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Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection
Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection
Okuguchi, Koji
54039
Lobbying
protection
tariff
Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998) generalized Long and Soubeyran's lobbying model of protection. They also constructed a simple numerical example with the linear inverse demand and cost functions to illustrate a paradoxical result in which entry of a new domestic firm leads to an increase in the domestic incumbents' profits. This paper shows that the paradoxical result occurs even if cost functions are quadratic. Numerical examples in this paper, together with the one in Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998), indicate that the paradoxical result is more likely if the number of domestic firms is small and if the number of foreign firms is large.
departmental bulletin paper
岐阜聖徳学園大学
1999-07
application/pdf
Review of economics and information studies
1
27
35
Review of economics and information studies
AA11833171
13453998
https://niigata-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/6714/files/110000971630.pdf
eng
http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110000971630
Copyright(C)2001岐阜聖徳学園大学
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