

# COMPARATIVE JAPANESE AND CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S.

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to compare Japanese foreign policies, in particular, security and military policies with Canadian ones in order to find something which the Japanese could and should learn from Canadians. In the comparison, special focus is put on both countries' relations with the United States.

For Canada, the United States is one of the most important country. They have a long boundary in common. The intercourse of the two countries is tremendous, which is shown in the recent conclusion of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

For Japan, although the Pacific Ocean lies between Japan and the United States, the United States is the most important country in almost all aspects, including political, economic and security ones.

In the security field, Canada is a member of NATO and she has the NORAD Agreement with the United States. Japan also has a bilateral security treaty with the United States. Canada and Japan are both the countries allied with the United States. Canada and Japan are geographically in the similar position of lying between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are three reasons why I am addressing this issue here and now.

First, I have been wondering for a long time why the foreign policy of Canada has been so independent and autonomous from the United States in comparison with Japanese foreign policy, in spite of the similar strategic and geopolitical situation. What makes this difference? Where

does this difference come from?

Secondly, as symbolized by the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the political and security situation in Europe is radically and rapidly changing. As a corollary, the nature and *raison d'être* of NATO is changing. Canada is a member of NATO and has soldiers stationed in Europe. Is Canada going to change its policy toward NATO and, if so, how will the policy change?

In Asia and the Pacific region, the situation is not changing so rapidly or radically as in Europe, because of the difference in the pattern of the confrontations. What should we learn from Europe in order to stabilize and democratize the Asia and Pacific region?

Thirdly, 1990 marks the 30th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which constitutes the central framework of both the Japan-U.S. relationship and Japanese foreign policy. Under the influence of relaxed East-West relations, the argument for reevaluation of the Treaty is very popular now in Japan. It also will result in the reevaluation of the Japan-U.S. relationship in general.

The best seller last year was the book titled "The Japan That Can Say No", which argues that Japan should say "No" to the United States when it is necessary. That is, in essence, the authors argue that Japan should be more independent from the United States. Many Japanese agree with this proposition.

It is a very critical issue for the Japanese to choose what kind of relationship we should have with the United States. I think that in this respect Canada's experiences are very useful, because Canada has had a more independent relationship with the United States than Japan has.

## I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

On August 15, 1945, after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted an unconditional surrender and was occupied by the United States. This is the beginning of the Japan's dependence on the U.S. In contrast, Canada was among the winners of the war, and Canada and the U.S. were allied members of the United Nations in wartime.

On May 5, 1947, a new Japanese Constitution entered into force. It

requires democracy, pacifism and protection of human rights. As to pacifism, Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates, as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign right of a nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of state will not be recognized.

Article 9 of the Constitution has had a strong impact on the Japanese military policy, although now we have big military forces.

On April 4, 1949, NATO was established, with Canada participating as an original member. Canada played an important role in establishing NATO.

On September 8, 1951, a Treaty of Peace was signed by Japan and the Allied Powers, including Canada and the U.S. At the same time, the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States was signed. Under this old Security Treaty, the U.S. had virtually unlimited rights to military bases and operations without any clear commitment to defend Japan. In a sense, it was an extension of the occupation. In return for recovery of independence as a state, Japan could do nothing but accept the Security Treaty. Both treaties entered into force on April 28, 1952.

As to the establishment and increase in military forces in Japan, in spite of the stipulation of the Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, MacArthur, ordered the make-up of the police reserve forces in 1950 at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. They were renamed as security forces in 1952 and developed into the self-defense forces in 1954 with 111,200 persons.

In August 1958, Canada and the United States signed a plan for a joint air defense (NORAD), and the following year, they agreed to a Defense Production Sharing Program. By these arrangements, Canada's military dependence on the U.S. was increased.

On January 19, 1960, the new Security Treaty between Japan and the United States was signed and entered into force on June 23, 1960. At that time, there was the strongest public demonstration in Japanese history against the conclusion of the Treaty because there was fear that the

Treaty would make Japanese people the target of the Soviet attack, which would otherwise be non-existent.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations, stipulates, in article 5, as follows:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

This Japan-U.S. security arrangement was placed within the framework of the United Nations Charter just like the North Atlantic Treaty. Some of the inequalities in the old treaty were eliminated, and the new treaty formalized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. But under the constraint of the Constitution, which does not permit Japan to have the right of collective self-defense, the Treaty applies only in the territories under the administration of Japan. It is one-sided in the sense that Japan has no obligation to exercise the right of collective self-defense when armed attack occurs against the United States.

## II RESTRAINTS AGAINST JAPANESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

As is shown in article 9 of the Constitution, regretting the militarism before and during World War II, pacifism is one of the most fundamental principles for the Japanese government and Japanese people.

Firstly, although in connection with the establishment and growth of the self-defense forces, the interpretation of the article 9 was changed to permit the existence of defensive forces under the Constitution, sending the self-defense forces abroad has not been permitted. Article 9 has been interpreted by the Japanese Government to mean that Japan does not have the right of collective self-defense, and that is the reason why we are reluctant to send forces for the peace-keeping operations under the United Nations.

Secondly, we have the three non-nuclear principles. That is, we will

not maintain, produce or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.

These principles, reflecting in part the feeling of nuclear allergy of the Japanese people caused by the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were adopted by the Government at the time of the conclusion of the agreement for reversion of Okinawa in 1971 and in part, to make the non-nuclear status of Okinawa certain.

The first two principles are included in the obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which Japan has signed and ratified. The third principle, non-introduction of nuclear weapons, has a special meaning to Japan, because many nuclear weapons have been deployed in European allied countries and also in South Korea and the Philippines, in order to secure the nuclear umbrella of the U.S.

Also, no nuclear weapons are deployed in Canada. In February 1985 when a secret plan for nuclear deployment was revealed, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Clark, strongly objected to the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Canadian soil, and said it was a national principle not to permit deployment of nuclear weapons, although cruise missile flight tests were permitted because of their non-nuclear warheads.

In the course of implementation of the third principle, the Japanese government has made it clear that this principle applies not only to the deployment on soil but also in the case of port-call or passage in territorial waters.

Also the Japanese government believes that the U.S. ships have no nuclear weapons when they call at ports or pass through territorial waters. But 70 to 80% of Japanese people do not believe in the government assurance, because the U.S. employs the principle that they will neither deny nor confirm the existence of nuclear weapons on their ships.

Thirdly, we have the one percent of GNP ceiling for the military budget. This was decided by the Cabinet in 1976 when the National Defense Program Outline was created, in order to put a cap on military expenditures. This one percent ceiling has been kept by the government for years, although in 1987 it was officially abandoned.

Although a one percent ceiling would seem to be very effective in putting a cap on military expenditures, the Japanese military budget has increased twice in ten years, because the Japanese GNP has been increasing by 6 to 7% every year.

Fourthly, we have three principles of non-export of weapons. Originally, in 1967, the principles included the prohibition of export of weapons to (1) communist countries, (2) countries to which United Nations resolutions prohibit export of weapons, and (3) countries which are or likely to be parties to international conflicts, but the principles have developed into an all-out ban of export of weapons.

In 1983, the Japanese Government decided that the United States should be an exception to these principles and began giving military technology to the U.S.

### III JAPANESE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

As an allied country, and as its economic and technical power has been developing, Japan has been obliged to maintain military cooperation with the United States.

Firstly, in November 1978, both governments adopted the Japan-U.S. Guide-lines for Defense Cooperation, under which the U.S. and Japanese military entered into joint planning relating not only to the defense of Japan but also to the security of the Far East. In essence, it makes it clear that the self-defense forces of Japan and military forces of the United States are mutually complementary.

Secondly, in 1980, the Japanese Marine Self-Defense Forces initiated what has become regular participation in the RIMPAC joint exercise, in which naval and air forces units from the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand also participate. In 1990, the Republic of Korea also participated.

Thirdly, in 1981, under the strong pressure from the United States, the Prime Minister assumed the role to protect the sea lanes out to 1000 miles.

Fourthly, as I said before, in 1983, the Prime Minister made an exception to the three principles of non-export of weapons in order to make it possible for the United States to receive military high-technology.

Fifthly, in 1985, in response to the United States' invitation to join the research phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI), Japan decided

to participate in the program, although Canada refused to participate at the government level.

Lastly, the issue of the burden-sharing is coming to the front as the Japanese economy is developing smoothly while the United States is suffering from twin deficits. The argument of "free ride", that is, Japan has derived a good share of its competitive advantage from artificially low defense expenditures, has gained considerable currency and political salience. Japan is now sharing about 40% of all U.S. expenditures for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

#### IV PUBLIC OPINION ON THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY

Public opinion surveys on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were made this May both in Japan and the United States (Asahi Shinbun, May 31, 1990), and I take up some of the surveys which show some fundamental aspects.

(1) The Security Treaty... Do you think that the Treaty is useful for your country?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	48%	54%
no	23%	36%
neither	18%	—
others,n/a	11%	10%

(2) Dependence on the United States... Should Japan continue the policy that Japan will not increase military power and depend on U.S. military forces and nuclear weapons?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	31%	22%
no	40%	71%
neither	18%	2%
others,n/a	11%	4%

(3) Sea Lane Protection... Is it necessary for Japan to protect sea lanes for oil because Japan is importing 70% of oil from the Middle East?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	47%	59%
no	34%	36%
others,n/a	19%	5%

(4) Soviet's Threat... Do you agree the opinion that as the Soviet's threat is decreasing, it's not necessary for Japan to increase her defence powers?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	50%	62%
no	30%	32%
others,n/a	20%	6%

(5) Burden Sharing... Japan now shares 40% of expenditures of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Should Japan share more and decrease the burden of the U.S.?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	16%	78%
no	71%	18%
others,n/a	13%	4%

(6) Japan's Threat... Do you agree the opinion that rapid increase of Japan's defense expenditures would make people in the U.S. and Asia feel that Japan might start military expansion?

	Japan	U.S.
yes	48%	60%
no	38%	38%
others,n/a	14%	2%

Although we can draw many comments from the surveys, I restrict myself to just one comment. In supporting the existence of the Security Treaty, a lot of people in both countries want Japanese independence from the United States without turning Japan into big military power.

## V CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICIES INDEPENDENT FROM THE UNITED STATES

In comparison with the Japanese foreign policies, Canadian foreign policies seem to have been more independent from the United States, in spite of the similar security and geopolitical situation of both countries.



The following are some examples where Canada's foreign policies are free from the influence of the United States and sometimes against the United States' will.

Firstly, in constructing NATO in 1949, it is said that Canada's role in establishing NATO to ward off the Soviet threat to Europe appeared to be that of a middle power, acting in the international interest, not that of a minor power acting in the wake of the U.S. initiative. Canada also cited Article 51 of the Charter and pressed for U.S. commitment to an organization that would embrace economic, social and political as well as military functions.

Secondly, at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, when it was clear that the United States would respond with military forces to the North Korean invasion, Canada, through diligent diplomacy and later military contribution, sought as a priority to channel American action through the multilateral framework of the United Nations.

Thirdly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, visited the Soviet Union in 1955, as the first visitor among the foreign ministers of NATO countries. His visit induced not only a relaxation in the East-West relationship but also the conclusion of a Canada-Soviet trade agreement.

Fourthly, with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Canada refused to support U.S. policy, and continued formal diplomatic relations with the Cuban government, in spite of strong pressure from the U.S.

Fifthly, in 1965, Prime Minister Pearson called for a pause, at an appropriate time, in the American bombing of North Vietnam.

Sixthly, in May 1968, the Canadian government announced it was seeking diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and supported its admission to the China seat in the United Nations. The action preceded a U.S. move in the same direction.

Seventhly, on April 3, 1969, Canada announced its decision and reduced forces stationed in NATO's central European theatre by half, began to phase out its nuclear role, and moved its remaining 5000-men contingent and three aircraft squadrons to reserve status, by dismissing American objections that a reduction of Canadian forces would fuel demands for similar U.S. action and British complaints that it would merely shift the defence burden onto the U.K.

Lastly, in 1985, when the United States invited many western

states to participate in research phase of the Strategic Defense initiative (SDI), Canada refused to participate at the government level, although Japan was willing to.

## CONCLUSION

The first reason why Canadian foreign policy in connection with the United States has been more independent than Japanese foreign policy derives from the fact that Canada was a winner and Japan was a loser of the second world war. While Canada was an original member of the United Nations, Japan was admitted to the U.N. in 1956.

As a nation occupied by the United States, it is natural that Japanese military and security policy was almost completely dependent on the U.S. in the early years after the second world war. Even after Japan recovered its independence, *de facto* occupation by the U.S. continued under the old Security Treaty. Although the new Security Treaty of 1960 rectified some aspects of dependence, it also reflected Japanese military and security subordination to the United States.

Since forty-five years have passed after the second world war, it is time for Japan to search for and take a more independent foreign policy, even in the military and security fields.

The second reason comes from the personal aspects. The prime ministers of Canada, especially Mr. Pearson and Mr. Trudeau, have had the tendency to be more internationally-oriented and more concerned with international issues, compared with Japanese prime ministers. Generally speaking, the prime ministers of Japan have been concerned with nothing but domestic problems, and in some cases only with their own constituents.

We need a prime minister who is more internationally-oriented and has his own idea of world order.

The third reason, which is the most important and critical, emerged from the difference between the styles of foreign policy, that is, Japan's bilateralism and Canada's multilateralism. While the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is bilateral, NATO is a multilateral organization.

While Japan's foreign policy is in almost all cases directed to and influenced by the United States, though Japan has three pillars of for-

eign policy, that is, it is a member of western democratic society, a member of Asian countries and has positive support for the United Nations, Canada's foreign policy, although strongly affected by the U.S., has much wider variety of options.

This is because Japan has only one friend, the United States, and the relationship between the two countries is sometimes expressed as a master and servant relationship. In contrast, Canada, besides the U.S., has close relationships with the United Kingdom and other nations of the Commonwealth of Nations, for example, India and Australia.

What is urgently needed for Japan is that it conduct more multi-lateral foreign policy and make more friends in the world and in the United Nations.

After the Iraqi invasion into and occupation of Kuwait and the adoption of the resolutions by the United Nations to apply sanctions against Iraq, the Japanese government is looking for the ways in which Japan can contribute to international peace and security. As an economic superpower, Japan should help the United Nations by contributing more money, and in order to play its international role Japan should do more than send money.

When Japan sends persons for international peace and security, Japan should take a multilateral approach and send persons under the United Nations auspices in accordance with the request from the United Nations. In the case of the Gulf crisis, the Japanese government's approach seems to me just to correspond to the request from the United States, not the United Nations, and is following the bilateral approach as before.

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