2024-05-26T09:15:30Z
https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00027160
2022-12-15T03:56:48Z
163:164:1432:1442
453:456
On the Unique Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests
On the Unique Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests
Yamazaki, Takeshi
158446
Contest
Rent Seeking
Nash Equilibrium
Uniqueness
There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent-seeking contest. First, the effectiveness of agent's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent-seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. Without assuming that each player's production function for lotteries is differentiable, Yamazaki (2008) proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a general rent-seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players. In this article, assuming the differentiability of each player's production function for lotteries, we give a simple proof of Yamazaki's (2008) result.
departmental bulletin paper
2013-09
application/pdf
新潟大学経済論集
95
99
115
新潟大学経済論集
AN00183269
02861569
https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/27160/files/95_99_115.pdf
eng