This dissertation claims that discourse markers are semantically bleached. In contrast to discourse markers, discourse particles retain some of the original meanings of the lexemes from which they are etymologically derived[20]. For example, the discourse particle "you know" retains some of the original meaning that refers to cognitive states even when it is used as a discourse particle (Fischer 2006; Macaulay 2000). Furthermore, the discourse particle "I mean" continues to utilize some of the original meaning of the verb in self-repair sequences in conversations (Wong & Zhang

---

[19] One of the two greatest drawbacks of Schiffrin's (1987) seminal work on discourse markers is that she makes no distinction between discourse markers that are semantically bleached and discourse markers that are not semantically bleached, which could therefore just as easily be classified as regular lexemes in some cases.

[20] Although this dissertation accepts this tenet of Fischer's (2006a) framework, this dissertation reverses the nomenclature. In Fischer's (2006) framework, a discourse particle is semantically bleached, and a discourse marker retains some of the original semantics of the lexeme or phrases from which it is derived. This dissertation claims exactly the same thing, but reverses the designations: discourse markers are semantically bleached and discourse particles retain some of their original meanings. The reasons for this slight of hand are more practical than theoretical: Google searches for discourse markers garner far more hits than Google searchers for discourse particles, and indeed the name "discourse marker" is far more prevalent in the academic literature. This decision is based on the desire to give this dissertation slightly wider circulation.

Waring 2010). That is, discourse particles are not fully semantically bleached, but discourse markers are semantically bleached.

Characteristics of Discourse Markers: (4)

●   Discourse markers are semantically bleached.

So far, we have shown that discourse markers are non-syntactic, polysemous, and semantically bleached lexemes that express procedural meanings, which indicate how the speaker intends the interlocutor to interpret the conceptual meanings in the utterance(s). Yet even this is not an exhaustive list of the key features of discourse markers. There is one more key characteristic of discourse markers that can only be deduced using conversation analytic methods: sequential sensitivity.

2.5   Discourse Markers & Sequential Sensitivity

This dissertation claims that a final characteristic of discourse markers is that they are sensitive to sequential environments and sequential position in such a way that it affects their procedural meanings. Depending on where discourse markers are in a sequence, discourse markers have different meanings and different effects; that is, sequential position itself is a key component of the interpretive process (Heritage 1984, 1998; Sidnell 2007; O'Neal 2010b, 2011c)[21]. In other words, the position in the discourse in which a discourse marker is placed affects the meaning it expresses just as

---

[21] Neither Heritage (1984, 1998) nor Sidnell (2007) make any reference to optimal relevance in their work, and because they are both conversation analysts, one should not expect them to do so. However, both Heritage (1984, 1998) and Sidnell (2007) do claim that the same discourse marker can express different things depending on where the discourse marker is deployed in the sequence. Heritage (1984, 1998) examined the discourse marker "oh" in third position in question-answer sequences and claimed that in such positions the discourse marker "oh" indicates that the speaker has moved from a position of not-knowing to a position of knowing; furthermore, he also examined the discourse marker "oh" in second position in question-answer sequences, that is, right before the answer to the question posed in the first pair part, and concluded that in such positions, the discourse marker "oh" adumbrates that the speaker found the question inapposite or problematic. Sidnell (2007) found a similar pattern for the discourse marker "look": depending on which part of the sequence the discourse marker "look" was appended to, it could preface different kinds of sequential actions.

much as the semantics of the discourse marker itself. Indeed, the procedural meaning that discourse markers convey to the interlocutor can change substantially depending on where a discourse marker is in a sequential exchange.

In order to demonstrate sequential sensitivity, we examine the discourse marker "oh" in two different sequential positions in two different examples. In the first of our two examples, both taken from the American TV show *Friends*, Ross walks into Rachael's apartment and begins a conversation. But the example requires some background information to understand: Ross and Rachael have a baby daughter named Emma, for whom Ross constantly provides stuffed-animal dinosaurs (the T-Rex comment in the transcript), but Ross and Rachael are not married and do not live together; furthermore, Rachael has recently been fired from her job at Ralph Lauren, a high-class apparel company. The discourse marker "oh" appears in the transcript in line 8 as the preface to a first pair part utterance. Therefore, the sequential position of the discourse marker "oh" in the example below is at the head of a first pair part utterance.

Sequential Position Test 1: Friends, Season 10, Episode 15

1	Ross:	Hi
2	Rachael:	Hi
3	Ross:	um, Emma left her stuffed T-Rex at my house. You know she can't
4		sleep without it.
5	Rachael:	hn (.) well she's asleep now. (1.0) Stop forcing that thing on her.
6	Ross:	Okay:::
7		(1.0)
8	Rachael:	**Oh** ((Rachael reaches across the table and taps Ross)) you're not
9		going to believe what happened to me today. Ralph Lauren called
10		and gave me my job back.
11	Ross:	**No:::::::**

The conversation above begins when Ross enters the apartment without knocking and says, "hi" in line 1. Rachael orients to Ross's utterance in line 1 as a greeting and produces an apposite response: another matching greeting (line 2). Ross mentions that Emma forgot the stuffed-animal dinosaur that he gave her at his apartment, and that Emma has difficulty sleeping without it (lines 3~4). Rachael orients to Ross's utterances as a request for permission to give Emma the stuffed-animal, but produces the dispreferred response: refusal (line 5). Rachael's dispreferred response is prefaced with all of the hallmarks of a dispreferred response: hesitation markers (hn), the discourse marker "well," and a reason to refuse Ross's request. Next, Rachael says, "stop forcing that thing on her," (line 5) to which Ross's orients as a request, and agrees to comply (line 6). After one second of silence, however, Rachael utters "oh" quite loudly, which is indicated with bold lettering in the transcript, and then proceeds to tell Ross that the company that recently fired her has decided to rehire her (lines 8~10). Ross orients to Rachael's utterance as a surprising announcement and utters "No" loudly, which shows the degree to which Ross is surprised by the sudden turn of events.

The important aspect of the example above for the purposes of this dissertation are the following: 1) the discourse marker "oh" prefaces an utterance in first pair part position; and 2) the discourse marker "oh" functions as a cognitive state marker, specifying that the speaker has suddenly remembered, or thought of, something relevant to the situation at hand. In other words, the discourse marker "oh" in the example above shows that the speaker has remembered something, and this serves as a catalyst for the launching of the first pair part of the next sequence. The manner in which the discourse

marker "oh" is used in this example is quite different from the way in which the discourse marker "oh" is utilized in the next example.

The next example of discourse markers & sequential position is also taken from the American TV show *Friends*, and as with the previous example, requires some background information in order to make sense of the interaction. The conversation begins when David shows up at Phoebe's apartment. David and Phoebe are former lovers, but broke up when David decided to move out of New York City in pursuit of his academic career. However, David has returned to New York City after a three-year hiatus, and wants to restart his former relationship with Phoebe. Unfortunately for David, Phoebe already has a new boyfriend named Mike.

Sequential Position Test 2: Friends, Season 9, Episode 6

1	David:	Wow. You look even more beautiful than you did yesterday.
2	Phoebe:	Oof. ((smiles))
3	David:	In fact um I'm going to kiss you now.
4	Phoebe:	.hh oh wait wait.
5	David:	yeah I can't get away with stuff like that it it it sounded sexy in
6		my head so I
7		(1.0)
8	Phoebe:	No no. It's it's not it's not that. Here. ((Phoebe & David sit down))
9		(1.0)
10	Phoebe:	Um (.) remember when you asked me if I was seeing someone
11		and I said no? Well um I am. His name's his name's Mike.
12	David:	**Oh.** Oh.
13	Phoebe:	Yeah. I should've told you.
14	David:	No (1.0) well yeah=
15	Phoebe:	=yeah

In the example above, David comments on Phoebe's pulchritude (line 1), to which Phoebe orients as praise and smiles in line 2. Next, David announces that he is going to kiss Phoebe in line 3, and Phoebe orients to David's utterance as an announcement, but blocks David's incipient action with a dispreferred response in line 4 (wait wait). After Phoebe's blocking action, David utters justifications for his attempted actions (lines 5~6), and Phoebe orients to David's utterance as a self-deprecation and states that the self-deprecations are unwarranted (line 8), followed by a pre-announcement (the request that David sit down, which is often a precursor to bad news). In lines 10~11, Phoebe informs David that she already has a new boyfriend, and that she cannot date David again, to which David orients as an information-telling first pair part, and produces two discourse marker "ohs," the first louder than the second.

The important aspect of the example above for the purposes of this dissertation are the following: 1) the discourse marker "oh" prefaces an utterance in second pair part position; and 2) the discourse marker "oh" functions as a social demonstration of a cognitive state, as it does in the previous example, but in this example it specifies that the speaker orients to the previous information as new information. In other words, the discourse marker "oh" in the example above shows that the speaker has gone from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing.

As one can see from the above examples, the positioning of the discourse marker "oh" partially affects the semantics expressed by the discourse marker—this is sequential sensitivity. When the discourse marker "oh" prefaces a first pair part utterance, it indicates that the speaker has remembered something, or thought of

something, that is suddenly relevant for the interaction at hand, and serves at the catalyst for the launching of a new sequence. When the discourse marker "oh" prefaces a second pair part utterance, however, it indicates that the speaker has learned something that they did not know before (Heritage 1984; O'Neal 2010a). Although the cognitive mechanisms behind the discourse marker "oh" could be the same, when the discourse marker "oh" is deployed in different sequential positions, the sociolinguistic importance of the discourse marker "oh" is not the same.

This leads us to the final characteristics of discourse markers. They are sequentially sensitive, which means that the position in which a discourse marker is placed in a sequence affects the interpretive process. If discourse markers preface first pair part utterances, they will express one procedural meaning; if discourse markers preface a second pair part, then they will express a different procedural meaning. Positioning alone is a factor in interpretations.

Characteristics of Discourse Markers: (5)

● Discourse markers are sequentially sensitive.

As we have seen, discourse markers are a heterogeneous lot of lexemes that often pepper English speech, but it is possible to derive order from conversational bedlam. Classification is possible along the lines proposed in this chapter. Although the classification system is necessarily loose, this is justified because discourse markers heavily vary from each other. As much as we might distain a hand metaphor to describe something as important to this dissertation as its classification criteria, the following is apt: the tighter the grip of the classification system, the more discourse markers will just

slip through the fingers. Accordingly, Fischer's (2006) framework, is a sound basis for a classificatory system of discourse markers because it is loose enough to encompass the heterogeneous nature of discourse markers and tight enough to prevent the escape of many lexemes that obviously are discourse markers.

3   Summary

To summarize, the definition of discourse markers utilized in this dissertation includes all of the following characteristics: 1) they are lexemes that are unaffected by syntactic structures; 2) they are lexemes that are polysemous with potentially multiple procedural meanings; 3) they are semantically bleached in the sense that they are etymologically derived from lexemes that convey conceptual meanings, but no longer retain those original meanings; 4) they now convey only procedural meanings; 5) and they are lexemes that have procedural meanings that are affected by sequential positioning. That is, discourse markers are intimately related to how a speaker intends their interlocutor to interpret their message, but the way in which that is achieved is multimodal, and the five main characteristics of discourse markers demonstrate that.

.

Chapter 3

Teleological Discourse Marking:

The Discourse Marker "So"

1   Discourse Marker So

Now we finally turn our attention to the main purpose of this dissertation: the explication of the discourse markers "so" and "okay." First, we examine the usage of the discourse marker "so" in oral American media in this chapter, and then we examine the usage of the discourse marker "okay" in oral American media in the next chapter. This dissertation will demonstrate that both the discourse marker "so" and the discourse marker "okay" have additional meanings that have not yet been elucidated.

We begin with an example of the discourse marker "so" from American media so that we can specify exactly the type of discourse marker "so" that will be under review in this chapter. The following example is taken from an American TV show called *Mad Men*, a story about an advertising agency in New York. A staff worker named Peggy walks into her boss's office, and asks her boss, Don, for his signature so that she can send her work to the printers.

Teleological "So" Example 1: Mad Men, Season 3, Episode 7

1	Peggy:	I just need a minute. I need to send Martin's to the printers.
2	Don:	Come on in. ((takes the document and begins to sign it))
3	Peggy:	So, do you know who you're gonna put on Hilton yet?
4	Don:	No
5	Peggy:	Well, I don't know if they want a woman's point of view but I read his
6		book and::=
7	Don:	=who told we were gonna land Hilton, because we're not.
8		And I resent you bringing work in here under pretense.
9	Peggy:	I didn't=
10	Don:	=I didn't need to sign off on this.
11	Peggy:	I'm sorry. I was excited. And I heard there was an amazing
12		assignment.

13	Don:	And you thought you'd walk in here and ask for it because I never say
14		no.
16	Peggy:	You say no all the time.

A "so" appears in line 3 of the above dialogue. Peggy deploys the "so" in first pair part position before an utterance that begins discussion of a topic unrelated to getting her boss's signature. However, it is important to note that this "so" is not a coordinating conjunction; it does not indicate a relationship of reason between two clauses (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman 1999). Furthermore, it is not an intensifier; the "so" is not intensifying the meaning of anything in the utterance that it prefaces (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman 1999). The "so" that appears in the above example does not have a conceptual meaning. And the reason why the "so" does not have a conceptual meaning is because the "so" is a discourse marker: it has a procedural meaning. The explication of the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so" in examples like the one above is the purpose of this chapter.

But before we examine the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so" that appears in most of the corpus, let us first examine the ways in which the discourse marker "so" has been researched so far. Because the discourse marker "so" might be a recent phenomenon, it has not been extensively studied. As a result there are not many studies to report.

2   Previous Studies of the Discourse Marker "So"

Discourse markers are not equally studied. It can be justifiably claimed that the discourse marker "well" is the most studied discourse marker of all (Halliday & Hasan

1976; Pomerantz 1984; Schourup 2001; Blakemore 2002; Schegloff & Lerner 2009). The exact opposite is true for the discourse marker "so"; the discourse marker "so" is the least studied discourse particle of all. There is a dearth of studies concerning this important linguistic phenomenon, and we will examine the few previous studies below.

2.1 The Discourse Marker "So" as a Topic Transition Marker

One of the most common ways to describe the discourse marker "so" is as a topic transition signal; that is, if a speaker prefaces an utterance with the discourse marker "so," the utterance will not be a topical outgrowth of previous talk, but rather will represent a new topic (Rendel-Short 2000; Ruhlemann 2007; Bolden 2006). Rendle-Short (2000) identifies a discourse marker "so" that appears in lectures that seems to adumbrate topical transitions in lectures. Ruhlemann (2007) claims that the discourse marker "so" initiates topic change in ordinary conversation[1]. Bolden (2006),

---

[1] Within conversation analysis, meaning is determined according to the way a participant orients to an utterance. Although it is very difficult to use conversation analytic methodology to demonstrate that a conversation participant orients to an utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" as a topical transition, it is possible, as the following example demonstrates. The following example is taken from the American-Canadian TV show "Defying Gravity", which was a short lived and melodramatic science fiction story concerning astronauts and alien artifacts. In the extract below, a female astronaut named Jennifer ("Jen" in the example), who is conducting a biology experiment in zero gravity on a NASA spaceship in earth orbit, and her husband, who works for NASA ground control and is on earth, are chatting over Skype. The husband is eating a burrito, but recently the husband had a car accident, and the doctors have ordered the husband to follow a strict regimen of dietary supplements called "thinners," but the burrito is in violation of the husband's dietary regimen, which angers his wife. The discourse marker "so" appears in line 4, and the interlocutor clearly orients to the utterance in line 4 as an attempt to change the topic.

Topic Transition "So" Example: Defying Gravity Skype Conversation
1   Woman: Admit it. It's a breakfast burger from Momos. I can smell the bacon.
2   Man: Jen I feel fine. They're monitoring me.
3   Woman: Baby you're sick. They've got you on thinners for God's sake.
4   Man: So what are you doing there? Are you working on the rabbit embryos?
5   Woman: You're changing the subject.
6   Man: Answer the question ((chortle))
7   (0.5)
8   Woman: It's a special project for me and you okay.
9   (2.0)
10   Woman: It's a surprise.

There is probably no better evidence within the conversation analytic framework that participants can orient to the presence of the discourse marker "so" as an initiation of topical change. Indeed, in line 5 of example 1, the woman reacts to her husband's turn in line 4 explicitly like the man were attempting to change the topic, although the woman uses the word "subject", but for all intents and purposes, "subject" is equivalent to "topic" in the example above. In line 5, the woman explicitly states that she believes that the man is changing the topic, which demonstrates her orientation to the previous turn as a conversational move designed to initiate another topic. Furthermore, it is not accidental that the turn in line 4 is prefaced with the discourse marker so, and it is important to note that in line 6, the man does not counter the woman's accusation of topic change. Indeed, the husband's response to line 6 seems to indicate that the woman correctly surmised the intent of the husband's turn in line 4. In a word, the husband deploys the discourse marker "so" to initiate a topic change, and his wife orients to the utterance prefaced by the discourse marker "so" as an attempt to

who examined both the discourse marker "so" and the discourse marker "oh," claimed that the discourse marker "so" prefaces topic transitions that conduct partner-oriented topics.

2.2   The Discourse Marker "So" as an Incipient Agenda Signal

Bolden (2008) was the first scholar to systematically examine the discourse marker so in first pair part positions in interactional sequences. According to Bolden (2008), the discourse marker so is deployed when the speaker begins to implement "incipient actions"; that is, the speaker prefaces their first pair part utterances with the discourse marker "so" when the action he or she is about to initiate an action that is not directly coordinated with immediately prior talk. This means that the discourse marker so is a type of topical disjunction signal, which explicitly marks the conversational contribution subsequent to the discourse marker as not a topical outgrowth of previous talk.

2.3   Third Position Discourse Marker "So"

However, the discourse marker so does not manifest only in first pair part positions. Raymond (2004) examined the discourse marker so in sequential post expansion environments, that is, after the production of a sequential second pair part, but before the production of what the interlocutors treated as a new sequential first pair part. According to Raymond (2004), the discourse marker so found in post expansions, after the second pair part, but before the initiation of a new sequential action with

---

change the topic of conversation. Furthermore, the husband validates his wife's interpretation of his previous utterance in his next turn. This is clear evidence that the discourse marker "so" can be oriented to by conversational participants as a signal of topic change in American media. However, this dissertation defines discourse markers as polysemous, and is not surprised that not all discourse marker "so"-s are teleological.

another first pair part, indicates that the speaker found the previous conversational contribution lacking; that is, if the producer of the second pair part failed to produce a relevant action from the perspective of the first part producer, then the discourse marker so can indicate that. In a word, the discourse marker so deployed in sequence closing expansions informs the interlocutor that another action and/or a further action was expected at a previous point but was not forthcoming.

3   The Teleological Discourse Marker "So" in Oral American Media

We now turn to the main purpose of this chapter: explicating the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so" in oral American media. This dissertation will argue that the discourse marker "so" is a teleology marker. Although the standard meaning of "teleology" is "the belief that purpose and design are part of and apparent in nature[2]," this dissertation utilizes the term "teleology" in a novel way. The first morpheme in the word is "tele," which is derived from the ancient Greek word "telos," which means "ends," or "means," or "purposes." The second morpheme is "logy," which is derived from the ancient Greek word "logos," which means "speech," or "words," although now the morpheme "logy" indicates "study of" in modern English. This dissertation uses the term "teleology" in the literal meaning of the morphemes present in the lexeme: "purpose-speech." That is, the term "teleology" or "teleological" are used to indicate that the speaker has a purpose, or a telos, in producing their speech; speakers are producing teleological speech when they attempt to achieve their interactional agenda.

---

[2]   According to www.dictionary.com.

The corpus of data that has been gathered for this examination comes from oral American media that is available over the internet through the iTunes service (i.e., TV shows, podcasts, and movies, etc.). Some of the corpus is unscripted, like the Podcasts, and therefore would be considered authentic data suitable to the study of language and discourse markers in particular (Heritage & Atkinson 1984; Schegloff 2007; Schiffrin 1987). However, some of the corpus data is scripted, like the TV shows and the movies, and therefore would fall outside of the typical bounds of acceptable research data.

This study includes both sets of data because recent corpus research has problematized the axiomatic claim that scripted data is somehow unrepresentative of real speech (Quaglio 2009). Indeed, corpus research that compares authentic data to certain scripted data have found that some sets of unauthentic, scripted data are actually quite representative of authentic English[3]. Indeed, this dissertation will claim that the examples present in this chapter will demonstrate that the discourse marker "so" is used in exactly the same way, and the dichotomy between the two sets of data is irrelevant—at least as far as how the discourse marker "so" is used. Be that as it may, we venture into our examples, and examine the scripted, inauthentic data set first in the following section, and then the authentic data in the next section.

3.1   The Teleological Discourse Marker "So" in Scripted American Media

The first set of examples is taken from inauthentic data, which is defined as data that was written and performed. The examples are taken from two American TV shows

---

[3]   Indeed, Quaglio (2009) claims that the English usage represented in friends is highly consistent with the English usage in an authentic corpus of English to which he compared it. The only measure which the Friends data set was found lacking was "narrative-ness," but when one considers that the scripts of twenty-four minute shows would not allow characters to tell long stories, this is not an entirely surprising finding.

and one movie: *Boardwalk Empire*, *Mad Men,* and *the Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*. *Boardwalk Empire* is a crime drama set during the Prohibition Era (1920-1933), focusing on the violent rise of the American mafia in the same period. *Mad Men* is another drama, but the setting is a New York advertising agency in the 1960s. Although both shows are set in past eras, the language praxis is contemporary, complete with modern discourse markers. The sole example taken from a movie is titled *the Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*, which is a grisly murder-mystery set in contemporary Europe. Although neither the setting nor the actors are American, this study includes this movie in the corpus because it is the American version of the original Swedish film.

The first example is taken from *Boardwalk Empire*, and requires some extensive background explanation. The example begins as Enoch and James are about to start talking. Enoch, a fictional gangster and politician who runs the illegal alcohol industry in Atlantic City, is having serious difficulties maintaining his control over the seedy underbelly of Atlantic City: rival gangs are stealing from him; other illegal distilleries are making other types of alcohol, and stealing his business; some local politicians are incorruptible and demand that Enoch be thrown in jail. Accordingly, Enoch has considerable problems and needs some help: bodies need to be buried; politicians need to be bribed or threatened; rival gangs need to be bludgeoned; enemy distilleries need to be destroyed. Luckily for Enoch, his nephew James has exactly the low amount of moral scruples Enoch needs. James has proven himself a fully capable thug before, capable of carrying out all sorts of nasty atrocities for Enoch. However, because of James's penchant for bloodlust, Enoch kicked him out of Atlantic City. But now Enoch

needs him to come back to Atlantic City and make Enoch's problems figuratively disappear. Therefore, Enoch has a definitive purpose in initiating this interaction: he wants to get James to come back to Atlantic City and remove his problems.

Teleological "So" Example 2: Boardwalk Empire, Season 1, Episode 8

1	Enoch:	need a drink
2		(2.0)
3	James:	whiskey?
4	Enoch:	Figured only champagne now with that get-up.
5		(2.0) ((James pours one cup of illegal whisky for both of them))
6	James:	It's espoque. ((referring to James's expensive attire))
7		(2.0)
8	James:	Al bought it for me.
9		(1.0)
10	Enoch:	Who's yer friend
11		(1.0)
12	James:	War buddy
13		(2.0)
14	Rich:	Richard Harrow
15	James:	To the lost. ((James holds up his cup for cheers))
16		(5.0) ((James and Enoch both drink their illegal whisky))
17	James:	So I'm assuming this is not a social call.
18		(1.5)
19	Enoch:	I need you to come home James.
20		(1.0)
21	James:	Need or want
22	Enoch:	Eli's been shot. They robbed Lawley's.
23	James:	Who did?
24	Enoch:	I don't know. We're at war kid.
25		(1.0)
26	Enoch:	They hit Chalky's a few months back. Killed one of his
27		men. Robbed O'Neal right out in the open right on the boards

28	James:	An now this
29	Enoch:	Someone's got it in their head that I'm weak. That I have
30		no real means of retaliation.
31	James:	You got the whole sheriff's department on your payroll.
32	Enoch:	And the sheriff's in bed with a bullet in his gut.
33		(0.5)
34		There are things I may require that I'm uncomfortable asking of
35		Eli anyway particularly with the election coming.
36		(7.0) ((James walks around the bar to Enoch's seat))
37	James:	This afternoon, when you saw me you looked at me like I was
38		something you scraped off your boot. Now it's four in the morning.
39		The world's closing in. I'm your long lost son=
40	Enoch	=don't overestimate
41		yourself James=
42	James:	=why shouldn't I Nuch? I'm doing very well here.
43	Enoch:	And how far with that go? You're Irish. Torio's Italian. You'll
44		always be an outsider.
45		(4.0) ((James fiddles with his vest))
46	James:	You know this suit cost seventy bucks?
47		(2.0) ((Enoch makes a face that indicates exasperation))
48	Enoch:	You're about as subtle as a kick in the teeth you know that.
49		(6.0) ((Enoch takes a drag from his cigarette))
50		Five percent of anything that comes in by boat and ten percent of
51		anything that comes in on wheels.
52	James:	And that Fed? (1.0) What do I do about him?
53	Enoch:	I'll work that out.
54		(3.0)
55	James:	I gotta think about it.
56		(6.0) ((Enoch takes a swig of illegal whisky))
57	Enoch:	You do that. But whatever you decide (.) don't ever keep me
58		waiting again.
59		((Enoch walks out of the bar))

This extract is significant for a number of reasons. The most important is probably that although there are a number of topic transitions in the extract, only one of them is prefaced with the discourse marker "so." In fact, previous to the appearance of the discourse marker "so" in line 17, there are offers and acceptances of illegal whiskey (lines 1~3), discussions of James's *nouveau riche* attire (the espoque comment in lines 4~8), an introduction to James's friend, Richard Harrow, who accompanied him to his meeting with Enoch (lines 10~14), and even a brief exchange about, and cheers to, the American war dead in World War One (line 16: To the Lost). None of them are prefaced with the discourse marker "so," even though any one of them could be considered a legitimate topic in its own right[4]. That is, the discourse marker "so" does not preface any of the utterances that initiate topic change in lines 1~16.

After all of the above topical divergences, the only utterance that appears with the discourse marker "so" manifests in line 17 when James states, "so I assume this isn't a social call", which is a declarative sentence. However, within conversation analysis, the orientation of the participant to an utterance is more important in understanding the previous utterance than is the syntax of the previous utterance. Enoch orients to James's utterance like it was one of the following questions: "what do you need? Why are you here? What is your purpose here?" We know this as analysts because Enoch says, "I need you to come home James" in line 19. That is, Enoch does no react to James's utterance in line 17 as if James's utterance was a mere observation, a statement of facts;

---

[4] Larry Schourup (personal communication 2012) reminded me that language is multimodal; that is, there are many different types of topic change, and many different ways to signal imminent topic change. While that is certainly so, this dissertation will argue that the discourse marker "so" is consistently deployed in one place in interactions, and that it is impossible to claim that the utterances that are prefaced with a discourse marker "so" are mere topic changes.

Enoch reacts to James's utterance like James had just asked Enoch why he was here, like James wanted to know what Enoch's purpose in visiting him.

It is not an accident that James deploys the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that asks Enoch to identify his purpose in being there. Indeed, initiating the purpose of the interaction, the teleology of the interaction, seems to be the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so" in this example. The example seems to suggest that James's utterance in line 17 is the teleological pivot in the interaction: the utterance in line 17 initiated the purpose of the meeting between James and Enoch, and Enoch begins to enumerate his problems, which Enoch hopes he can convince James to solve for him. That is, the utterance to which the discourse marker "so" is appended in the example explicitly moves the conversation to the main purpose of the conversation, the reason why Enoch called on James, and simultaneously demonstrates that although James does not know what Enoch's purpose in initiating the conversation is yet, he is fully cognizant that Enoch has a purpose for being here and talking to him.

Because the discourse marker "so" prefaced the utterance that initiated the teleology of the interaction, the main purpose of the interaction, we will designate this discourse marker "so" the teleological "so."[5] But this is just one example. It could be

---

[5] Indeed, when one accepts the explanation that the discourse marker "so" adumbrates the initiation of the teleology, the main purpose, of the interaction, then a lot of examples without an explicit teleological participant orientation start to make more sense. For example, the discourse marker "so" deployed before the utterance in line 5 of the example below can be interpreted as the first utterance in the main purpose of the conversation itself, even though there is no explicit orientation from either participant that the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so". In the example below, Estelle, Joey's agent, calls Joey. The relationship between Estelle and Joey is professional only: Estelle is Joey's agent, and as such Estelle's job is to provide job information to Joey and see to it that he gets parts in plays, TV shows, and commercials. Accordingly, any interaction between Joey and Estelle has a teleological orientation; that is, any conversation between Joey and Estelle is not a relational conversation, designed to maintain social bonds and camaraderie. On the contrary, it is a transactional conversation instead with a teleological orientation: Joey gets parts; Estelle gets money. The interaction between Estelle and Joey begins as a telephone call.

Friends, 2005, Season 10, Episode 4
1   Phone Ring
2   Joey: hello?

an outlier. We will need to examine another example to see if the discourse marker "so" is consistently used to preface the utterance that initiates the purpose of the interaction.

The next example is taken from *Mad Men*. This example also requires extensive contextual explanation. Mr. Price, one of the executives at the advertising agency in *Mad Men*, found a lost wallet in his taxi on the way to work this morning. Being a fairly honest and upstanding gentleman, Mr. Price called a phone number written on a piece of paper in the lost wallet in the hopes that he could return the wallet to its rightful owner. However, unbeknownst to Mr. Price, he has accidentally found the wallet of a Pimp, which is American slang for a "prostitute manager," and when Price gets a call back from the phone number he previously telephoned, the caller is a prostitute, named Dolores, who works for the pimp who lost his wallet, Alex Bullio.

Teleological "So" Example 3: Mad Men Season 5, Episode 2

1   Secretary: I have the owner of the wallet returning your call.

2   Mr. Price: Thank you. Hello.

3   Dolores: Hello. Mr. Price. I'm calling for Alex Bullio.

4   Mr. Price: And who is this?

5   Dolores: This is his girl Dolores.

6   Mr. Price: Oh

7   (1.0)

8   Mr. Price: well when he comes into the office I think I should

9   speak with him personally.

3	Estel:	Joey, it's Estel.
4	Joey:	Hey.
5	Estel:	So, how'd your audition go today?
6	Joey:	What audition?
7	Estel:	the one I told you about last week!

After a brief exchange of greetings, Estelle asks Joey about his audition in line 5. Estelle reveals her teleological orientation to this interaction through her choice of question: she's calling to garner information that will further her interests as Joey's agent; her purpose in calling Joey is to see if he got the part in the play she told him about on a previous occasion. However, Joey forgot about the audition completely, so of course did not get the part. But that detail should not blind us to the fact that Estelle deployed the discourse marker "so" before an utterance that can be interpreted as central to her role, her purpose, as Joey's agent. That is, Estelle deploys the discourse marker "so" before an utterance that displays her orientation to the business being pursued in the conversation.

10	Dolores:	Oh I'm not his secretary. I'm his girl. I'm like his wife but
11		I can't call myself that.
12		(1.0)
13	Mr. Price:	Oh
14		(1.0)
15	Mr. Price:	You don't sound happy about that.
16	Dolores:	Excuse me?
17	Mr. Price:	I'm married myself.
18	Dolores:	Oh good for you. What's her name?
19	Mr. Price:	Rebecca. Rebecca Price. Well obviously.
20	Dolores:	That's a pretty name.
21	Mr. Price:	I suppose so. She enjoys it.
22	Dolores:	Do you think she's at home right now lying in bed talking
23		to a stranger?
24	Mr. Price:	Oh uh I should hope not.
25	Dolores:	So:::: so you have Alex's wallet?
26	Mr. Price:	Yes I do
27	Dolores:	And where are you?
28	Mr. Price:	I'm at my offices in midtown

The example above begins with a clear notification of the purpose of the interaction. Mr. Price's secretary notifies Mr. Price that she has the owner of the wallet on the telephone line, which tells us the teleology of the interaction that is about to happen: the owner of the wallet wants to arrange for the handover of the wallet; the only conceivable reason for Mr. Price to talk with the owner of the wallet is to arrange for the handover of the wallet. Because the first line of the transcript notifies us as to the purpose of the interaction, we can formulate a testable hypothesis. If the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction, the main purpose of the interaction, then the discourse marker "so" should be deployed before the

utterance that initiates discussion of the handover of the wallet. On the other hand, if the discourse marker "so" is not a teleology marker, but rather just a topic change signal, then it could appear at any topic transition in the dialogue.

First, Mr. Price and Dolores exchange self-identification sequences (lines 2~9), and then exchange information concerning their marital statuses (lines 10~17). After that, Dolores comments on the beauty of Mr. Price's wife's name (lines 18-21), and inquires about the current whereabouts of Mr. Price's wife (lines 22~24). As one can see, Mr. Price and Dolores cover quite an extensive span of topics between lines 2 and 24, but neither participant ever deploys the discourse marker "so," nor does either participant broach the topic of handing over the wallet. Therefore, topic change and the use of the discourse marker "so" are mutually exclusive between in lines 2~24.

However, the discourse marker "so" does make an appearance in the example above. Dolores finally deploys the discourse markers "so" twice in line 25 before the utterance "you have Alex's wallet?", which coincides exactly with the teleological purpose of the interaction. The reason, the purpose, that Dolores called Mr. Price in the first place was to ascertain if Mr. Price had Alex's wallet and to procure the wallet. That is, the discourse marker "so" is prefacing the utterance that represents the initiation of the entire purpose of the interaction.

It is no accident that the discourse marker "so" appears before the utterance in line 25. It is also no accident that the discourse markers "so" does not appear before any other topic changes in the conversation: for example, the utterance "I'm married myself" in line 17 doesn't have a "so" but it is a topic shift; also, the question in line 22 is

clearly an attempt to shift the topic of the conversation to a more salacious area, but it is not preceded by a discourse marker "so" either. What this example shows is that topic transitions are not categorically prefaced with the discourse marker "so." In fact, only the utterances that initiate the main purpose of the conversation are marked by the discourse marker "so" in the above example.

Next we turn to another example from *Mad Men*. The following example is exceptional: at first glance, it seems that the purpose of the conversation is explicitly stated, and is not marked with a discourse marker "so" at all; furthermore, a topic that is clearly not the nominal main purpose of the interaction is prefaced with the discourse marker "so," which seems to invalidate the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the main purpose of the interaction. However, upon closer inspection, one can see that the explicitly stated purpose of conversation is not the actual purpose of the conversation, and that the nominal purpose of the interaction was not the real purpose of the interaction. Furthermore, the discourse marker so, when it actually appears, collocates with utterance that can be interpreted as the first utterance representing the real purpose of the conversation.

In the following example, Peggy, one of the few prominent women in the advertising agency depicted in *Mad Men*, and one of the copywriters that works for Don, the lead copywriter at the company, comes into Don's office, and asks him to sign a signature at the beginning of the conversation. Therefore, at least nominally, Peggy explicitly states the purpose of the interaction: Peggy needs to get Don to sign something for her. Don, as the lead copywriter, needs to sign off on any document that

is sent to the printers. Accordingly, if the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the main purpose of the interaction, one would expect that the discourse marker "so" would be deployed before the utterance that seeks to garner Don's signature. However, Peggy does not do that. In fact, Peggy deploys the discourse marker "so" in a very different location. Peggy deploys the discourse marker "so" before an attempt to steer the conversation toward a plumb assignment that could substantially better Peggy's career—if she can get Don to give her the assignment.

Teleological "So" Example 4: Mad Men, Season 3, Episode 7

1	Peggy:	I just need a minute. I need to send Martin's to the printer.
2	Don:	Come on in. ((Peggy hands Don a print sheet. Don signs it))
3	Peggy:	.hhh so do you know who you're gonna put on Hilton yet
4	Don:	No
5	Peggy:	Well I don't know if they want a woman's point of view but
6		I read his book and:::=
7	Don:	=who told you we were gonna land
8		Hilton kuz we're not. And I resent you bring work in
9		here under pretense.
10	Peggy:	I didn't=
11	Don:	=I didn't need to sign off on this.
12		(2.0)
13	Peggy:	I'm sorry. I (.) I was excited. And I heard there was an
14		amazing assignment.
15	Don:	And you thought you would come in here and ask for it
16		because I never say no.
17	Peggy:	You say no all the time.

First, Peggy reveals the nominal purpose of the initiation of the conversation in line 1: She tells Don that she needs his signature. However, there is no discourse marker "so" at the beginning of this utterance. Accordingly, one might point to this interaction

as a counter-example to the idea that the discourse marker "so" is a conversational teleology marker. However, Peggy does deploy the discourse markers "so" in line 3. Peggy is an extremely motivated worker, and she wants Don to put her on the Hilton account, if the company lands the Hilton account. From line 5 to line 6, Peggy starts to make the case that she should be the one in charge of the Hilton account, and by insinuation, that Don should assign her the account.

However, unfortunately for Peggy, Don is in a horrible mood, and cuts her off in line 7, and accuses her of bringing work into his office under pretense. In other words, Don accuses Peggy of pretending that her real purpose in initiating the conversation had nothing to do with the print permission sheet. That is, Don claims that Peggy's nominal purpose of initiating this interaction, getting Don's signature, and the real purpose in initiating the interaction, getting herself assigned to the Hilton account, are different, which is what was intended by the "pretense" comment. Initially Peggy denies that this is the case (line 10), but Don cuts her off again and confronts her with the evidence for his theory: he did not need to sign the document that Peggy asked for to complete her work; Don's signature was superfluous (line 11). After two seconds of uncomfortable silence (line 12), Peggy admits that the nominal purpose of the interaction and the real purpose of the interaction, are different, and apologizes to Don, but attempts to justify her actions as the result of overexcitement (line 13~14).

Accordingly, one can see that the discourse marker "so" is actually deployed at the beginning of an utterance that represents the initiation of real purpose of the conversation. Although nominally the purpose of the conversation was to get Don's

signature, upon a retroactive inspection of the entire conversation, one can see that the actual purpose of the conversation, the actual teleological orientation of the conversation, was to get Don to assign Peggy to the Hilton account, not to get Don to sign off on something. It is important to note that the discourse markers "so" is deployed in front of the real teleological utterance of the conversation, not the nominal one.

The following example of the praxis of the discourse marker "so" is also exceptional and is taken from a very grizzly murder mystery movie: *the Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*. Michael, who is the story's main protagonist, is on the trail of a serial murderer of the worst sort. Michael believes that Anita's uncle, Henry, is somehow related to the murders, and approaches her at her place of work in order to extract information, posing as a biography writer of her uncle, hoping that Anita might reveal something incriminating about her uncle. Anita, on the other hand, is unaware that her uncle is a suspect in a murder investigation. In fact, Anita is just an investment banker who works at a bank in London. The types of people who come to meet her at her bank usually just seek investment advice; therefore, when Anita meets new people at her investment bank, she can assume that they are there for a purpose: investment advice.

Indeed, as the details of the interaction below show, Anita orients to Michael's presence at her bank very teleologically; she believes that Michael has come to the bank for investment advice, which is in keeping with the purpose of a bank. Michael, however, has a hidden purpose: subtly extract information from Anita. Therefore, one cannot assume that he would use the discourse marker "so". Anita's purpose, however,

is to orient to Michael as a potential customer for her investment bank, and one would

assume that any topic broaching investments and banking in general would be prefaced

with the discourse marker "so"—and that's indeed what happens in line 9.

Teleological "So" Example 5: *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*

1	Michael:	Anita Vanger?
2	Secretary:	Through there
3	Michael:	Excuse me. I probably should have made an appointment
4	Anita:	No it's fine. Uhm. Please [have a seat
5	Michael:	[thank you
6	Michael:	Michael
7	Anita:	Michael. How do you do::
8	Michael:	How do you do.
9	Anita:	So, you're looking for investment advice.
10	Michael:	Well, I would be if I had any money.
11	Anita:	Sorry I don't understand.
12	Michael:	I'm writing a biography of your uncle, Henry. That's that's
13		why I'm here.

The example above begins when Michael asks Anita's secretary where Anita is,

and the secretary dutifully notifies Michael about Anita's current whereabouts (lines

1~2). Next, Michael walks up to Anita's desk and apologizes for inconveniencing her,

to which Anita orients as not a problem (lines 3~4). Then Anita motions for Michael to

sit down, to which Michael orients to as an offer, which he accepts and expresses

gratitude (lines 4~5). After that, Michael states his name, to which Anita orients as a

self-identification and repeats Michaels name, acknowledging it (lines 6~7). Next, Anita

and Michael exchange "how do you do?" sequences, to which neither participant orients

as a question (lines 7~8). The discourse marker "so" does not appear in any of the

previous sequences, and this fact is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction.

The discourse marker "so" does make an appearance in the example though, in line 9. Anita deploys the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance "you're looking for investment advice." Anita has just tried to start business discussions with Michael. Because Anita works at an investment bank, and because Michael has suddenly shown up at her bank during business hours, Anita can be forgiven for assuming that Michael came to her for investment advice. That is, Anita attempted to initiate a business agenda between herself and a potential customer. It is important to note that Anita deployed the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that was an attempt to initiate business proceedings between herself and a potential customer.

However, unfortunately for Anita, Michael is not a potential customer, and he is not looking for investment advice. In line 10, Michael states that he has no money, to which Anita orients as an inscrutable comment in line 11 given that Michael has just walked into a bank and asked to see the bank's investment councilor: Anita states, "Sorry I don't understand." In other words, Anita has begun a repair sequence, and orients to Michael's behavior as problematic. This demonstrates that Michael's behavior does not match the teleology of the interaction that Anita assumed.

The example above demonstrates that participants formulate expectations about the current interaction, as Relevance Theory hypothesizes, and that participants can orient to expectations that are flouted as problematic and deserving of repair, as Conversation Analysis hypothesizes. Furthermore, the above example illustrates that

deviating from the teleologic orientation of the conversation can invite repair because doing so can be perceived as peculiar and abnormal.

We have seen four examples from scripted data that demonstrate that the discourse marker "so" is consistently used to preface the utterance that initiates the main purpose, the telos, of the interaction. However, one could legitimately claim that these examples do not demonstrate the actual usage of the discourse marker "so" because all the examples are taken from inauthentic data. That is a serious concern, and it is one that we will remedy in the next section, in which we will examine how the discourse marker "so" is used in authentic data.

3.2   The Teleological Discourse Marker "So" in Unscripted American Media

Next we examine the praxis of the discourse marker "so" in authentic data. Our authentic data set includes a number of podcasts, which are downloadable Internet radio shows. All podcasts are authentic data in the sense that they are not scripted beforehand[6]. As such, podcasts are a readily available source of authentic English usage between native speakers of American English.

Like section 3.1, section 3.2 will utilize conversation analytic methodology to examine conversation praxis, and to determine the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so," but we will also examine a second type of evidence for the teleology of the discourse marker "so" as well: podcast descriptions. When someone downloads a podcast, he or she downloads more than just an audio file; they download a textual

---

[6]   Although all of the examples of the Podcasts used in this dissertation are not scripted data, it is fair to say that substantial portions of the podcasts are probably edited to some degree. Indeed, in some Podcasts, the host of the show actually makes jokes such as, "I should have stupid comments like that edited out in post-production" and "Don't worry. I'll edit out your twenty-seconds of lugubrious silence." Obviously, however, the podcast producers did not edit out those comments. Therefore, although it is fair to say that Podcasts are authentic data because they are not scripted events, they are professionally made and professionally edited.

description of the podcast, which often includes a summary of the purpose of the podcast. For example, in the screenshot[7] below, under the heading "Macworld Podcast," which is the name of the podcast, the purpose of each of the podcasts is written in a column[8].

Podcast Screenshot Example 1: Macworld Podcast 327

The podcast descriptions that accompany a podcast audio file when it is downloaded are perfect for determining the praxis of the discourse marker "so." This is because the description of the podcast informs us of the purpose of the podcast before we even begin to listen to the podcast. Of course, anyone could guess from the name of the podcast that the Macworld podcast would cover topics related to Apple products and themes, but the podcast descriptions take this one step further: they inform us what the topic of each separate podcast is; that is, the podcast description tells us what the purpose of each podcast is. For example, in Podcast Screenshot Example 1, the

---

[7] A screenshot is a computer made picture of the computer desktop.

[8] After Apple released the 11th version of iTunes, which is the program that manages the download of podcasts, the podcast screen looks slightly different. Most of the screenshots used in this dissertation were created before iTunes was upgraded to version 11. Therefore, if one were to download the podcasts enumerated in this dissertation today with the current generation of software, it is likely that the podcast descriptions would look different, although the text would be the same.

description of the second podcast in the list states, "Reviewing the iPad mini," which

tells us the teleology, the purpose, of the second podcast. If the discourse marker "so"

really does preface the utterance that initiates the teleology, the purpose, of the

interaction, then we could hypothesize that the discourse marker "so" would preface the

utterance that initiates discussion of the iPad mini. Therefore, podcast descriptions

allow us to determine the teleology, the purpose, of the interaction before it even begins.

This is the second type of evidence we will examine in order to determine the praxis of

the discourse marker "so."

Our first example from the authentic data set is taken from *the Macworld Podcast*.

The Macworld podcast is devoted to discussion of anything and everything

Apple-related, from the company itself to the products it makes. In the podcast, a panel

of tech-savvy Mac-lovers will discuss what was then the soon-to-be-released iPadmini.

We know this before we even listen to the podcast because the teleology, the purpose,

of the podcast is listed in the podcast description, as is shown below.

Podcast Screenshot Example 2: Macworld Podcast 327

A quick perusal of the podcast description indicates that the speakers have gathered to discuss the iPad mini, one of the 2012 Apple products. That is, the purpose of the interaction in the example below is to discuss the iPadmini, and if the discourse marker "so" really does adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, then one would expect that the first utterance that initiates the discussion of the iPadmini would be prefaced by the discourse marker "so"—and that's exactly what happens in line 16.

Teleological "So" Example 6: Macworld Podcast 327

1	Phil:	Macworld podcast number 327 for Wednesday November 7th
2	Phil:	Hello again podcast listeners. It's the Macworld podcast.
3	Phil:	I'm Phillip Michaels. I'm hosting this week. What is on everyone's
4		mind? I don't know about you whether it's the election where someone
5		was just elected. We're not recording this on Wednesday. Or whether it's
6		the iPadmini. And here to talk about the new iPadmini, the newly
7		released slimmed-down version of the iPad, is the man who reviewed it,
8		Dan Frakes. Hello [Dan
9	Frakes:	[hey Phil hello.
10	Phil:	How are you today [.hhh
11	Frakes:	[good
12	Phil:	And because we are legally mandated to have two Dans in every podcast
13		and also because he knows a thing or two about the iPad it is Dan Moren
14		as well. Hello Dan Moren.
15	Moren:	Hi Phil. My agent thanks you=
16	Phil:	=yes So::: uh the iPadmini, is it just a big
17		iPod touch Dan Frakes?
18	Frakes:	It is:::=
19	Phil:	=or is it a smalle[r::
20	Frakes:	[a smaller iPad
21	Phil:	Uh uh

22   Frakes: I- it really is a smaller iPad and it runs iPad Apps, all iPad Apps natively.

In the example above, Phillip Michaels (Phil in the transcript), the host of the podcast, introduces the podcast to the listeners (lines 1~5). Next Phillip introduces the two other panelists: Dan Frakes and Dan Moren (lines 6~15). No discourse marker "so" ever makes an appearance during the podcast introduction and the panelist introductions, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance(s) that initiates the teleology of the interaction.

The discourse marker "so" does make an appearance in the data though. In line 16, Phillip Michaels deploys the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that initiates the teleology and purpose of the interaction: discussing the iPad mini with the panelists on the Podcast. Accordingly, the deployment of the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that initiates discussion of the main purpose of the interaction matches the podcast description of the main purpose of the interaction—the iPad mini.

However, there is a further bit of conversation analytic evidence to support the claim that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance(s) that initiate the teleology of the interaction. After Phillip deploys the discourse marker "so" in line 16, his interlocutors orient to the utterance as entirely unproblematic. Dan Frakes does not attempt to repair the utterance in line 16 as problematic at all, and Dan Frakes just answers the question. That is, the participant orientation reveals that the conversation participants thought the initiation of the teleology of the interaction was completely quotidian and normal.

Accordingly, one can see through a comparison of the podcast description, which notifies the listener as to the purpose, the teleology, of the interaction, and the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" that the purpose of the interaction stated in the podcast description and the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" match perfectly. The discourse marker "so" was deployed before utterance that initiated the teleology of the interaction. Furthermore, a conversation analytic analysis of the interaction reveals that the participants to the interaction oriented to the initiation of the teleology of the interaction as entirely unproblematic, and entirely warranted at that point in the conversation.

But this is just one example. It could just be an example of one speaker's idiolect. Further examples of the discourse marker "so" used as a preface before the utterance that initiates the teleology of the interaction will strengthen the case. And further examples show this to be the case.

The next example is also taken from a podcast, *the PBS Newshour Podcast*. The PBS Newshour podcast is an American news podcast with a focus on American politics and culture. In the following example, the host, Judy Woodworth, will interview two panelists, David Brooks and Mark Shields, about the importance of the state of Ohio in the American electoral process (this podcast was recorded one week before the 2012 American presidential election) and the microtargeting of voters. We know this before we even listen to the podcast because the teleology, the purpose, of the podcast is listed in the podcast description, as is shown below.

Podcast Screenshot Example 3: The PBS Newshour (10/26/2012)

A quick glance at the podcast description indicates that the host the two panelists have gathered to discuss the importance of Ohio in American presidential contests, and the practice of "microtargeting" voters. That is, the purpose, the teleology, of the interaction in the example below is to discuss those two topics. If the discourse marker "so" really does adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, then one would expect that the first utterance that initiates the discussion of either the importance of the state of Ohio in American elections or the microtargeting of voters would be prefaced by the discourse marker "so"—and that's exactly what happens in line 5.

Teleological "So" Example 7: The PBS Newshour (10/26/2012)

1	Judy:	And to the analysis of Shields and Brooks. That is syndicated
2		columnist Mark Shields and New York Times columnist David
3		Brooks. Welcome gentlemen.
4	Mark:	Judy
5	Judy:	So:::::: we just heard the professor say, Mark, uh, whoever
6		wins Ohio is gonna win the election. Is that how you see it?
7	Mark:	I never argue with a tenured professor.
8	Judy:	(laughs)
9	Mark:	No, I think he's absolutely right.
10		(3.0)
11	Judy:	Okay. David, what do you think?
12	David:	Well, I spend a lot of time arguing with tenured professors,
13		but this one seems to have stumbled on the truth.

In the example above, Judy introduces the segment and the two panelists (lines 1~3), and then exchanges greetings with the panelists (lines 3~4)[9]. The discourse marker "so" does not make an appearance in lines 1~4, and this is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction because introductions and greetings are not the purpose of the interaction. Introductions and greetings are just preambles to the main purpose of the interaction.

The discourse marker "so" does make an appearance in the data though. In line 5, Judy Woodworth deploys the discourse marker "so" before the first utterance that initiates discussion of importance of the state of Ohio in American elections, which is one of the purposes of the interaction listed in the podcast description. Accordingly, the deployment of the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that initiates discussion of one of the main purposes of the interaction matches the podcast description of the main purpose of the interaction—the importance of the state of Ohio in American presidential elections.

Furthermore, there is conversation analytic evidence to support the claim that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance(s) that initiate the teleology of the interaction. After Judy deploys the discourse marker "so" in line 5, her interlocutors orient to the utterance as entirely unproblematic. Mark Shields does not attempt to repair the utterance in line 5 as problematic, and Mark Shields just orients to Judy's

_____

9   Although it is not a focus of this dissertation, it is interesting to point out that a transition to a new segment of the PBS Newshour podcast is accomplished with a discourse marker "and" in line 1 of the transcript. That is, the new segment, and a new topic, is marked with "and" in the first utterance that represents the beginning of a new topic. This is important because this is some evidence that the discourse marker "so" really is not a topic transition signal. Indeed, Blakemore (2002) claims that "and" is a discourse marker, and the example above attests to that theory.

utterance as a question. That is, the participant orientation reveals that the conversation participants thought the initiation of the teleology of the interaction was completely quotidian and normal at that point in the interaction.

Accordingly, one can see through a comparison of the podcast description, which notifies the listener as to the purpose, the teleology, of the interaction, and the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" that the purpose of the interaction stated in the podcast description and the utterance prefaced with the discourse marker "so" match perfectly. The discourse marker "so" was deployed before utterance that initiated the teleology of the interaction, and we know this as analysts because the podcast description describes the purpose. Furthermore, a conversation analytic analysis of the interaction reveals that the participants to the interaction oriented to the initiation of the teleology of the interaction as entirely unproblematic, and entirely warranted at that point in the conversation.

So far we have seen examples of the discourse marker "so" in conversational praxis in authentic data. A pattern has emerged: the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance that initiates discussion of the teleology of the interaction. Further examples will demonstrate that the pattern is actually a categorical characteristic.

The next example is also taken from the Macworld podcast, but the host of this podcast is different, so we have access to data of another speaker's usage of American English. In the following example, the host, Chris Breen, will interview two panelists, Jim Galbraith and Roman Loyola, about the a new type of computer: the Macbook Pro

13-inch retina-display computer. We know this because the teleology, the purpose, of the podcast is listed in the podcast description, as is shown below.

Podcast Screenshot Example 4: Macworld Podcast 326

A quick glance at the Macworld podcast description indicates that the host and the two panelists have gathered to evaluate the 13-inch Macbook Pro, one of the new types of Apple computers. That is, the stated purpose, the teleology, of the interaction in the example below is to evaluate whether the 13-inch Macbook Pro is a good computer or not. If the discourse marker "so" really does adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, then one would expect that the first utterance that initiates the evaluation of the 13-inch Macbook Pro would be prefaced by the discourse marker "so"—and that's exactly what happens in line 16.

Teleological "So" Example 8: Macworld Podcast 326

1	Chris:	Macworld podcast number 326 for October 31st, 2012.
2		Welcome to another Macworld Podcast. I'm Chris Breen. Given that
3		it's Halloween we really should be doing something seasonal but in
4		our business this time of year really means new apple products
5		prepared for the holidays. And we've had a lot of them flowing
6		through macworld labs recently. And because we have, I've invited
7		lab direct Jim Galbraith and Macworld's senior editor Roman Loyola
8		to join me to talk about two new products they've recently looked at:
9		the 13-inch retina-display macbook pro and the new Mac mini.

10		So let's talk. ((Transition Music))
11	Chris:	I'm joined by Roman Loyola and Jim Galbraith to discuss the
12		performance of a couple of products recently released by apple.
13		Welcome fellas!
14	Roman:	Thanks
15	Jim:	Hello
16	Chris:	So let's start with the 13-inch macbook pro retina-display. Now
17		obviously the display is the big deal on this one but does performance
18		suffer because of that display compared to one with a standard display
19		or is it better?
20	Roman:	I think the other internal enhancements like the superfast flash storage,
21		I mean, it's a much faster system.

In the above example, Chris Breen begins with a monologic introduction of the macworld podcast (lines 1~9), and after a spate of transition music (line 10)[10] Chris Breen introduces the two panelists on the podcast (lines 11~15). Then, in line 16, Chris Breen deploys the discourse marker "so" to initiate the main agenda or purpose of the interaction: examining the characteristics of the 13-inch macbook pro retina-display computer (lines 16~19). Again, we have proof that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterance(s) that initiate the main purpose of the interaction if the main purpose of the interaction is determined by the description of the podcast available in the podcast description.

---

10 The savvy reader who has not succumbed to the effects of this soporific dissertation yet will notice that there is another discourse marker "so" in the example in line 10 that has not been commented on. Indeed, the first discourse marker "so" in the previous example does not first the characterization of the discourse marker "so" expressed in this dissertation. In fact, this discourse marker "so" collocates with a clear topic transition: the phrase it prefaces is "let's talk," and transition music plays right afterwards. It is suspected that this discourse marker "so" is a genuine topic transition signal, which was alluded to in a previous footnote in the section of this chapter covering topic transition signal "so." This dissertation does not consider the presence of this kind of discourse marker "so" as problematic for the hypothesis of this dissertation because this dissertation contents that the discourse marker "so" is polysemous—it can have two different meanings and two different functions. The presence of the discourse marker "so" in the example demonstrates the validity of this dissertation's characterization of discourse markers; it does not detract from it. Another point that is worth mentioning is this: the first discourse marker "so" appears when the podcast is still monologic; that is, while Chris Breen is not yet conversing with anyone.

Furthermore, there is conversation analytic evidence to support the claim that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance(s) that initiate the teleology of the interaction. After Chris Breen deploys the discourse marker "so" in line 16, his interlocutors orient to the utterance as entirely unproblematic and entirely normative. Roman Loyola does not attempt to repair the utterances in line 16~19 as problematic, and just orients to Chris's utterance as a question. That is, the participant orientation reveals that the conversation participants thought the initiation of the teleology of the interaction was completely quotidian and normal at that point in the interaction. There is no evidence that the participants thought a teleological orientation in the interaction was in any way repairable at this point.

Another example from authentic data will illustrate the tendency of the discourse marker "so" to preface utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction. The following example is taken from the *PBS Newshour Podcast*. In the extract, the host, Judy Woodworth, will interview two panelists, David Brooks and Mark Shields, about the monthly jobs report, sequestration (a process of automatic governmental budget cuts), and the Tea Party Primary wins. We know this before we even listen to the podcast because the teleology, the purpose, of the podcast is listed in the podcast description, as is shown below.

Podcast Screenshot Example 5: The PBS Newshour (08/04/2012)

A quick glance at the PBS Newhour Podcast description indicates that the host and the host and the two panelists have gathered to discuss the Job Report, Sequestration, and Tea Party Primary Wins. That is, the stated purpose, the teleology, of the interaction in the example below is to discuss the Job Report, Sequestration, and Tea Party Primary Wins. If the discourse marker "so" really does adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, then one would expect that the first utterance that initiates discussion of either the Job Report, Sequestration, or Tea Party Primary Wins would be prefaced by the discourse marker "so"—and that's exactly what happens in line 4.

Teleological "So" Example 9: The PBS Newshour (04/08/2012)

1	Judy:	And now to the analysis of Shields and Brooks. That is
2		syndicated columnist Mark Shields and New York Times
3		columnist David Brooks. Gentlemen. Good to have you
4		with us. So whether we use that strange word
5		sequestration or whether we talk about automatic budget
6		cuts, David with so much at stake why couldn't they come
7		to an agreement on this.
8	David:	Well remember it's supposed to be terrible. The idea of
9		sequestration it's an enforcement mechanism. They said to
10		themselves we're gonna force ourselves to cut a budget
11		deal with each other and if we don't do it we'll hit ourselves
12		in the face with a hammer. And that'll be so bad we'll do it.

| 13 | The problem is suppose that you don't do it. Then you end |
| 14 | up hitting yourself in the face with a hammer. |

In the above example, Judy first introduces the new segment of the podcast (lines 1~3) and then exchanges greetings with the two panelists (lines 3~4). It is important to note that the discourse marker "so" does not appear in lines 1~4, and that this is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of speech. After all, introductions and greetings are not the purpose of this interaction. They are just a means to get to a point in the interaction in which the teleology can be started.

The discourse marker "so" does appear in the example in a position predicted by the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction. Judy Woodworth deploys the discourse marker "so" in line 4 before the first utterance that initiates discussion of Sequestration, which is one of the purposes of the interaction listed in the podcast description. Accordingly, the deployment of the discourse marker "so" as a preface to the utterance that initiates discussion of one of the main purposes of the interaction matches the podcast description of one of the main purposes of the interaction—discussion of Sequestration. The discourse marker "so" again appears in positions predicted by the theory that the discourse marker "so" is a teleology marker.

Furthermore, there is conversation analytic evidence to support the claim that the discourse marker "so" prefaces the utterance(s) that initiate the teleology of the interaction. After Judy Woodworth deploys the discourse marker "so" in line 4, her

interlocutors orient to the utterance as entirely unproblematic and entirely normative. David Brooks does not attempt to repair the utterances in lines 4~7 as problematic, and just orients to Judy's utterance as a request for information, which he provides at length. That is, the participant orientation reveals that the conversation participants thought the initiation of the teleology of the interaction was completely quotidian and normal at that point in the interaction. There is no evidence that the participants thought a teleological orientation in the interaction was in any way repairable or problematic at this point.

All of the above examples demonstrate the normative usage of the discourse marker "so" in authentic data. The discourse marker "so" seems to be used to preface utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction[11]. However, not all examples of the praxis of the discourse marker "so" are so clean. Sometimes the discourse marker "so" is used in positions that problematize the claim that the discourse marker "so" is a

---

[11] The ability to adumbrate the initiate of the teleology of the interaction is not the exclusive purview of the discourse marker "so." Other discourse markers, such as the discourse marker "well" in the example below, can also adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction. The following excerpt is taken from the PBS Newshour, and the podcast description clearly states that the purpose of the interaction is to discuss the "fiscal cliff" with the two guests: David Brooks and Mark Shields. According to the analysis provided by this dissertation so far, one would expect that the discourse marker "so" would be deployed before the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, which, according to the podcast description, is discussion of the "fiscal cliff." However, that is not what happens in the example below.

PBS Newshour Podcast (12/29/2012)
1	Jeff:	And that brings us to the analysis of Shields and Brooks. Syndicated columnist Mark Shields and
2		New York Times columnist David Brooks. Well, developing fiscal cliff, walking walking walking
3		David, short time ago the president came out of a meeting with congressional leaders, and he said he
4		was **mod**estly optimistic. Are **you**?
5	David:	Uh No. No. And no and everyone's trying to look busy so when we go over they can say well we
6		tried. He came back from Hawaii and he had to do something. And so they had a meeting::: but if
7		you don't have a new offer you're not really making progress. You can have a nice frank exchange
8		but they're they're in the business of making a deal. And there's no really as far as we know
9		evidence that they've moved. So I remain convinced as I have been that we're probably going
10		to go over.

In line 2, Jeff, the host of this segment of the PBS Newshour, deploys the discourse marker "well" before he initiates the teleology of the interaction. The participants orient to Jeff's utterances as unproblematic and completely expected in this context. This is in spite of the fact that the discourse marker "so" does not appear in the transcript at all. However, this dissertation does not claim that the discourse marker "so" is the only discourse marker that can preface utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction. This example clearly shows that the discourse marker "well" can also serve that function. Yet, how can the presence of the discourse marker "well" at a location that this dissertation predicts the discourse marker "so" should appear in be reconciled with the hypothesis of this dissertation? It can be reconciled because this dissertation does not claim that only the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction; other discourse markers seem to be perfectly capable of doing this as well. This dissertation claims that the discourse marker "so" can adumbrate teleology in interaction, and the examples in this dissertation demonstrate that, but this dissertation does not claim that only the discourse marker "so" does this. As with all things in language, one function can be performed by mean elements of language (Halliday 2009). The discourse marker "so" is no exception.

teleology marker. We examine such cases next, and this dissertation will claim that even the problematic and exceptional cases demonstrate that the participants orient to the deployment of the discourse marker "so" as a teleology marker.

The discourse marker "so" in the following example is exceptional because it does not seem to be used in order to initiate the teleology of the interaction; rather, the discourse marker "so" seems to be used in order to reinitiate the teleology of the interaction, and in some sense is very similar to *anyway* in the data. The following example is taken from a podcast called *Startalk* radio. The host, Neil Degrasse Tyson, is an American astrophysicist, and he commonly asks American comedians to participate in the podcast in the hopes that they can collaborate in explaining difficult astrophysical phenomena to a wider audience in a humorous way.

The podcast was recorded a few weeks after August 25th, 2012. This is significant because on August 25, 2012, Neil Armstrong died, who was the first man on the moon, and an American hero. Usually *Startalk* radio discusses black holes and wormholes and other esoteric phenomenon of astrophysics, but because of the death of Neil Armstrong, Neil Degrasse Tyson, the host of the show, decided to devote the podcast to a eulogy of Neil Armstrong instead. Accordingly, the teleology of the podcast is discussion of Neil Armstrong, as the screenshot below demonstrates.

Podcast Screenshot Example 6: Startalk Radio (10/09/2012)

A quick glance at the Startalk Radio podcast description indicates that the host intends to give a tribute to Neil Armstrong. That is, the stated purpose, the teleology, of the interaction in the example below is to discuss Neil Armstrong and his contribution to. If the discourse marker "so" really does adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction, then one would expect that the first utterance that initiates discussion of Neil Armstrong would be prefaced by the discourse marker "so"—and that *does not* happen! Rather, the discourse marker "so" seems to be utilized to reinitiate discussion of Neil Armstrong after a long tangential aside unrelated to the late astronaut-hero.

The following example begins well after the start of the podcast. The host and the guest have already discussed many facets of Neil Armstrong's life. However, the orientation of the conversation begins to flounder on a number of tangential asides, and the topic of the conversation wonders far off from the teleology of the podcast—discussion of Neil Armstrong. Neil Degrasse Tyson does redirect the topic of the conversation back to Neil Armstrong, but when he does he deploys the discourse marker "so" at the beginning of the utterance that takes the conversation back to the teleology of the discussion in line 35.

Teleological "So" Example 10: Startalk Radio (09/10/2012)

1	Neil:	Uh so so so yeah so now when we go the computing is just
2		everywhere.
3	Paul:	[yeah
4	Neil:	[You have computers in your refrigerators now an
5		everything [you
6	Paul:	[yeah
7	Neil:	interact with practically has a computer so space would be
8		no different from this. It would have to be temperature

9		tested and shocked tested and all [the rest of it.
10	Paul:	[would it be uh would it
11		be risky though to make everything like that going into
12		space. Would there be fallbacks [where you wouldn't?
13	Neil:	[Yeah for everything
14		important they've always build in redundancies.
15	Paul:	Right
16	Neil:	[Always
17	Paul:	[And do they ever build in sort of analog I mean er?
18	Neil:	You mean an abacus? (laughs) for
19	Pual:	Yeah yeah. Would you have an abacus along with a
20		solar calculator just in case you really needed to do quick
21		math?
22	Neil:	right because no knows because no one can do math in
23		their head anymore at all.
24	Paul:	What would had you got to the moon and all of a sudden
25		you had to do taxes
26	Neil:	[(laughs)
27	Paul:	[and then you were like oh my god I have none of the tools
28		because all the electricity is dead.
29	Neil:	(laughs) yeah I think you know they don't have to do taxes
30		while they're in space. I'm sure of it. And if not we'll start
31		a movement to make that happen.
32	Paul:	That's literally the plot of the movie with Bruce Willis.
33		Whatever it was called. Asteroid or something. Anyway.
34		[h
35	Neil:	[So so getting back to Neil Armstrong, [so when he died on
36	Paul:	[yeah
37	Neil:	on au- august 25th
38	Paul:	yes=
39	Neil:	=as you may know the family asked of the world to
40		consider that evermore wink at the moon night.

In lines 1~16, Paul, the guest on the podcast, and Neil, the host of the podcast, discuss the advent of ubiquitous computing and how that affects the designs of contemporary spaceships. Next, the discussion turns to math and jokes about taxes in space (lines 17~31). After that, Paul makes a reference to a bad Bruce Willis film (lines 32~34). Although a slew of various topics and sequences appear before line 35, the discourse marker "so" never makes an appearance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that initiate the teleology of the interaction: none of the topics before line 35 match the purpose of the interaction as described in the podcast description.

However, the discourse marker "so" does appear in the conversation, but it is used in a novel way in line 35. Neil deploys the discourse marker "so" twice as a preface to an utterance that reinitiates discussion of Neil Armstrong. That is, the discourse marker "so" is used in the example above to return to a previous element of the discussion; the discourse marker "so" is used like the discourse marker "anyway" in this example!

But the discourse marker "anyway" is often described as a means to reinitiate prior topics (Urgelles-Coll 2011). Is the discourse marker "so" functionally equivalent to the discourse marker "anyway"? The answer to that is no. The procedural meaning of the discourse marker "so" is to adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction. In the previous example, the podcast describes the teleology of the podcast as a tribute to Neil Armstrong. However, the example contained a number of digressions unrelated to Neil Armstrong. In line 35, Neil, the host of the podcast, deploys the discourse marker "so" as a preface to an utterance that reinitiates the

teleology of the interaction: discussion of Neil Armstrong. That is, this usage of the discourse marker "so" is exactly the same as the discourse marker "so" that appeared in many of the other examples in this chapter. Although the discourse marker "so" is utilized in a novel way in the example above, the usage is consistent with the way the discourse marker "so" is used in the other examples: in all the examples in this chapter, the discourse marker "so" prefaces utterances that (re)initiate the teleology of the interaction; that is, the discourse marker "so" adumbrates the beginning of one of the interactional agendas.

4   Summary

The above examples all demonstrate that the discourse marker "so" is intimately connected with advancing the agenda of one of the speakers in the interaction in both inauthentic sets of data like TV shows and movies and authentic sets of data like Podcasts. That is, when speakers deploy the discourse marker "so," they are moving the conversation to matters directly connected with progression of their interactional agenda to its proper culmination. The discourse marker "so" is strongly connected to the advancement of the teleology of the interaction.

Of course, the discourse marker "so" used as a preface to the initiation of the teleology of the interaction is only one the usages of the discourse marker "so." The discourse marker "so" has appeared in some of the footnotes of this dissertation as a marker of topic transition. The discourse marker "so" does have other usages, but that fact is not a problem for this dissertation because this dissertation insists that discourse

markers are polysemous.

The discourse marker "so" is also not the only discourse marker worth focusing on. Indeed, other discourse markers manifest different procedural meanings in interaction, and we turn our attention to another important phenomenon of conversational praxis in the next chapter: the discourse marker "okay."

.

Chapter 4

Dolichological Discourse Marking:

The Discourse Marker "Okay"

1   Discourse Marker Okay

We now turn to an explication of the discourse marker "okay" in oral American media. Although the discourse marker "okay" is one of the most extensively researched discourse markers, it is far from fully described. Indeed, one of the procedural meanings of the discourse marker "okay" has been all but ignored: adumbrating an extended turn (O'Neal 2010b, 2011b). And that is the purpose of this chapter: to amend the lacuna in the academic literature and to describe some of the procedural meanings of the discourse marker "okay" that have not yet been explained.

We begin with an example of the discourse marker "okay" from American media so that we can specify exactly the type of discourse marker "okay" that will be under review in this chapter. The following example is taken from the *PBS Newshour* podcast, and because it is a podcast, it represents an authentic example of American English praxis. In the example, Judy Woodworth interviews a reporter who is covering a mass-shooting in America. The mass-murderer who committed the atrocities wrote violent messages and images in a notebook before he went on a killing rampage, and Judy inquires to the reporter about the notebook in the segment below. The discourse marker "okay" appears in line 7.

Dolichological "Okay" Example 1: PBS Newshour (07/27/2012)

1   Judy: Now go back to the notebook and as you've said there's
2   been a lot of unconfirmed reports about it. What have you
3   been able to determine from your own reporting was in the
4   notebook what happened to it. Eh who was it mailed to?
5   And and did anyone at the university actually see it before
6   the shooting?

7	Woman:	Okay. This is a bit fuzzy but our information right now
8		from various sources is that this notebook is for real. It is
9		and that court records also now confirm that. It was sent
10		from Holmes to somebody in building 500. It's our
11		understanding that is Lynn Fenton the psychiatrist he was
12		seeing. My:: information from two different sources is that
13		this document uh had information in it that could have
14		provided a hint of the attack to come. As you probably
15		know other media have reported that this notebook
16		contained scary drawings of stick figures who were
17		carrying guns and mowing down other stick figures with
18		weapons. Which is kinda haunting based on the attack
19		that actually took place in the Aurora movie theater in
20		which allegedly James Holmes mowed down 70 people in
21		a sold out Batman [showing
22	Judy:	[an and what whether anybody actually
23		looked at it because they're having questions about that.

The discourse marker "okay" appears in line 7, but it does not express a conceptual meaning; that is, the discourse marker "okay" that appears in line 7 does not mean "sufficient," nor can it be paraphrased as "I understand" or as an affirmative response to the previous utterance (Schegloff 1986; Gaines 2011; Beach 1995a, 1995b). Nor does the discourse marker "okay" in the previous example express the idea that the sequence has been successfully concluded (Beach 1995b, 1990; Schegloff 2007; Gaines 2011); indeed, if anything, the discourse marker "okay" expands the sequence into the second pair part rather than close the sequence down. This "okay" is a discourse marker, and it expresses a procedural meaning; the discourse marker "okay" indicates how the speaker intends the interlocutor to orient to their message, and is not itself a message. In

other words, the discourse marker "okay" expresses a procedural meaning in the example above, not a conceptual meaning.

But before we examine the procedural meaning of the discourse marker "okay" that appears in the corpus, let us first examine the ways in which the discourse marker "okay" has been researched so far. Because the discourse marker "okay" was one of the first discourse markers to be identified as representative of that class, it has been extensively studied. As a result, a multitude of studies concerning the discourse marker "okay" permeate the academic literature.

2   Previous Studies of the Discourse Marker "Okay"

As noted in the previous chapter, discourse markers are not equally studied. Some discourse markers attract far more attention from academia than others. Again, as noted in the previous chapter, it can be justifiably claimed that the discourse marker "well" is the most studied discourse marker of all, and a plethora of studies have been devoted to explicating its functions in communication (e.g., Halliday & Hasan 1976; Pomerantz 1984; Schourup 2001; Blakemore 2002; Schegloff & Lerner 2009). However, if the discourse marker "well" wins the figurative race to the most academic studies devoted to it, second place belongs to the discourse marker "okay," and that means that any cursory review of the previous academic literature concerning the discourse marker "okay" needs to be quite extensive. The following is an attempt to summarize nearly twenty years of research into the vagaries of the discourse marker "okay."

Even though it is fair to say that the academic literature that covers the discourse marker "okay" is quite extensive, the grand scope of the literature can be summarized into two camps: the studies that adopt a conversation analytic methodology to ascertain the functions of the discourse marker "okay," which inevitably lead to conclusions concerning the interactional effect of the discourse marker; and studies that utilize a non-conversation analytic methodology to establish the meanings of the discourse marker "okay," which tend to reveal the cognitive effect of the discourse marker. We review the claims of both camps below.

2.1   Successful Sequence Closing Discourse Marker "Okay"

The standard account of the discourse marker "okay"[1] in conversation analysis claims that the discourse marker "okay" is a sequence closer, which is usually placed in sequence closing third position (Schegloff 2007). However, not all sequences are marked with the discourse marker "okay" according to this view; only successfully completed sequences are marked with the discourse marker "okay" (Schegloff 1986, 2007; Button 1990; Beach 1993, 1995a, 1995b). That is, the discourse marker "okay" in sequence closing third position has a global approbative[2] meaning (Gaines 2011).

The corollary to this description of the discourse marker "okay" as a sequential closure approval marker is that sequences that are not brought to a successful conclusion are expanded or repaired, and not marked with a discourse marker "okay" (Schegloff 2007). This distinction seems to hold even for monologic talk (Rendle-Short

---

[1] In scholarship based on conversation analytic methodology, discourse markers are designated as either "sequential markers" (e.g., Sidnell 2007) or "tokens" (e.g., Kasper 2009), not discourse markers. The terminology used in conversation analysis to categorize elements of language like discourse markers is not yet standardized.

[2] "Approbative" is a neologism. It simply means "approving" (Gaines 2011).

2000). Furthermore, the deployment of the discourse marker "okay" also projects the incipient nature of a further sequence to be produced soon (Cordon 1986, 2001; Beach 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Liddicoat 2004, 2007). That is, the deployment of the discourse marker "okay" is more than the marking of a sequence as successfully completed; it also adumbrates further related talk.

The following is an example of the classical usage of the discourse marker okay, which seems to indicate that the sequence has been brought to a successful culmination. In the extract below, Rebecca and Rick are preparing dinner for friends. Rebecca asks Rick about the costs of the other ingredients they will need to finish the dinner.

Successful Sequential Closing "Okay" Example 1: SBCSAEP1: CHA08[3]

1   Rebecca: Do you know how much it's gonna be?
2   Rick: Oh no. Not yet
3   Rebecca: Okay.

In line 1, Rebecca utters "do you know how much it's gonna be?" and Rick orients to the utterance as a question and produces an answer in line 2. Rebecca orients to Rick's second pair part (Oh no. Not yet) as sufficient for the purposes of closing the sequence, and produces a single stand-alone discourse marker "okay" to finish off the sequence in line 3.

It is important to note that this sequence may look like it is unsuccessful: Rick does not produce an affirmative answer to Rebecca's question, nor does he produce any of the requested information; indeed, if one defines the success or failure of a sequence

---

[3] The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE) is a publically available corpus open to all on www.talkbank.org (Du Bois & Englebretson 2004, 2005; Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, & Thompson 2000; Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, Thompson & Martey 2003). However, it does have one glaring problem: it is not transcribed according to conversation analytic standards. The examples used in this dissertation that are taken from the SBCSAE have all been re-transcribed to accord for conversation analytic transcription standards. The original lines of the corpus are listed above the example itself.

based on affirmation, then the sequence in the example is a complete failure. But if one defines success as affirmation, and failure as disaffirmation, then one falls into an etic trap and defines interactional details according to one's own standards rather than the standards of the actual participants.

The emic interpretation of the conversation praxis in the example above is that Rebecca oriented to Rick's response in a way that demonstrates that she found even his utter lack of information as sufficient to warrant the culmination of the sequence. The participants decide if the sequence is a success or a failure, not the analysts. Rebecca herself claimed that Rick's attempt to answer the question alone was sufficient grounds for orienting to Rick's second pair part as a satisfactory conclusion to the sequence, and that is what the discourse marker "okay" expresses in the example.

2.2   Task Management "Okay"

Not all linguists accept the conversation analytic claim that the discourse marker "okay" indicates that one speaker believes the sequences has been satisfactorily finished. Other scholars, usually scholars that do not accept the core premises of conversation analytic methodology, claim that the discourse marker "okay" is involved with task management (Bangerter & Clark 2003; Filipi & Wales 2003; Bangerter, Clark, & Katz 2004; Gaines 2011). That is, rather than signaling that a sequence has been brought to a successful completion as studies using conversation analytic methodology claim, these studies, which utilize psycholinguistic and cognitive linguistic methodologies, claim that the discourse marker "okay" is a transition between interactional projects (Bangerter & Clark 2003). Whether the interactional project involves interactional

communication or something more physical like moving objects around or giving instructions on a map task (Bangerter & Clark 2003; Filipi & Wales 2003) does not really matter: the discourse marker "okay" appears between interactional projects, which could be either physical or just oral projects, to signal that one project is complete and another is about to begin.

3   The Dolichological Discourse Marker "Okay"

We now turn to the main purpose of this chapter: explicating one of the additional procedural meanings of the discourse marker "okay" in oral American media. This dissertation will argue that the discourse marker "okay" is a dolichology marker. "Dolichology" is a neologism[4] designed to fill a taxonomic hole: no word seemed to describe what the discourse marker "okay" does in any of the following examples, so this study created a new word from Greek components. The first morpheme in the word is "dolicho," which is derived from the ancient Greek word that means "long" or "far." The second morpheme is "logy," which is derived from the ancient Greek word "logos," which means "speech," or "words,"[5] although now the morpheme "logy" indicates "study of" in modern English.

This dissertation uses the term "dolichology" in the literal meaning of the morphemes present in the lexeme: "long-speech." That is, the term "dolichology" or "dolichological" are used to adumbrate that the speaker will take an extended turn,

---

[4] The claim that "dolichology" is a neologism is a little tenuous: a Google search of the term found one hit, which led to a PDF that claimed that "dolichology" was roughly equivalent to "longiverbosity," which is another neologism. This is, however, the first time any search term has ever garnered only one hit in a Google search.

[5] According to http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=-logy

during which the interlocutor will orient to as long speech and therefore maintain a long period of listenership. Accordingly, this dissertation claims that the discourse marker "okay" can adumbrate an extended turn during which the interlocutor will remain silent.

The corpus of data that has been gathered for the examination of the praxis of the discourse marker "okay" comes from oral American media that is available over the internet through the iTunes service (i.e., iTunes University Lectures, TV shows, and podcasts, etc.). Some of the corpus is unscripted, like the iTunes University Lectures and the Podcasts, and therefore would be considered authentic data suitable to a conversation analytic study of language and discourse markers in particular (Heritage & Atkinson 1984; Schegloff 2007; Schiffrin 1987). However, some of the corpus data is scripted, like the TV shows, and therefore would fall outside of the typical bounds of acceptable research data within conversation analytic methodology.

This study includes both sets of data because recent corpus linguistics research has problematized the axiomatic claim that scripted data is somehow unrepresentative of real speech (Quaglio 2009). Indeed, corpus linguistics research that compares authentic data to certain scripted data have found that some sets of unauthentic, scripted data are actually very representative of authentic English[6]. Indeed, this dissertation will claim that the way the discourse marker "okay" is used in both the inauthentic and authentic examples present in this chapter is exactly the same way, and that the dichotomy between the two sets of data is irrelevant—at least as far as how the

---

[6] Indeed, Quaglio (2009) claims that the English usage represented in friends is highly consistent with the English usage in an authentic corpus of English to which he compared it. The only measure which the Friends data set was found lacking was "narrative-ness," but when one considers that the scripts of twenty-four minute shows would not allow characters to tell long stories, this is not an entirely surprising finding.

discourse marker "okay" is used. Be that as it may, we venture into our examples in the next three sections; first, we examine the praxis of the discourse marker "okay" in iTunes University Lectures in section 3.1; then we examine the scripted, inauthentic data set in section 3.2; and last, we look at the authentic data in section 3.3. The claim of this dissertation is this: dolichological discourse marking is accomplished with the discourse marker "okay" in all three sets of data.

3.1   The Dolichologic Discourse Marker "Okay" in iTunes University Lectures

The first set of examples (Dolichologic "Okay" Examples 2~5) is taken from Yale university lectures available for download from iTunes University. iTunes University should be considered one of the marvels of the modern world: iTunes University is a service available through the iTunes computer program that allows users to download authentic university lectures for free; through iTunes, anyone can download university lectures from esteemed universities like Harvard and Tokyo University[7]. Although it is as yet impossible to take credits for courses through iTunes, the lecture content is real and authentic; if one listens to the iTunes University lectures, one listens to the same lectures that university students listen to. Accordingly, the Yale university lectures gathered as a corpus for this dissertation are authentic data.

The corpus is composed of nine lectures from the following Yale university courses: The Moral Foundations of Politics, Political Philosophy, and Astrophysics. As

---

[7] What type of lectures are available from each university vary widely: Tokyo University only offers one-time special lectures from guests; Harvard University has a series of full courses including all classroom lectures and even the special sections.

one can deduce from the titles of the lectures, the corpus over-represents humanities

subjects, but hard-science subjects like astrophysics are also present in the corpus.

The first example we examine is from the second lecture of The Moral

Foundations of Politics course. In this course, the lecturer, Ian Shapiro, discusses topics

ranging from John Rawl's difference principle to Karl Marx's labor theory of value.

However, regardless of the content of the lecture, Professor Shapiro ("Prof" in the

transcripts) initiates the lectures with the discourse marker "okay."

Dolichological "Okay" Example 2: *The Moral Foundations of Politics, Lecture 2*

1   Prof: Okay so, let's begin. I asked you to, to bear two questions
2   in mind. (Lecture continues uninterrupted for about 50 minutes)

In the example above, Professor Shapiro begins the lecture in line 1. In the

previous lecture, Professor Shapiro asked his students to think about how Adolf

Eichmann justified to himself the crimes he helped perpetuate in Nazi Germany, which

is what the professor refers to in lines 1~2. However, the important thing about this

example for the purposes of this dissertation is the manner in which the professor

initiates the lecture. Professor Shapiro begins the lecture with the deployment of two

discourse markers: the discourse marker "okay" and the discourse marker "so." For the

entire span of the lecture, which lasts about fifty minutes, the students are silent, and

maintain their status as listeners. Therefore, the discourse marker "okay" was deployed

as the preface to an extended monologic[8] interaction—"monologic" because only the

---

8 "Monologic" is technical jargon that indicates that only a single speaker produces talk during an interaction. "Monologic" is used contrastively with "dialogic" (two speakers produce talk during an interaction) and "multilogic" (numerous speakers produce talk during an interaction).

professor speaks and "interaction" because even listening is an action within the conversation analytic framework.

The above example demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" can be deployed at the beginning of an extended monologic interaction, in this case an academic lecture, which is the genesis of the term "dolichologic okay." That is, the discourse marker "okay" seems to adumbrate the interactional event that is about to take place, and the interactional event is long and monologic. One of the functions of the discourse marker "okay" is to adumbrate an extended turn, which could explain why the discourse marker "okay" was used to preface a university lecture.

But this is just one example. It could just be an example of one speaker's idiolect. Further examples of the discourse marker "okay" used as a preface to extended monologic interactions will strengthen the case. And indeed further examples show this to be the case.

The next example we examine is from the fourteenth lecture of the Introduction to Political Philosophy course. In this course, the lecturer, Steven Smith, discusses topics that permeate the political great books of the Western tradition (*Democracy in America*, *The Prince*, *The Social Contract*, etc.). However, regardless of the content of the lecture, Professor Smith ("Prof" in the transcripts) initiates the lectures with the discourse marker "okay."

Dolichological "Okay" Example 3: *Introduction to Political Philosophy, Lecture 8*

1	Prof:	Okay, where are we. To- today, we're going to study, I'm
2		gonna talk about Aristotle's, you might call it Aristotle's
3		comparative politics. And focusing on the idea of the

4   regime. (Lecture continues uninterrupted for about 50 minutes)

In the example above, the professor announces that he will lecture on Aristotle's comparative politics, but the important thing about this example for the purposes of this dissertation is the manner in which the professor initiates the lecture. Professor Smith begins the lecture with the deployment of the discourse marker "okay" and the students remain passive listeners for the rest of the lecture. This example demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" can be used to initiate extended monologic interactions; that is, the discourse marker "okay" can be used to adumbrate a dolichological event.

The two previous examples are taken from political science courses, but the discourse marker "okay" is also used in other genres of academic lectures to preface the initiation of the lecture. The next example is taken from a hard-sciences lecture: Astrophysics 160. In these lectures, Charles Bailyn ("Prof" in the transcript) discusses black holes, dark energy, wormholes, and other esoteric topics. But just like the two previous professors, he deploys the discourse marker "okay" to start his lecture.

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 4: *Frontiers & Controversies in Astrophysics, Lecture 8*

1   Prof: Okay, welcome to the second part of uh, of Astro 160.
2   (Lecture continues uninterrupted for about 50 minutes)

In the example above, the professor welcomes the students back to class after a weeklong hiatus, and then promptly begins the lecture. However, the important thing about this example for the purposes of this dissertation is the manner in which the professor initiates the lecture. Professor Bailyn begins the lecture with the deployment of the discourse marker "okay." Like the two previous examples, this example demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" can be used to initiate extended

monologic interactions; that is, the discourse marker "okay" can be used to adumbrate a dolichological event.

The previous three examples illustrate the normative usage of the discourse marker "okay" at the beginnings of academic lectures: the discourse marker "okay" marks the initiation of the lecture, which is an extended monologic interaction—dolichologic, in other words. Many of the lectures in the corpus begin with the discourse marker "okay" and the discourse marker "okay" is by far the most common—but by no means the only—discourse marker found at the beginning of the academic lectures in the corpus (O'Neal 2011b). But the next example is exceptional. The discourse marker "okay" does not appear at the beginning of the Professor Smith's talk. Rather, it manifests later in his lecture.

Dolicological "Okay" Example 5: *Introduction to Political Philosophy, Lecture 15*

1	Prof:	Uh, well, good, good morning. It's so, it's so nice to see you
2		again, on this gorgeous, on this gorgeous autumn day. And
3		we had a wonderful wonderful weekend didn't we.
4		(3.0) ((students nod heads))
5	Prof:	Yes we did
6		(4.0)
7	Prof:	Uh::: okay, today
8		(3.0)
9	Prof:	I want us to begin, we move ahead, we're moving ahead.
10		Today we begin with Mr. John Locke.
11		(Lecture continues uninterrupted for about 50 minutes)

In the example above, Professor Smith hails the students with a morning greeting, and then comments on the beauty of the day (lines 1~2). Next, he states that the students had a wonderful weekend (line 3), to which the students orient as a declaration and nod

their assent (line 4). The professor orients to the student's collective embodiment of assent with his own secondary agreement (line 5).

After four seconds of silence (line 6), the professor begins the lecture in line 7 with the deployment of the discourse marker "okay." We know this as analysts because the utterance to which the discourse marker "okay" is appended is a preview of the lecture (lines 7~10). Accordingly, we have evidence that the discourse marker "okay" initiates the extended monologic interaction: before the deployment of the discourse marker "okay," the professor and the students engaged in sequential greetings; after the deployment of the discourse marker "okay," only the professor speaks for the rest of the lecture video on topics directly related to political philosophy.

All of the previous lectures taken from downloadable iTunes University courses begin with the discourse marker "okay," and the deployment of the discourse marker "okay" collocates with the beginning of an extended turn, which becomes a university level lecture. Indeed, the most common discourse marker to appear at the beginning of iTunes University downloadable lectures is the discourse marker okay (O'Neal 2011b). These two facts are consistent with the hypothesis that one of the procedural meanings of the discourse marker "okay" is to adumbrate a dolichologic event—an extended turn in which one speaker claims a greater right to speak for a longer than normal turn. Again, the persistence with which the discourse marker "okay" is used at the opening of university lectures indicates that this is probably not a random phenomenon.

However, the goals of the lecturers can give us some clues: the professors are about to start lecturing, and they need to attract the attention of the assembled audience

124

and notify them that the lecture will soon begin. Accordingly, the professors needed to use some means with which they could notify their audience of all of the above. It seems that professors persistently resorted to the use of the discourse marker "okay" to convey such meanings. That is, the discourse marker "okay" seems to be a signal of the speaker's intention to initiate a monologic interaction and take an extended turn in which the interlocutor or interlocutors will assume extended listenership.

However, although all of the previous examples demonstrate that the discourse marker "okay" can appear before long utterances, one can conceivably claim that the scope of the discourse marker "okay" does not demonstrate the intention to extend a speaker's turn to length of the entire lecture. One could even claim that the function of the discourse marker "okay" at the head of these lectures does not relate to the function of the lecture itself: in other words, the teleology of the lecture and the purpose of the discourse marker "okay" are not the same. But, as we will examine in the examples in the next two sections, that claim cannot be reconciled with how the discourse marker "okay" is used in speech events that are not academic lectures. Indeed, the discourse marker "okay" appears in many other contexts, but the procedural meaning seems to stay the same: the discourse marker "okay" prefaces the initiation of an dolichologic turn in conversations.

3.2   The Dolichologic Discourse Marker "Okay" in Scripted Media

The discourse marker "okay" can project a long utterance or multiple utterances in interactions that are not academic lectures. There are numerous examples of the discourse marker "okay" prefacing long monologic stretches of talk in conversations in

inauthentic data and authentic data. Although it is difficult to assess the actual meaning

of discourse marker "okay" in dialogic conversations, one can see from examples below

that indeed the same phenomenon happens again even in interactions that do not involve

a lecturer and students, and through a retrospective conversation analytic analysis, one

can see that the orientation to utterances prefaced with the discourse marker "okay" is

often to maintain silence until the speaker indicates that they are finished. We examine

such extracts now.

The first set of examples are taken from inauthentic examples of conversations

taken from American media, mostly American TV shows. In the following extract,

Phoebe is practicing her wedding speech. In American white middle class weddings, it

is custom for both the bride and the groom to give a speech during their wedding

ceremony. Although it is just a practice wedding speech, Phoebe is taking it very

seriously. Also, notice one very important fact: Phoebe begins her speech, which may

be assumed to be a rather long utterance because it is a wedding speech, with the

discourse marker "okay."

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 6: Friends, Season 10, Episode 12

1   Monica: The bride has a few words she would like to say.
2   Phoebe: Okay. Hello everyone. And, uh thank you all for being here
3   tonight. So tomorrow's the big event. And some of you
4   might not know, but Mike and I didn't get off to the best
5   start. (The speech continues)

In the example above, Monica announces to everyone at the wedding practice

ceremony that Phoebe is about to give a speech in line 1, which is an utterance that

highly suggests continued talk after it and is therefore a pre-sequence. However, unlike

many other pre-sequences, Monica does not produce the continued talk after the utterance but rather passes her turn to Phoebe. Indeed, all the participants at the wedding practice ceremony orient to Monica's utterance as a pre-sequence: they all physically orient their bodies toward Phoebe, which can be taken as an indication that they all thought Phoebe was about to produce another spate of talk. In lines 2~5, Phoebe begins to deliver the speech she intends to give during her real wedding.

However, what is important to note here is the following two points: 1) Phoebe deploys the discourse marker "okay" at the head of her turn, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "okay" is a dolichologic discourse marker; and 2) Phoebe's interlocutors, who are the assembled mass of people around her, simply nod at her speech at appropriate moments and never attempt to take the floor away from Phoebe, which is a fact that is also consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "okay" is a dolichologic discourse marker because a dolichologic discourse marker should be oriented to with silence. Of course, the discourse marker "okay" is deployed in conjunction with many other signals that project an extended turn of talk—in particular, Monica announces to everyone that Phoebe is about to give a speech, which is a pre-sequence that adumbrates an entire further sequence of talk. Be that at it may, the discourse marker "okay" is deployed at the outset of an extended monologic turn to which all the interlocutors orient to as passive listeners.

In the next example from the inauthentic corpus of examples, another speaker prefaces an extended monologic turn with the discourse marker "okay," to which all the interlocutors—except one—orient as an extended monologic turn: they remain silent

while the initial speaker creates a dolichologic event. The example requires some background information to understand. The example centers around Chandler, who is about to give a new idea for an advertisement for one of the company's new products: a type of athletic shoe. However, Chandler is the oldest person on the advertisement idea team, and some of the younger colleagues chide him about the fact that he is older than they are, a fact that will be relevant to the interaction below.

Initially, Chandler seeks permission to get his idea to the group, and then proceeds to relay his idea to the boss, who is sitting at the edge of the table. Notice, however, one important fact: Chandler's idea is rather long, containing multiple clauses and numerous illustrations of how this advertisement would appear on TV, so if the discourse marker "okay" really is a dolichologic discourse marker, then it should preface the beginning of that utterance—and that's exactly what happens.

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 7: Friends, Season 9, Episode 15

1	Boss:	Who's next?
2	Chan:	((Waves his hand))
3	Boss:	Chandler ((Points at Chandler))
4	Chan:	Okay. You start on the image of a guy putting on the shoes.
5		He's about my age.
6	Slade:	Pst. Your age?
7	Chan:	**Ahan**! So he's rolling down the street and he starts to lose
8		control, you know, maybe he falls, maybe he hurts himself.
9		Just then a kid comes flying by wearing the shoes. He
10		jumps over the old guy and laughs and the line reads not
11		suitable for adults.
12	Boss:	Chandler. That's great.

In the above example, Chandler proceeds to relay his idea for a company commercial about new young-men's shoes to his boss, but before he does so, he deploys the discourse marker "okay" once in line 4. After that, from lines 4 to 11, with a brief interruption in line 6, to which Chandler orients to as a rude interruption and spits back "Ahan!" in line 7 before returning to the description of his idea, Chandler relays his idea to his boss over many clauses of information. In line 12, Chandler's boss expresses his acclaim for Chandler's idea, and the idea session comes to an end.

The important thing to note is the following: during Chandler's pitch of his idea to his boss, all the interlocutors, except for Slade who Chandler quickly shuts down with a sardonic epithet marked with a pitch-accent (**Ahan!**) in line 7, everyone is silent and remains an interlocutor. That is, they all oriented to Chandler as if he were taking an extended turn, and they all decided that the appropriate action under such circumstances was to maintain silence and listenership for an extended period of time. This example of interaction is consistent with the hypothesis that the discourse marker "okay" can preface an extended turn to which both parties, the speaker and the interlocutors, orient as a turn that is longer than normal, and indeed changes the conversation, however briefly, from a dialogic conversation into a monologic event.

The last example from the corpus of the inauthentic data also demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" can be used to foreshadow the following speech as dolichologic. As with all the examples, this extract requires some background information to assess properly. Phoebe is about to tell Monica that she had mugged Monica's brother, Ross, when she was a teenager; however, Phoebe was not cognizant

of the fact that she had mugged Ross until just a few seconds ago, when she was reminded of the fact in the previous section of the episode. Although the example is peppered with continuers, Phoebe begins to tell Monica what she had done to Monica's brother long ago. Note, however, that Phoebe begins her confession with the discourse marker "okay," and note that Monica's contribution to the conversation is limited to continuers that pass her turn to speak back to Phoebe so that she can continue her confession. It is also important to note that Phoebe's utterance is essentially one continuous utterance from line 1 all the way down to her final confession in line 14.

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 8: Friends, Season 9, Episode 15

1	Phoebe:	Okay. I think we have a problem here
2	Monica:	What?
3	Phoebe:	Well, um, back in my mugging days, you know, I, um, I
4		worked Saint Marks Comics.
5	Monica:	Yeah
6	Phoebe:	Well, uh, pipe was my weapon of choice and um pre-teen
7		comic book nerds were my meat.
8	Monica:	So?
9	Phoebe:	Well, there was this one kid who had a sticker on his
10		backpack that said [geology rocks
11	Monica:	[Geology rocks
12		(3.0)
13	Monica:	Oh my God
14	Phoebe:	I know. I mugged Ross.

In line 1, Phoebe mentions to Monica that they have a problem, and Monica orients to Phoebe's statement as if it were a pre-sequence, which is an utterance which projects further talk after a go-ahead signal has been produced. We know this because the classic go-ahead signal for a pre-sequence is "what," and Monica produces that in

line 2 (Schegloff 2007). With that, the pre-sequence has been completed, and Phoebe begins to produce the base sequence first pair part of a confession: she once mugged Monica's brother long ago, but when she did it, she didn't know that it was Monica's brother. Phoebe's confession is relayed in bits and pieces from lines 3 to 14, but it does not culminate in a full confession. Both Phoebe and Monica co-produce "Geology rocks", which is the sticker that Ross put on his backpack when he was a kid, at which point Monica orients to such a disclosure as informative, and reacts accordingly in line 13 (Oh my god!). In line 14, Phoebe fully confesses to her previous crime, but does so well after Monica realizes what she has done.

The important thing to note about the previous extract is that Phoebe deploys the discourse marker "okay" at the beginning of her confession to Monica and that her confession is not a single quick utterance. Monica's continuers constantly punctuate Phoebe's confession, compelling her to progress her story until its culmination, which shows that Phoebe's confession is quite a long span of strategically placed information that helps Monica guess the gist of the confession without forcing Phoebe to directly state what she had done. That is, the discourse marker "okay" is deployed here to preface a long extended turn. However, what makes the turn long and extended is the interaction itself: the two participants co-construct the extended turn; Phoebe produces a number of utterances that culminate in a confession; Monica deploys continuers that simultaneously pass her turn back to Phoebe and that prod Phoebe to get to the point of her turn: explaining what the problem is that was alluded to in line 1.

All of the previous data indicate that the discourse marker "okay" can be deployed to indicate that the speaker intends to take an extended turn, and that the utterance to which the discourse marker okay is deployed is oriented to by conversation participants like it were a request to remain silent and maintain extended listenership. However, all of the data in this section share a central, problematic characteristic—they are all inauthentic data. That is, although the discourse marker "okay" in the previous data seems to be deployed to adumbrate an extended turn, one could conceivably jettison any conclusions based on the data as the product of the ephemeral lexical gymnastics of sappy TV drama screenwriters. Yet, this would be a mistake. This is because the discourse marker "okay" is used in exactly the same way in authentic data—it adumbrates an extended turn in real data sources as well, and it is to those sources we turn next.

3.3   The Dolichologic Discourse Marker "Okay" in Unscripted Data

The discourse marker "okay" also appears in authentic data. And, just as it does in the two previous sets of data, the discourse marker "okay" prefaces dolichologic events; it adumbrates an extended turn during which interlocutors are silent and maintain extended listenership. Accordingly, in spite of the authenticity or inauthenticity of the data sets, the discourse marker "okay" displays a surprisingly similar range of procedural meanings in each data set.

The first example from the authentic data set involves a TV news show interview that was later rendered into a downloadable podcast. The following example is taken from the *PBS Newshour* podcast. In the example, Judy Woodworth interviews a reporter

who is covering a mass-shooting in America. The mass-murderer who committed the atrocities wrote violent messages and images in a notebook before he went on a killing rampage, and Judy inquires to the reporter about the notebook in the segment below. The discourse marker "okay" appears in line 7.

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 9: PBS Newshour (07/27/2012)

1	Judy:	Now go back to the notebook and as you've said there's
2		been a lot of unconfirmed reports about it. What have you
3		been able to determine from your own reporting was in the
4		notebook what happened to it. Eh who was it mailed to?
5		And and did anyone at the university actually see it before
6		the shooting?
7	Woman:	Okay. This is a bit fuzzy but our information right now
8		from various sources is that this notebook is for real. It is
9		and that court records also now confirm that. It was sent
10		from Holmes to somebody in building 500. It's our
11		understanding that is Lynn Fenton the psychiatrist he was
12		seeing. My:: information from two different sources is that
13		this document uh had information in it that could have
14		provided a hint of the attack to come. As you probably
15		know other media have reported that this notebook
16		contained scary drawings of stick figures who were
17		carrying guns and mowing down other stick figures with
18		weapons. Which is kinda haunting based on the attack
19		that actually took place in the Aurora movie theater in
20		which allegedly James Holmes mowed down 70 people in
21		a sold out Batman [showing
22	Judy:	[an and what whether anybody actually
23		looked at it because they're having questions about that.

After a slew of questions, the reporter finally begins to speak in line 7, but only after she has deployed the discourse marker "okay" once as the preface to the entire

response. Also note this: the reporter's answer extends over a number of clauses and over quite a long span of time. Indeed, the reporter does not even begin to stop talking until Judy butts in at line 22; that is, the reporter intended to speak beyond the end of her utterance in line 21, and probably would have if Judy had not shut her turn down before its natural culmination. This example demonstrates that the discourse marker "okay" can project very long turns, monologic events, inside even dialogic conversations.

The next extract is taken from the Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English. It also represents an example of authentic data. In the next example, two brothers, Alin and Leonard, discuss their family, and the discussion turns to a story about the relationship between their sister and their mother. Before one of the brothers begins an extended turn to relate a story to his brother interlocutor, he deploys the discourse marker "okay," and the storyteller's interlocutor stays quiet until the storyteller indicates the culmination of the story.

Dolichologic "Okay" Example 10: SBCSAEP1: CHA06 Lines 317~345[9]

1	Alin:	Did I tell you about when Mom was having Arnold and Lisabeth over
2		for lunch finally
3		(1.0)
4	Alin:	.hh Okay well Mom (.) They call up in August and go (.) I mean it's
5		(.) Daddy's been dead what (.) seven years and finally it dawns on
6		Lisabeth that she doesn't see Mom that much
7		(1.0)

---

[9] The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE) is a publically available corpus open to all on www.talkbank.org (Du Bois & Englebretson 2004, 2005; Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, & Thompson 2000; Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, Thompson & Martey 2003). However, it does have one glaring problem: it is not transcribed according to conversation analytic standards. The examples used in this dissertation that are taken from the SBCSAE have all been re-transcribed to accord for conversation analytic transcription standards. The original lines of the corpus are listed above the example itself.

8		well it's cause she n- (.) I know she never calls her right .hh So Mom
9	Leonard:	((swallows something))
10	Alin:	hh. she just goes I feel like you've got a whole other w:orld outside of
11		us like you don't even need us Mar and that you have a whole other
12		life
13	Leonard:	.hh
14	Alin:	Mom said I do (laughs) .hh well.
15	Leonard:	.hh poor Lisabeth

In the example above, Alin begins his turn in lines 1~2 with a classic example of a pre-sequence—an utterance which strongly suggests that further actions are incipient but which require some sort of go-ahead signal from the interlocutor. The example is audio only, so one can only assume that because Alin continues his story past the pre-sequence question, Alin must have received some sort of non-verbal go-ahead signal from his interlocutor, Leonard. However, after the deployment of the pre-sequence question, which itself strongly projects a further story of some sort, Alin takes an in-breath (line 4), which itself is a repertory signal that Alin needed to take a breath before continuing further, which in turn suggests that Alin thought he was going to talk for a while, Alin deploys the discourse marker "okay" in line 4.

From line 4 to line 14, Alin relates a story about their sister and mother. Meanwhile, Leonard makes no audible noises with the sole exception of one swallowing noise in line 9, but nothing Leonard says can be interpreted as an attempt to take the floor until 15. That is, for more than ten lines after Alin deploys a concatenation of signals that he intended to take a long turn (the pre-sequence, the in-breath, and the discourse marker "okay"), Leonard says nothing and simply

maintains a continuous state of listenership. Indeed, Leonard does not move to make the temporarily monologic conversation dialogic again until after Alin indicates that the story is finished in line 14 when he laughs at his own story culmination.

All of the examples above demonstrate that the discourse marker "okay" can be used as a dolichologic discourse marker. Although this is not the only procedural meaning that the discourse marker "okay" can express, nor is it the most common procedural meaning expressed by the discourse marker "okay," one procedural meaning that speakers can deploy the discourse marker "okay" to express is the adumbration of an extended turn. After the deployment of the discourse marker "okay," listeners will maintain silence until the speaker has indicated that the interactional project has been completed.

However, this dissertation does not claim that the discourse marker "okay" is the only way to adumbrate an extended turn. Nor does this dissertation claim that the discourse marker "so" is the only way to adumbrate the initiation of the interactional teleology. Indeed, there are other ways to perform exactly the same function. Language is, after all, multimodal, and any speaker has more than one option available to him or her at any time. And that is the topic to which we turn in the next chapter.

.

Chapter 5

Conclusion:

There and Back Again

1　　There and Back Again

The return of the hero to their native home at the end of a story is a common trope in many forms of literature. In *the Hobbit*, Bilbo Baggins returns to Hobbiton. But Bilbo is irrevocably changed by the journey. In *Batman Begins*, Bruce Wayne comes back to Gotham City. Yet, when Bruce comes back to Gotham City, he is no longer the despondent brat of his former life. Although the story of this dissertation is not nearly as dramatic, it does entail a return of sorts for the author, but, as with the two stories mentioned above, the author is not the same as when he set out on his journey.

Long ago, when the author was a student at a Chinese university (2005~2006), one of his Chinese teachers, who had a PhD in Chinese language education, stated, "the more I learn about Chinese, the less I understand it." After four years of intense study of American English, the author of this dissertation has begun to have the same opinion. American English, and probably all types of English and all language, is a nebulous mass of amorphous concepts employed at the whim of the speaker. It is little wonder that the further one ventures into the metaphorical gaseous nebula of American English, the further it slips from one's figurative grasp.

The main reason that a nebula metaphor is such an apt description of American English is the following: American English is inherently multimodal, containing a number of methods to perform the same effect. Depending on whether a speaker of American English desires to be subtle or blatant, direct or indirect, he or she can choose from an array of choices to express his or her thoughts. Therefore, because American English is so multimodal, it is fitting to end this dissertation with some thoughts on the

other ways that the central themes of this dissertation—teleologic and dolichologic discourse marking—can be accomplished in American English.

2   Alternatives Teleologic and Dolichologic Marking in English

This dissertation was mostly concerned with explicating one way speakers of American English adumbrate teleologic and dolichologic orientations in interaction. This dissertation argued that the discourse marker "so" is highly involved in foreshadowing the initiation of the teleology of the interaction. This dissertation also argued that the discourse marker "okay" can adumbrate a dolichologic event—an academic lecture, a story, or even a confession, all of which are one genre of long extended monologic turns. But these two discourse markers are hardly the only means American English has at its disposal to do either. All languages are multimodal—they have many metaphorical tools in the figurative tool shed to perform one job. This section lightly touches upon some of the other tools in American English tool shed.

2.1   Alternatives to Teleologic "So"

American English has an extraordinarily large number of ways to adumbrate the initiation of the teleology of the interaction. The discourse marker "so" is just one of the ways in can be done, and it is a subtle one at that. Because the discourse marker "so" is a subtle way to initiate the teleology of the interaction, American English contains more obvious, and even blatant, ways to initiate teleology.

One way American English can adumbrate the teleology of the conversation without recourse to the discourse marker "so" is to use a pre-sequence (Schegloff 2007).

For example, one could just say, "I've got a favor to ask," which strongly projects both further talk after a go-ahead signal from the interlocutor and teleologic talk. That is, if someone uses the pre-sequence "I've got a favor to ask," one can be sure that the sequence that is about to begin is teleologic; whatever the speaker's purpose in initiating the interaction was, it will be revealed soon.

Of course, the downside of this type of pre-sequence is that it lacks all subtlety. One of the things that conversation analysis has revealed is that impositions on the interlocutor are imbedded in pre-sequences in order to avoid a direct request. The deployment of the discourse marker "so" avoids all the complications of a more forward means of initiating the teleology of the conversation. It is both subtle and quick, rather than blunt and obvious like other types of teleology initiations.

2.2   Alternatives to Dolichologic "Okay"

American English also has a large repertoire of tools to take an extended turn. The discourse marker "okay" is just one of those, and it is a rare one at that. There is a host of other ways to adumbrate an extended turn in American English. Language is, after all, multimodal.

One other way American English has to adumbrate an extended turn is the pre-sequence. Pre-sequences usually adumbrate a sequential action that necessitates a long turn, and can be used for everything that this dissertation has claimed the discourse marker "okay" can be used for—stories, confessions, and long answers (Schegloff 2007). Indeed, at least superficially, the pre-sequence seems to be the better interactional mechanism to set up a dolichological event: it notifies the interlocutor that

a dolichological event is about to be deployed, and it seeks the interlocutor's permission to do so.

However, there is a critical difference between the deployment of a pre-sequence and the discourse marker "okay," even though both can be used to adumbrate a dolichological event. A pre-sequence requires more forethought and pre-planning. It is also contingent on the response of the interlocutor to proceed to the base sequence first pair part that the pre-sequence foreshadows. The discourse marker "okay" contains no such restrictions: the discourse marker "okay," because it is a discourse marker, does no require a pre-sequence in order to initiate the base sequence it adumbrates, nor is the discourse marker "okay" dependent on a go-ahead signal from the interlocutor. That is, although the one of the purposes to which a pre-sequence or the discourse marker "okay" can be deployed is the same, it is conceivable that the decision-making process that leads to each is slightly different: it is possible that the discourse marker "okay" is used to adumbrate dolichological events that cannot be foreshadowed with a pre-sequence because of sequential contingencies.

3   Future Directions

Although all above presents ways in which other means of expressing teleology and dolichology in interaction are possible, it is all pure speculation at this point. Future research will have to elucidate whether teleology and dolichology can be foreshadowed via other means. Yet, even if future research demonstrates that teleology and dolichology can be adumbrated through different means than those proposed in this

dissertation, that will just further necessitate research that explicates the differences between each of the ways. But that type of research is for another day. For now, I gladly close the door.

Appendix A: Conversation Analytic Transcription Conventions

Conversation analytic transcriptions are based on the original Jeffersonian system, but they have been slightly amended for the purposes of this dissertation. For a few of the lexemes in some of the examples, the standard conversation analytic transcription was replaced with international phonetic alphabet (IPA) transcription. This dissertation considers this justified because one of the tenets of conversation analysis is that no detail, *a priori*, should be discounted as meaningless and inconsequential.

Unfortunately, the standard Jeffersonian transcription system renders certain phonological details of interaction meaningless and inconsequential in an *a priori* manner because it cannot adequately distinguish between certain phonemes, and therefore cannot really assess whether certain phonemes are interactionally relevant or not. The application of IPA transcription to the standard conversation analysis transcription method allows such an analysis, and therefore empowers conversation analytic methodology to be applied to phonological analysis.

Conversation Analysis has certain transcription standards, even with the added application of IPA transcription for certain lexemes. The following examples below illustrate how conversation analytic transcripts are written. As much as is possible, the transcriptions are written in standard English orthography, until the phonological details deviate to too great a degree to justify standard English orthography[1]. In that case, the transcriber is warranted to write the pronunciation in either IPA or non-standard English orthography.

---

[1] This is often a judgment call on the part of the transcriber.

Simultaneous Utterances

Simultaneous utterances are marked at the beginning of the overlap of both of the utterances with left brackets.

Simultaneous Utterance Example: *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*

1   Mich: Anita Vanger?
2   Secretary: Through there.
3   Mich: Excuse me. I probably should have made an appointment.
4   Anita: No it's fine. Uhm. Please [have a seat
5   Mich: [thank you

In the example above, in line 4, Anita utters "have a seat" at the same time that Michael (*Mich* in the transcript) utters "thank you."

Contiguous Utterances

Contiguous utterances are utterances that have no appreciable pause between the utterances. In order to demarcate contiguous utterances, conversation analysts first append an equals sign to the end of the first utterance, and attach an equals sign to the front of the next utterance.

Contiguous Utterances Example: *Mad Men*

1   Peggy: So, do you know who you're gonna put on Hilton yet?
2   Don: No
3   Peggy: Well, I don't know if they want a woman's point of view but I read his
4   book and::=
5   Don: =who told we were gonna land Hilton, because we're not.

In line 4, Peggy stretches the pronunciation of the word "and," but Don figuratively "jumps in" at a point of the conversation that cannot be considered a

transition relevance point in line 5. The two equals signs signify that there was no appreciable pause between Peggy's "and" and Don's "who." That is, Don interrupted Peggy before she could complete the utterance projected by the lexical item "and" (Liddicoat 2004).

Silences & Pauses

Conversation Analysis does not transcribe pauses or silences in a different way, although conversation analysis does recognize the sociological difference between pauses and silences. For the sake of simplicity, both pauses and silences are transcribed in exactly the same way. Micro-silences, silences less than half a second in time, are marked with a period inside two parenthesis. Silences of half a second or more are written in numerals representing seconds of time without an utterance.

Silences Example: *Mad Men*

1   Dolores: Oh I'm not his secretary. I'm his girl. I'm like his wife but
2   I can't call myself that.
3   (1.0)
4   Mr. Price: Oh

After Dolores described her situation to Mr. Price in lines 1~2 and creates a transition relevance place at which Mr. Price could begin his rejoinder, but he does not. There is about one second of silence before Mr. Price says anything, and this is transcribed as (1.0) in the transcript.

Sound Stretches

Sound stretches are appreciably longer than normal pronunciation of continuants. Sound stretches are marked with colons.

Sound Stretches Example: *Macworld Podcast*

1   Phil: =yes so::: uh the iPadmini, is it just a big
2   iPod touch Dan Frakes?
3   Frakes: It is:::=
4   Phil: =or is it a smalle[r::

In line 1, Phillip (*Phil* in the transcript) pronounced "so" with an elongated vowel. In line 3, Dan Frakes (*Frakes* in the transcript) pronounced "is" with an elongated voiced sibilant.

Pitch-Accents

Pitch-Accents are phonological prominences in the interaction, and the syllables upon which they manifest are written in bold letters.

Pitch-Accents Example: *2011 Sound File 2*

1   Mika: yes I I don't like Kendo [hnnhnnhn
2   Kelly: [hhnnhnn
3   Kelly: then **why** did you join hnn [hnnn
4   Mika: [hhnhnnn

In line 3, Kelly's utterance is phonologically prominent, with increased pitch and volume, on the lexeme "why."

Laughter

Laughter is a common phenomenon in the transcripts, and it does have an

interactional effect: usually it necessitates that the partner also begin laughing. Conversation analytic transcripts write laughter as a series of "hs" or the word "laughs" in parenthesis.

Laughter Example: *2011 Sound File 2*

1	Mika: yes I I don't like Kendo [hnnhnnhn
2	Kelly: [hhnnhnn
3	Kelly: then **why** did you join hnn [hnnn
4	Mika: [hhnhnnn

In all lines of the example, Mika and Kelly engage in choral laughter (simultaneous laughter). The laughter is always written with a series of the letter "h."

Kinesthetic Details

When participants perform some non-verbal action that affects the interaction in some appreciable way, conversation analytic transcription requires that the action be described within double parenthesis.

Kinesthetic Details Example: *Political Philosophy, Lecture 15*

1	Prof:	Uh, well, good, good morning. It's so, it's so nice to see you
2		again, on this gorgeous, on this gorgeous autumn day. And
3		we had a wonderful wonderful weekend didn't we
4		(3.0) ((students nod heads))

After a summary description of the weekend's weather and activities, the students nod their heads. This factoid is written with double parenthesis at the location in which it occurs in the transcript.

Appendix B: Source Materials

All of the source materials used in this dissertation in the transcripts are listed below. The source materials are arranged into sections based on the type of source material: Podcasts, TV Shows, Movies, iTunes University Lectures, The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English, and The English as a Lingua Franca Corpus. All of the source materials, except for the English as a Lingua Franca Corpus, are available for download from iTunes. The Podcasts and the iTunes University Lectures are free to download, but the TV Shows and the Movies are only available for purchase. However, because there is no standardized way to write the reference for downloaded materials from iTunes, this dissertation references the TV Shows and the movies with their DVD format references. There is no standard way at all of referencing either Podcasts or iTunes University Lectures, so this dissertation adopted its own style of referencing for those two types of references. The English as a Lingua Franca Corpus is a collection of English conversation sound files that were recorded between college students who were not native-speakers of English. The corpus is the personal property of the researcher.

Podcasts

HBO (2012). *Real Time with Bill Maher*. Episode 252 (Originally Aired 6/15/2012). HBO Podcasts.

Macworld (2012). *Macworld Podcast*. Episode 326 (Originally Aired 10/31/2012). IDG Consumer & SMB.

Macworld (2012). Macworld Podcast. Episode 327 (Originally Aired 7/11/2012). IDG Consumer & SMB.

PBS (2012). *PBS Newshour*. (Originally Aired 04/08/2012). MacNeil/Lehrer Productions.

PBS (2012). *PBS Newshour*. (Originally Aired 10/26/2012). MacNeil/Lehrer Productions.

PBS (2012). *PBS Newshour*. (Originally Aired 07/27/2012). MacNeil/Lehrer Productions.

PBS (2012). PBS Newshour. (Originally Aired 12/29/2012). MacNeil/Lehrer Productions.

Tyson, Neil D. (2012). *StarTalk Radio Show*. (Originally Aired 09/10/2012). StarTalk Radio Productions.

TV Shows

Edelstein, Michael (2010). *Defying Gravity: The Complete First Season*. Perf. Livingston, Ron. 20th Century Fox, DVD.

Schwimmer, David, Bruce Weiss, Gail Halvorson, Keith Bright & Lonnie Davis (2002). *Friends: The complete ninth season*. Perf. Anniston, Jennifer & Courtney Cox. Warner Home Video, DVD.

Schwimmer, David, Bruce Weiss, Gail Halvorson, Keith Bright & Lonnie Davis (2003). *Friends: The complete fifth season*. Perf. Anniston, Jennifer & Courtney Cox. Warner Home Video, DVD.

Schwimmer, David, Bruce Weiss, Gail Halvorson, Keith Bright & Lonnie Davis (2005). *Friends: The complete tenth season*. Perf. Anniston, Jennifer & Courtney Cox. Warner Home Video, DVD.

Weiner, Matthew (2011). *Mad Men: Season Four*. Perf. Hamm, John & Elizabeth Moss. Lionsgate, DVD.

Weiner, Matthew (2012). *Mad Men: Season Five*. Perf. Hamm, John & Elizabeth Moss. Lionsgate, DVD.

Winter, Terence (2012). *Boardwalk Empire: The complete first season*. Perf. Buscemi, Steven & Michael Pitt. HBO studios, DVD.

Movies

Fincher, David (2011). *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*. Perf. Craig, Daniel & Rooney Mara. Sony Pictures Entertainment, DVD.

iTunes University Lectures

All iTunes University lectures were downloaded via the iTunes software program. All of the lectures were from courses offered through Yale University's iTunes service.

Bailyn, Charles (2007). *Frontiers & Controversies in Astrophysics*, Lecture 8. Yale University.

Shapiro, Ian (2010). *The Moral Foundations of Politics*, Lecture 2. Yale University.

Smith, Smith (2006). *Introduction to Political Philosophy*, Lecture 8. Yale University.

Smith, Smith (2006). *Introduction to Political Philosophy*, Lecture 15. Yale University.

The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English

The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English is available online at www.talkbank.org. The following two excerpts were used in this dissertation as data.

SBCSAE CHA06

SBCSAE CHA08

The English as a Lingua Franca Corpus

2011 Semester 1 Sound File 2

References

Ajimer, Karin (2002). *English Discourse Particles*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Ajimer, Karin, Ad Foolen & Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen (2006). Pragmatic Markers in Translation: A Methodological Proposal. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 101-114. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Bangerter, Adrian & Herbert Clark (2003). Navigating joint projects with dialogue. *Cognitive Science* 27, 195-225.

Bangerter, Adrian, Herbert Clark & Anna Katz (2004). Navigating joint projects in telephone conversations. *Discourse Processes* 37, 1-23.

Bazzanella, Carla (2006). Discourse markers in Italian: Towards a "compositional" meaning. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to discourse particles*, 449-464. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Beach, Wayne (1990). Language as an in Technology: Facilitating Topic Organization in a Videotext Focus Group Meeting. In M. J. Madhurst, A. Gonzalez and T. R. Peterson (eds.), *Communication & the Culture of Technology*, 197-220. Pullman: Washington State University Press.

Beach, Wayne (1993). Transitional regularities for 'causal' "okay" usages. *Journal of Pragmatics* 19, 325-352.

Beach, Wayne (1995a). Preserving and Constraining Options: "Okays" and "Official" Priorities in Medical Interviews. In G. H. Morris & R. J. Chenail (eds.), *The Talk of the Clinic*, 259-290. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Beach, Wayne (1995b). Conversation analysis: "Okay" as a clue for understanding consequentiality. In S. J. Sigman (ed.), *The Consequentiality of Communication*, 121-162. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Billig, Michael (1999a). Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology in conversation analysis. *Discourse and Society* 10, 543-558.

Billig, Michael (1999b). Conversation analysis and the claims of naivety. *Discourse and Society* 10, 572-576.

Blakemore, Diane (2002). *Relevance and Linguistic Meaning*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bolden, Gloria (2006). Little Words That Matter: Discourse Markers "So" and "Oh" and the Doing of Other-Attentiveness in Social Interaction. *Journal of Communication* 56, 661-688.

Bolden, Gloria (2008). Implementing Incipient Actions: The discourse marker "so" in English conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41, 974-998.

Borderia, Salvador P. (2006). A functional approach to the study of discourse markers. Approaches to discourse particles. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 77-100. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Borderia, Salvador P. (2008). Do discourse markers exist? On the treatment of discourse markers in Relevance Theory. *Journal of Pragmatics* 40, 1411-1434.

Boyle, Ronald (2000). Whatever happened to preference organization? *Journal of Pragmatics* 32, 583-604.

Button, Greg (1990). On varieties of closings. In G. Psathas (ed.), *Interaction Competence*, 93-148. Washington, D.C: International institute for ethnomethodology and conversation analysis & University Press of America.

Celce-Murcia, Marianne & Dianne Larsen-Freeman (1999). *The Grammar Book*. 2nd ed. New York: Heinle & Heinle.

Chomsky, Noam (2002). *Syntactic Structures*. 2nd ed. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Condon, Sherri (1986). The discourse functions of OK. *Semiotica* 60, 73-101.

Condon, Sherri (2001). Discourse ok revisited: Default organization in verbal interaction. *Journal of Pragmatics* 33, 491-513.

Culler, Jonathan (1986). *Ferdinand de Saussure*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Drew, Paul (1997). "Open" class repair initiators in response to sequential sources of troubles in conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 28, 69-101.

Drew, Paul & Traci Walker (2009). Going to far: Complaining, escalating and disaffiliation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41, 2400-2414.

Du Bois, John & Robert Englebretson (2004). *Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English, Part 3*. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.

Du Bois, John & Robert Englebretson (2005). *Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English, Part 4*. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.

Du Bois, John, Wallace Chafe, Charles Meyer, & Sandra Thompson (2000). *Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English, Part 1*. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.

Du Bois, John, Wallace Chafe, Charles Meyer, Sandra Thompson & Nii Martey (2003). *Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English, Part 2*. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.

Eggins, Suzanne & Dianne Slade (1997). *Analysing Casual Conversation*. Oakville: Equinox.

Filipi, Anna & Roger Wales (2003). Differential uses of okay, right, and alright, and their function in signaling perspective shift or maintenance in a map task. *Semiotica* 147, 429-455.

Firth, Alan (1996). The discursive accomplishment of normality: On 'lingua franca' English and conversation analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics* 26, 237-259.

Fischer, Kerstin (2006a). Towards an understanding of the spectrum of approaches to discourse particles: introduction to the volume. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 1-21. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Fischer, Kerstin (2006b). Frames, constructions, and invariant meanings: the functional polysemy of discourse particles. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 427-448. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Fraser, Bruce (2006). Towards a theory of discourse markers. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 189-204. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Gaines, Paul (2011). The multifunctionality of discourse operator okay: Evidence from a police interview. *Journal of Pragmatics* 43, 3291-3315.

Goffman, Erving (1981). *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Haegeman, Lilianne (1994). *Introduction to Government and Binding Theory*. 2nd ed. New York: Blackwell.

Haight, Jonathan (2012). *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon.

Halliday, Michael A. K. (2004). *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.

Halliday, Michael A. K. (2009). *The Essential Halliday*. J. Webster (ed.). New York: Continuum.

Halliday, Michael A. K. & Ruqaiya Hasan (1976). *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.

Hansen, Maj-Brit Mosegaard (1998). *The Function of Discourse Particles*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Hansen, Maj-Brit Mosegaard (2006). A dynamic polysemy approach to the lexical semantics of discourse markers (with an exemplary analysis of French toujours). In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 21-42. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Heinemann, Trine (2009). Two answers to inapposite inquiries. In J. Sidnell (ed.), *Conversation Analysis: Comparative Perspectives*, 159-186. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Heritage, John (1984). A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement. In J. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of Social Action*, 299-345. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Heritage, John (1998). Oh-prefaced responses to inquiry. *Language and Society* 27, 291-334.

Heritage, John & Maxwell Atkinson (1984). Introduction. In J. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of Social Action*, 1-16. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchby, Ian & Robin Wooffitt (2008). *Conversation Analysis*. 2nd Ed. Malden: Polity.

James, Allen (1983). Well in reporting clauses: meaning and form of a 'lexical filler'. *Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik* 8, 33-40.

James, Deborah (1972). Some aspects of the syntax and semantics of interjections. *Proceedings of the annual meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society* 8, 162-172.

James, Deborah (1973). Another look at, say, some grammatical constraints on, oh, interjections and hesitations. *Proceedings of the annual meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society* 9, 242-251.

Jenkins, Jennifer (2000). *The Phonology of English as an International Language: New Models, New Goals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, Jennifer (2002). A Sociolinguistically-based, Empirically Researched Pronunciation Syllabus for English as an International Language. *Applied Linguistics* 23, 83-103.

Kasper, Gabriel (2009). Locating cognition in second language interaction and learning: Inside the skull or in public view? *International Review of Applied Linguistics (IRAL)* 47, 11-36.

Levinson, Stephen (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, Diana (2006). Discourse markers in English: a discourse-pragmatic view. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 43-61. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Liddicoat, Anthony (2004). The projectability of turn constructional units and the role of prediction in listening. *Discourse Studies* 6, 449-469.

Liddicoat, Anthony (2007). *An Introduction to Conversation Analysis*. New York: Continuum.

Locke, John (1689/1996). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Ed. K. Winkler. New York: Hackett.

Macaulay, Ronald (2000). You know, it depends. *Journal of Pragmatics* 34, 749-767.

Maruyama, Keiichiro (1983). *Soshuuru wo yomu*. Tokyo: Iwanami.

Nunberg, Geoffrey (2006). *Talking Right: How conservatives turned liberalism into a tax-raising, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading, body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show*. New York: Public Affairs.

Nyan, Thanh (2006). From procedural meaning to processing requirement. Approaches to discourse particles. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 167-188. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

O'Neal, George (2010a). Danwa no fuhenkadshi oh no rensatekiichi to imikinou. *Universality and Individuality in Language* 1, 69-85.

O'Neal, George (2010b). The discourse particle okay in base sequence first pair part position. *The Journal of the Study of Modern Society and Culture* 49, 1-16.

O'Neal, George (2011a). The discourse particle so at anchor position in the american television drama Friends: Adumbrating a teleological conversation. *Niigata Studies in Foreign Languages and Cultures* 16, 61-89.

O'Neal, George (2011b). In the first three seconds: The discourse particles okay and so at initial position in monologic iTunes university lectures. *The Journal of the Study of Modern Society and Culture* 52, 167-194.

O'Neal, George (2011c). Daiichi seibun no boutou in okeru danwafuhenkashi well. *Universality and Individuality in Language* 2, 65-89.

O'Neal, George (2013). No need to quit your flapping: The intelligibility of allomorphs with flap /ɾ/ phonemes that substitute for either the /ɹ/ or /l/ phonemes in nonnative speaker English conversations. (In Press)

Pierrehumbert, Janet & Julia Hirschberg (1990). The meaning of intonational contours in the interpretation of discourse. In P. Cohen and J. Morgan (eds.), *Intentions in Communication*, 134-178. Boston: MIT Press.

Pinker, Steven (1994). *The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language*. New York: William Morrow and Company.

Pinker, Steven (1997). *How the Mind Works*. New York: Norton.

Pinker, Steven (2000). *Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language.* New York: Harper Perennial.

Pinker, Steven (2003). *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature*. New York: Penguin.

Pinker, Steven (2008). *The Stuff of Thought*. New York: Penguin Books.

Plato (2004). *Republic*. Ed. C.D.C Reeve. Cambridge: Hackett.

Pomerantz, Anita (1984). Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes. In J. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of Social Action*, 57-101. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Quaglio, Paul (2009). *Television Dialogue: The sitcom Friends vs. natural conversation*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Raymond, Geoffrey (2004). Prompting action: the stand-alone so in ordinary conversation. *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 37, 185-218.

Rendle-Short, Johanna (2000). When "okay" is okay in computer science seminar talk. *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics* 22, 19-33.

Rendle-Short, Johanna (2003). "So what does this show us?": Analysis of the discourse marker 'so' in seminar talk. *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics* 26, 46-62.

Ruhlemann, Christoph (2007). *Conversation in Context*. Sydney: Continuum.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1980). Preliminaries to preliminaries: Can I ask you a question. *Sociological Inquiry* 50, 104-152.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1984). On some questions and ambiguities in conversation. In J. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), Structures of Social Action, 28-52. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1986). The routine as achievement. *Human Studies* 9, 111-151.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1988). Presequences and indirection: Applying speech act theory to ordinary conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 12, 55-62.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1991). Conversation analysis and socially shared cognition. In L. Resnick, J. Levine and S. Teasley (eds.), *Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition*, 150-171. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1992). Repair after next turn: The last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation. *American Journal of Sociology* 97, 1295-1345.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1997). Third turn repair. In G. R. Guy, C. Feagin, D. Schiffrin and J. Baugh (eds.), *Towards a Social Science of Language: Papers in honor of William Labov. Volume 2: Social Interaction and Discourse Structures*, 31-40. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1999a). Schegloff's texts as Billig's data: A critical reply. *Discourse & Society* 10, 558-72.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1999b). Naivete vs. sophistication or discipline vs. self-indulgence: A rejoinder to Billig. *Discourse & Society* 10, 577-82.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2000). When 'others' initiate repair. *Applied linguistics* 21, 205-243.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2007). *Sequence Organization in Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2010). Some other 'Uh(m)'s. *Discourse processes* 47, 130-174.

Schegloff, Emanuel A., Gail Jefferson & Harvey Sacks (1977). The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. *Language* 53, 361-382.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. & Gene Lerner. (2009). Beginning to respond: well-prefaced responses to wh-questions. *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 42, 91-115.

Schiffrin, Deborah (1987). *Discourse Markers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schiffrin, Deborah (2006). Discourse marker research and theory: Revisiting and. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 315-338. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Schourup, Lawrence (1985). *Common Discourse Particles in English Conversation*. New York: Garland.

Schourup, Lawrence (2001). Rethinking well. *Journal of Pragmatics* 33, 1025-1060.

Schourup, Lawrence (2011). The discourse marker now: A relevance-theoretic approach.

Journal of Pragmatics 43, 2100-2129.

Searle, John (1969). *Speech Acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sidnell, Jack (2007). Look-prefaced turns in first and second position: launching, interceding and redirecting action. *Discourse Studies* 9, 387-408.

Sidnell, Jack (2010). *Conversation Analysis*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

Sperber, Dan & Dierdre Wilson (1995). *Relevance: Communication & Cognition*. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Terasaki, Alene (2004). Pre-announcement sequences in conversation. In G. Lerner (ed.), *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, 171-224. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Tokieda, Motoko (1941/2007a). *Kokugogaku genron (jou)*. Tokyo: Iwanami.

Tokieda, Motoki (1941/2007b). *Kokugogaku genron (ge)*. Tokyo: Iwanami.

Urgelles-Coll, Miriam (2011). *The Syntax and Semantics of Discourse Markers*. New York: Continuum.

Vivien, Ler S. L. (2006). A relevance-theoretic approach to discourse particles in Singapore English. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 149-166. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Wagner, Johannes (1996). Foreign language acquisition through interaction—A critical review of research on conversational adjustments. *Journal of Pragmatics* 26, 215-235.

Waltereit, Richard (2006). The rise of discourse markers in Italian: a specific type of language change. In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 61-76. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Weydt, Harald (2006). What are particles good for? In K. Fischer (ed.), *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, 205-218. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Wooffitt, Robitt (2005). *Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Wong, Janice (2000). Delayed next turn repair initiation in native/non-native speaker English conversation. *Applied Linguistics* 21, 244-267.

Wong, Janice & Hansun Zhang Waring. (2010). *Conversation analysis and second language pedagogy: A guide for ESL/ EFL teachers*. New York: Routledge.

Young, Richard & Jina Lee (2004). Identifying units in interaction: Reactive tokens in

Korean and English Conversations. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 8, 38